On Dec 3, 2008, at 5:02 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> I struggle with the question of what a platonic object actually is,
> even for something very simple. Let's say the implementation of a
> circle supports roundness in the same way that a certain computation
> supports consciousness. We can easily think of many ways a circle can
> be represented in the real world, but which of these should we think
> of when considering the platonic object? Is it possible to point to
> platonic square and say it isn't round, or does the square support
> roundness implicitly since it could be considered a circle
> transformed? And is there any reason not to consider roundness as a
> basic platonic object in itself, perhaps with circles somehow
> supervening on roundness rather than the other way around?

I see what you mean. But I'm uncomfortable with (what I perceive as)  
the resulting vagueness in the platonic view of consciousness. You've  
indicated that you think of consciousness as fundamentally  
computational and Platonic - that's it's an essential side-effect of  
platonic computations, as addition is the essential side-effect of the  
sum of two-numbers. But if we don't have a clear conception of  
"platonic computations", do we even really know what we're talking  
about? I'm worried, essentially, that the move to Platonia "solves"  
the problems created by these thought experiments only by creating a  
view of consciousness that's too vague to allow such problems to arise.

-- Kory

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