On 28/12/2008, at 12:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> With
> Everett everything becomes clearer: nature does not collapse the wave,
> and thus, does not provide any examples of a machine generating truly
> random events. Randomness appears in the mind of the multiplied
> observers, exactly like in the mechanical self-duplication experience.
> That is why Everett and comp fits so well together.

Here I feel I finally understand the kernel of comp. The outcome of  
any measurement is always subject to the 1 indeterminacy, which we  
read as "random"

In fact "random" is itself a product of OUR unavoidable uncertainty,  
non? TRUE random would admit the white rabbits; like the dice  
disappearing after we throw them

> Of course Everett could be wrong, and comp could be wrong, and
> naturalism could be right: but it is up to the naturalist to say what
> is the machine's atomic operation that a Turing machine cannot
> complete. If it is the generation of a truly random event, and if this
> is based on the wave collapse, then I can understand (but you will
> have to solve all the problem raised by the collapse, you will have to
> abandon the theory of relativity like Bohm and Bell suggested, etc.).
> Or you say like Searle that "only special machine can think:
> biological brain".

If Searle (and Penrose) are right, then why not a simple biological  
brain transplant? Why bother with looking for "the right substitution  
level" at all in this case?
Just pilfer a wet, messy brain from a road accident victim and shove  
it into your skull. But where would we now stand with respect to the  

I asked my partner today whether she felt she would be the same person  
after receiving a biological brain transplant and she said "Of course  
not! I would now be the dead person whose brain I have inherited. Who  
I am is generated only by MY brain." Proves she is a materialist/ 
physicalist, I guess. We all know people like this. Sigh.

I then asked her if she would feel herself to be the same person after  
a digi-brain transplant. She responded that this was maybe possible,  
but she felt dubious about it.

Would there in fact be any difference? After all, we are assuming that  
wet, messy brains and digi-brains are equivalent, all things considered?

> In that case we have to suppose something very
> special about the brain: it generates consciousness.

This made me laugh out loud. I just love it when you say things like  
this. Perhaps we must give up on the notion that personhood has  
anything at all to do with a brain?

> But this is just
> a blocking argument: it could be interesting only if it points on
> something special in the brain that a digital machine cannot imitate.
> Without such specification it is just equivalent with the *assumption*
> that the brain is not a digital machine.

Enter the soul, enter religion - enter the supernatural. Hummmph!!



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