Stathis, common sense, not always applicable to math-related topics is startled before a task on a REGULAR contraption-type Turing machine (binary, electrically driven finite hardware etc.) can emulate ALL the potentials of 11+billion neurons in unrestricted groupings and unlimited connectivities as to the complexity of all the codes/details (un!)imaginable. (Maybe if you change to Bruno's infinite Loebian vs. Turing machine...?? I doubt if you can do that, since there are different brains (eg for genetical etc. reasons) and I cannot figure so many (although limited number) variables in the 'unrestricted' (all encompassing?) Loebian machines.) * To Brent's remark: The 'sequence vs. time' is not trivial, it has its intricacies: considering an 'open' time-scale your 'sequence' may follow up some sequencing steps in nanosecs, others in lightyears. Principally it is all 'time', yet no time-systemic temporality. * Spacetime is harder: the hard-problem (thought) part works easily in a_temporal - a_spatial conditions where sequence IS yet included, however spatial restrictions much less. E.g. plunging into the inter-universe teleporting it is hard to figure out spatial conditions 'between' universes. How far is U3 from U145? Does Multiverse have a space-system? * Ccness? what type? I find even Bruno's version restricted, although my version (response to infirmation) is applicable in computing, I just figure more planes than just Platonic (i.e. numerical? math?) objects.
John On Tue, Jan 13, 2009 at 6:49 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>wrote: > > 2009/1/13 Brent Meeker <[email protected]>: > > > In human consciousness, as instantiated by brains, there is a process in > which > > signal/information is not local, it is distributed in spacetime and is > connected > > causally which means, per relativity, that you cannot make any unique > spacelike > > snapshot and label it "the state". I don't go so far as to claim that > > consciousness *must be* instantiated in this way, but I think there must > be > > something that makes the "states" part of a process - not just snapshots. > Bruno > > gets around the problem of defining states by assuming a digital Turing > like > > process, but then he has to provide something besides spacetime to make > the set > > of states a sequence; which is he does by invoking the requirement that > they be > > a computation. I have some doubts as to whether this is enough, but at > least it > > is something. > > It comes down to whether the brain is Turing emulable. If it is, then > I see no problem describing it in terms of a sequence of discrete > states. The question then arises whether the causal links between the > states in an intact digital computer are necessary to give rise to > consciousness, which is what I thought you were claiming, or whether > the same states in disconnected fashion would achieve the same thing. > Opponents of computationalism such as John Searle have argued that if > a Turing machine can give rise to consciousness then the disconnected > states would also have to give rise to consciousness, which is then > taken as a reductio against computationalism. The alternative way, > saving computationalism, is, I think, Bruno's: it isn't the physical > states giving rise to consciousness, but the computation as Platonic > object. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
