On 19/01/2009, at 9:58 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 18-janv.-09, à 11:32, Kim Jones a écrit :
>> On 18/01/2009, at 4:38 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>> I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are
>>> Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal
>> supernatural causal links
> All right, if you define "supernatural causal links" by the "natural"
> relation existing among "natural" numbers (or other finite things).
> Assuming comp, of course.
But Brent was momentarily speaking of materialism - materialism
doesn't acknowledge any form of comp "immateriality" except according
to the (probably) false mind/body dualism, where the mind is allowed
to be an ethereal emanation of the brain. But that's not even
immateriality in your specific sense - that's popular superstition.
You've cured me of that. Mind is computation; matter is computation -
consciousness is not unique in the sense of some special pleading that
allows it to avoid Turing emulability.
> That "natural supernatural" is really "super" in the sense that, as a
> machine or number, we cannot prove or known all the relations from
> which physics and nature emerge or supervene on.
Once comp is assumed this follows, yes.
> Kim, (and others) are you OK with the first person indeterminacy
I am happy to move on from this now. I cannot see how there can be a
way of distinguishing any of my copies.
> Are you ok that, from a first person point of view, throwing a coin
> self-duplication are identical or isomorphic experience?
The two appear fundamentally the same process apart from the numbers
of atoms involved
> And, do you agree that introducing delays does not change the
> expectations (the probabilities, or the credibilities) used for the
> first person indeterminacy?
Discussion over the last few days points has circled around this;
personally, I now accept that "I" only exist when my conscious mind is
up and running. During delays in teleportation my conscious mind
cannot run on any hardware so I have no way of experiencing the delay.
In fact the delay makes no difference to the outcome from my
In step 6 every consistent extension is now virtual but this makes no
difference to my belief that I am the same person I was before
teleportation since I anticipate a consistent extension and that is
what I experience. All that the experiment has to do is match my
expectations with a consistently logical and convincing reality and I
am prepared every time to say "This is real and this is happening to
me" despite delays, annihilated originals, virtual renderings etc. As
long as I am convinced by the environment I find myself in, I am
prepared to bet that it is causally connected to the one (I
experienced) before it - which I guess it would be even if it were an
unconvincing low-res simulation.
> Take all you time, but if you can ask some question, it will help me
> prepare the answer. If UDA1..6 is well understood, meaning that there
> is no more question, I will try to imagine a way to explain step 7,
> this without getting in the mathematical details (if that is
This is the hard part! Still, I feel that I can intuit it. This is
where you show how physics arises from number. Also how the Multiverse
and MWI find their place in comp.
> I know that sometimes, things can seems so incomprehensible that
> cannot even ask any question.
Not incomprehensible - just counter-intuitive. It's a mind-boggling
exercise and up to here I do not feel you are losing any explanatory
power by cutting back on the maths.
> In that case, tell me know that it is too
> much incomprehensible, and it will be my duty to make things even more
> clearer .... until the "ah ah" (meaning "I understand or I have find
- I did get a brief case of the "Ah Ah" (meaning I understand) when I
read this article recently:
Our world may be a giant hologram - space - 15 January 2009 - New
Surely the discovery of the graininess of spacetime adds weight to the
physics/psychology reversal of comp?
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