Le 18-janv.-09, à 11:32, Kim Jones a écrit :
> > > On 18/01/2009, at 4:38 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > >>> >>> I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are >>> incompatible, >>> though. >> >> Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal >> links? >> >> Brent >> >> > > > supernatural causal links All right, if you define "supernatural causal links" by the "natural" relation existing among "natural" numbers (or other finite things). Assuming comp, of course. That "natural supernatural" is really "super" in the sense that, as a machine or number, we cannot prove or known all the relations from which physics and nature emerge or supervene on. Kim, (and others) are you OK with the first person indeterminacy issue? Are you ok that, from a first person point of view, throwing a coin and self-duplication are identical or isomorphic experience? And, do you agree that introducing delays does not change the expectations (the probabilities, or the credibilities) used for the first person indeterminacy? Take all you time, but if you can ask some question, it will help me to prepare the answer. If UDA1..6 is well understood, meaning that there is no more question, I will try to imagine a way to explain step 7, and this without getting in the mathematical details (if that is possible). I know that sometimes, things can seems so incomprehensible that people cannot even ask any question. In that case, tell me know that it is too much incomprehensible, and it will be my duty to make things even more clearer .... until the "ah ah" (meaning "I understand or I have find an error". Best, Bruno > > enter the hand wavers > > Kim > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
