On 07 Feb 2009, at 04:47, Kim Jones wrote:

>  (see Broukère 1982),

It is (see de Brouckère 1982) Note the "c", and the "de".

>  Phenomena of genetic regulation with regard to mechanism are  
> eloquent [elegant?=poss. error:] Kim)

It is "eloquent" (indeed). Perhaps it would be clearer to say:  
"Phenomena of genetic regulation are eloquent with regard to Mechanism".
Mechanism is "Mechanist Philosophy" and so a capital M is better  
suited (I am afraid that you are not just translating my 1994 thesis,  
but you are correcting it ! Well, don't worry, this can be done at a  
second pass.

I have no other remark. Excellent job. I guess that now I have not  
escape but to seriously introduce you to math for respecting the deal.  
Good move Kim :)

This will be done asap, through little posts. The plan is:  Numbers  
==> functions ===> computable functions ===> computations ===> the  
seventh step (of the UDA).



> (Jacob and Monod 1961, Thomas 1978, Thomas and van Ham 1974).
> Here again is what Diderot said in his conversation with d'Alembert,  
> in confronting Cartesian mechanism and the development of the embryo:
> "Do you see this egg? With this, one can upend every school of  
> theology and every temple on Earth. What is this egg? Before the  
> germ (of life) is introduced, no more than an insensate mass; and  
> after it's introduction, what is it then? An insensate mass, since  
> the germ itself is but an inert and coarse fluid. How might this  
> mass progress to another form of organisation, toward the sensation  
> of feeling, toward life itself? By warmth. What produces this  
> warmth? Movement. What will be the successive effects of movements?  
> Instead of my response, sit here and together we will follow these  
> movements from moment to moment. Starting with a point that  
> oscillates, a thread that extends and gathers colour, to the flesh  
> which forms; a beak, tiny wing-ends, eyes, feet appear; a yellow- 
> tinged matter that divides and which produces intestines; behold an  
> animal. An animal that moves, becomes agitated, sounds its voice; I  
> hear its squawking through the shell; it grows its downy coat; it  
> sees. The weight of its head, which bobs back and forth, unceasingly  
> brings its beak against the inner rampart of its prison; this now  
> breaks; it leaves, it walks, it flies, it registers irritation, it  
> flees, it returns, it complains, it suffers, it loves, it desires,  
> it experiences joy; it possesses each of your affects; all of your  
> actions, it can perform them all. Can you claim, with Descartes that  
> it is no more than a purely imitative machine? In that case, tiny  
> children laugh at you with derision and the philosophers' rejoinder  
> is that if such is a machine, then you are but another." {footnote 6}
> (Footnote 6: We note here the essentially modernist mindset of  
> Diderot who places the animal on the same rung as the human, thus  
> rejecting Descartes' distinction. In general, with the notable  
> exception of La Mettrie, mechanism will face a poor reception. This  
> brings to mind Pascal's argument. This genre of "argument" is not  
> all that far from what Turing called "head in the sand objection"  
> qualifying more as "consolation" than refutation. (Turing 1950)
> The contemporary biologist may surmise that - relative to the laws  
> of chemistry - the problem of biological reproduction is solved. The  
> discovery by biochemists and molecular geneticists of the plan or  
> description of the cell and the fashion by which this map is  
> chemically represented, decoded and executed within the organism  
> constitutes cause for the application of the Principle of Unique  
> Reassembly, the Determining Principle and the Limiting Hierachical  
> Principle (this last appearing already with classical genetics, see  
> Cuny 1969). In the same way, the older discovery of the importance  
> of particle exchanges with the surrounding environment or between  
> organisms - as happens during breathing, during digestion, during  
> conception, favours the application of the Locality Principle (Van  
> Helmont, Mendel, Lavoisier, Vesale - to cite the more well known  
> ones; see de Broukère 1982, Ambroselli et al 1987, Vesale 1543).
> 1.1.5 Doubts Arising from Chemistry
> Watson has said "the cell obeys the laws of chemistry", and the  
> preceding incentives perhaps justify a belief in indexical mechanism  
> relative to those laws. If these laws prove themselves to be non- 
> mechanisable, mechanism will thereby find itself weakened, perhaps  
> even refuted but certainly relativised.
> This suggestion is all the more well-founded in that the laws of  
> chemistry are captured by quantum mechanics. Despite its name  
> ("mechanics" is here used in the Newtonian sense), philosophers and  
> theologians are attracted to QM and see in the factual descriptions  
> (up to here confirmed) of this theory an empirical justification of  
> the non-mechanist nature of the world and/or of consciousness.  
> {footnote 7}
> (Footnote 7: Letovski 1987 takes up a (too?) rare encounter between  
> cognitivists open to computational approaches to consciousness and  
> neuroscientists open to the use of QM to resolve the brain/mind gap.)
> Anti-mechanist arguments founded on QM are various. We shall briefly  
> examine several:
> a) The oldest argument: QM provides evidence of an intrinsic  
> indeterminism in the world (or more precisely concerning the  
> relations between the observer and the world. Mechanism is  
> determinist. Thus, our relation to the world is not mechanist.
> Those who use this argument are tempted to "explain" such a free  
> interpretation by means of this indeterminism. This argument has  
> already been refuted by Carnap or Mackay or Schroedinger. In  
> addition, I will show that mechanism *is not* determinist.
> a) The most recent argument: QM makes possible very particular forms  
> of material, for example the quasi-crystals of Penrose and Schectman  
> (see Penrose 1989). Penrose suggests, though without any seeming  
> conviction, that the brain could be a *sort* of quasi-crystal.  
> Similarly, Margenau 1984 and Squires 1990 seek to utilise QM to  
> develop a dualist and non-mechanist theory of the mind (see also  
> Stapp 1993).
> The following arguments merit close and detailed examination since  
> the (indexical) mechanist hypothesis considerably clarifies them. To  
> this end, I will make use of a bare minimum of assumed quantum  
> mechanical knowledge to allow the reader to follow the argument.
> Newton conceived of matter and light as constituted of particles  
> interacting with one another. Huygens was more prepared to reserve  
> this way of seeing things for matter alone. He develops a successful  
> wave theory of light which takes account of a number of luminous  
> phenomena. Einstein will provide evidence, in his work on the photo- 
> electric effect, of the corpuscular aspect of light, without  
> dethroning the wave theory in the process. He also arrives at the  
> quantum theory of light. De Broglie extends the wave-particle aspect  
> of light to matter.  This permits the taking into account of the  
> behaviour of electrons in Bohr's description of atoms and signals  
> the birth of the quantum theory of matter.
> (to be cont.)
> K
> Email:
> kimjo...@ozemail.com.au
> Web:
> http://web.mac.com/kmjcommp/Plenitude_Music
> Phone:
> (612) 9389 4239  or  0431 723 001
> >


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