Not yet. But if you exercise moderate patience I can translate the whole thing within the next two weeks (minus diagrams)
Thanks for the accolade K On 05/02/2009, at 5:37 PM, Hector Zenil wrote: > > This is pretty good. Is there any online source with a complete > version available? > > Thanks. > > > On Thu, Feb 5, 2009 at 7:32 AM, Kim Jones <[email protected]> > wrote: >> Trans. Kim Jones (extract only) >> >> 1.1 Mechanist Philosophies >> 1.1.1 Different types of Mechanism >> I distinguish the following mechanist hypotheses: >> BEHAVIOURIST MECHANISM >> Some machines can behave as thinking beings (living, conscious etc.) >> (BEH-MEC) >> STRONG MECHANISM >> Some machines can think (living beings, conscious beings, have a >> private >> life etc.) (STR-MEC) >> INDEXICAL MECHANISM >> I am a machine (or - you are a machine, or again - human beings are >> machines) (IND-MEC) >> By replacing "machine" by "digital machine" one obtains the >> corresponding >> digital theses. >> The behaviourist digital mechanism BEH-DIG-MEC corresponds largely >> to that >> of Turing in his 1950 article. In the same way, the strong digital >> mechanism >> STR-DIG-MEC corresponds to what is called in the literature the >> strong >> artificial intelligence thesis (strong AI). >> In this work I am exclusively interested in indexical and digital >> mechanism >> (IND-DIG-MEC or just IDM). "Digitality" necessitates Church's >> Thesis, which >> is why the digital aspect is explained in its turn in the second >> part. >> There, I will show how a procedure, due essentially to Goedel, >> permits an >> indexical treatment of machines in general. >> Proposition: >> IND-MEC => STR-MEC => BEH-MEC, and >> BEH-MEC ≠> STR-MEC ≠> IND-MEC. >> (with or without the hypothesis of digitality) >> >> Reasoning: One admits that humans know how to think (conscious >> beings, >> having private lives etc.) In this case IND-MEC entails STR-MEC and >> STR-MEC >> entails BEH-MEC. That BEH-MEC does not entail STR-MEC is supported by >> Weizenbaum (1976) (see also Gunderson {footnote 1} 1971). STR-MEC >> does not >> entail IND-MEC, since the fact that machines are able to think does >> not >> entail that they alone are able to think. It is conceivable that >> machines >> are able to think without we ourselves being machines. Wang (1974) >> presents >> a similar reasoning. Nevertheless, numerous philosophers make >> implicit use >> of an opposing opinion: STR-MEC => IND-MEC, see for example Arsac >> 1987. >> {Footnote 1: Gunderson 1971 criticises the Turing Test. The Turing >> Test is a >> test for BEH-MEC. Simply put, a machine (hidden) passes the test if >> it is >> able to pass itself off as a human being during a "conversation" by >> means of >> a computer keyboard terminal.} >> 1.1.2 Mechanist Philosophy: Historical Summary >> Contemporary digital mechanist philosophy is due in large measure to >> Descartes and Hobbes {footnote 2} (see Rogow 1986, Bernhardt 1989). >> Descartes wanted to distinguish Man from the animals. He argues >> that the >> animal, as much as Man's body (including the brain), is a machine. He >> understood by this a finite assembly of of material components >> that unequivocally determine the behaviour of the whole. Descartes >> surmises >> that the soul is not mechanical. In separating the soul from the >> body in >> this way, and thus the mind from matter, he is the originator of >> the dualist >> position, widely encompassed by the philosophy of mind. One speaks of >> Cartesian Dualism. >> There follows three arguments that Descartes presented in favour of >> his >> distinction of man from the animal-as-machine (We note that this >> distinction >> entails the negation of IND-MEC.) >> {footnote 2: One can detect some mechanist affirmations or questions >> among (pre and post-Socratic, though not necessarily >> materialist) philosophers, from Greek antiquity (cf Timaeus and >> Plato, see >> also Odifreddi 1989). Among Chinese philosophers, for example Lao- >> Tzu, a >> certain monk is admired for having passed off his "automated" >> servants as >> flesh and blood beings. Among Hindu philosophers for example, in the >> "Questions to the King Milinda", the human body is compared to the >> chariot, >> and the human mind is compared to the different parts of the chariot, >> similar to Hume's (1739) manner of tackling the problem of identity >> with his >> boat. The temptation to set up artefacts in the image of Man is >> also a >> component of several myths, (for ex. the Golem in Jewish culture, >> see for >> ex. Breton 1990). It is no exaggeration to maintain that the very >> idea of >> mechanism appears wherever and whenever machines themselves are >> developed.} >> 1) Animals are not endowed with reason and cannot engage in >> linguistic >> communication >> This argument is losing credibility since language and reason seem >> more >> accessible to today's machines than for example, emotion which is >> communally >> allowed in the case of certain animals (see for ex. Lévy 1987). Here >> Descartes takes Aristotle's position which asserts that Man is a >> "reasoning >> animal". >> 2) Machines are finite beings. A finite being cannot conceive of the >> infinite. Now, I am able (said Descartes) to conceive of the >> infinite. Thus >> I am not a machine. >> This argument against IND-MEC brings into relief two fundamental >> questions: >> a) Can man conceive of infinity? >> b) Can a machine conceive of infinity? >> Question a) differentiates Hobbes' point of view from Descartes'. >> Hobbes >> surmises that he cannot in effect conceive of infinity. >> 3) A machine can only carry out particular tasks, as it turns out, >> those >> tasks for which it was constructed. In effect, Descartes is saying: >> "Since, in the case that reason is a universal instrument that >> participates >> in every sort of encounter, these organs need a certain particular >> disposition for each and every action; from this comes the idea >> that it is >> morally impossible that a machine might possess sufficient >> diversity such >> that it might act in every living occurrence in the same way that >> our reason >> assists our actions (Descartes, "1953", page 165). >> The idea of a universal machine had nevertheless crossed the mind >> of Raymond >> Lulle (1302) whom Descartes had studied. This same idea will >> reappear with >> Leibnitz, culminating in the work of Turing, and this will be >> explained in >> the second part. >> La Mettrie will rehash Descartes' animal-as-machine for the purpose >> of >> extending it to Man (La Mettrie 1748, see also Gunderson 1971). >> In parallel with Descartes, Hobbes himself develops the mechanist >> hypothesis >> (Rogow 1986). On can date Hobbes' motivation toward mechanism from >> the time >> of his discovery of geometry. Having been particularly impressed by >> the fact >> that he might have been convinced by a *finite communication* based >> on >> logical geometrical reasoning, Hobbes conceives of the mechanistic >> character >> of thinking. He then thinks that it should be possible to reduce >> thinking to >> addition and subtraction. (see Webb 1980). He is thus very close to >> the >> *functionalist* position in the philosophy of mind: that the >> additions and >> multiplications might be realisable by a *telegraphic network* , a >> *hydraulic system*, an *electromagnetic device* , or even *a >> windmill*, a >> *catapult* or a *calculating device* (ordinateur), citing Searle's >> enumeration (Searle 1984). Thought is thereby reduced to operations >> not >> necessarily equipment-dependent, and to the constituent matter >> employed to >> realise these operations. La Mettrie, after his own fashion, argues >> in >> something like the same sense: >> "Thus a Soul of mud, discovering in the twinkling of an eye, the >> relations >> and the consequences of an infinity of ideas difficult to conceive, >> would be >> preferable evidently to an ignorant and stupid Soul, which might be >> made of >> all the more precious Elements" (La Mettrie 1748). >> Similarly, Lafitte engages us on the subject of Babbage, precursor >> of 19th >> century information processing, to which we will return in the >> second part: >> "For Babbage, all machines being a composition of different organs >> linked >> together in a complex manner, the important thing to fix is less >> the very >> form of the organs than the sequencing of their functions, which >> relates to >> organic linkages that cause the ensemble to function." (Lafitte >> 1930). >> Differing with Descartes, Hobbes concludes that it is not possible >> that Man >> - whom he considers to be a finite being - might conceive of the >> infinite. >> Hobbes' motivation, being finitist and indexical (human thought is >> mechanisable) is therefore opposed to Descartes' animal-as-machine >> and is, >> in this sense, much closer to the contemporary motivation in the >> direction >> of artificial intelligence. Soon I will return to the relation >> existing >> between mechanism and functionalism. >> 1.1.3 What is a machine? >> Given the familiar connotations of the word "machine" - locomotives, >> electric kettles, automobiles, computers, microscopes, dish- >> washers, sewing >> machines, rice-cookers, time-pieces, mechanism may well seem >> grotesque. >> Even if machines are considered to be artefacts of exclusively human >> construction, in other words artificial, the concept of the machine >> is >> difficult to define. Lafitte, in 1911 argues that just such a >> definition can >> only be made in vain: >> "To claim to be able to define the concept of a machine is to >> suppose that >> the science of machines has come about, or that it might one day >> come about >> in all it's perfection. Other than what is chimerically-speaking, >> to assign >> limits to the development of mechanical forms, is to suppose in the >> first >> place an entire and complete knowledge of the character of every >> individual >> present and future mechanism, followed by the perfection of a >> measuring >> instrument capable of situating each into a definitive category >> according to >> their ensemble of characteristics. But, this again implicitly >> admits to a >> massive division of sorts, conforming to those contours we can >> cleanly >> envisage and having no link whatsoever with other bodies." (see >> also further >> on 2.3) >> Similarly, La Mettrie, in "Man as Machine" writes: >> "Man is a Machine so composed that it is frankly impossible to >> initially get >> a clear idea of it and consequently to arrive at a definition" >> What Hobbes and Descartes have in common is that a machine is a >> locally >> finite being. Its global behaviour is determined by the behaviour >> of its >> elementary constituents, these being finite in number at each >> instant (call >> this the "digital aspect"). The number of components can >> nonetheless grow >> according to the work performed by the machine. >> (to be cont.) >> >> K >> >> Email: >> [email protected] >> Web: >> http://web.mac.com/kmjcommp/Plenitude_Music >> Phone: >> (612) 9389 4239 or 0431 723 001 >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> > > > > -- > Hector Zenil http://www.mathrix.org > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
