Jack Mallah wrote:
> --- On Tue, 2/10/09, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah <jackmal...@yahoo.com>:
>>> 2) If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1
>> (e.g. discarding any errors that A2 might have made) then
>> one could say that A1 is the same person as B, while A2 is
>> not. This is causal differentiation.
>> Yes, but I'm assuming A1 and A2 have identical content.
> That actually doesn't matter - causation is defined in terms of
> counterfactuals. If - then, considering what happens at that moment of
> saving the data. If x=1 and y=1, and I copy the contents of x to z, that is
> not the same causal relationship as if I had copied y to z.
Isn't that making the causal chain essential to the experience; contrary to the
idea that the "stream of consciousness" is just the computation? The causal
chain is not part of the computation, A1 and A2 could be implemented by
different physics and hence different causation.
>>> 3) If I am defined as an observer-moment, then I am
>> part of either A1 or A2, not even the whole thing - just my
>> current experience. This is the most conservative
>> definition and thus may be the least misleading.
>> This is the way I think of it, at least provisionally.
>> But the point is, I do look at the clock and I do know that I am A, with
>> probability 1, and therefore that I will soon be B with probability 1.
> That contradicts what you said above about being an observer-moment. If you
> are, then some _other_ observer-moments will be in B, not you.
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