On 28 Feb 2009, at 03:02, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > 2009/2/28 Günther Greindl <[email protected]>: > >> The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten >> years >> old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply >> the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten >> years >> we often change so much that we indeed become a very _different_ >> person. >> >> So, what counts is change, not "objective" time. >> >> What we _are_ is I think more about what we (can) _become_, rather >> than >> a single snapshot at time t_0. And if this becoming is lost, that >> is the >> true tragedy. > > The problem with this explanation is that fear of death is only > partly, if at all, attenuated by rational considerations. I could > probably make my hour old backup do anything I want by holding a gun > to his head. Darwinian evolution did not prepare us to duplication and the like. This happens all the time. Our cortex contradicts some instincts wired in the limbic system and in the cerebral stem. In discussions about duplication with amnesia, it is important to distinguish the quasi academical or conceptual question "do we survive?", and the practical question "Are we happy surviving in this or that way". I would say "no" in practice to a doctor who proposes me an artificial brain and warning me on a possible amnesia, yet, if I have no choice, I believe that comp forces me to say that I will survive (yet unhappily wounded). Of course we are then lead to the idea that we always survive no matter what. In practice we want keep what we like, be it books, programs, friends, memories, sure. Stathis, you post which I quote below was very good: <<This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I) will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there exists some copy who will have a memory of my present experiences would I not object to dying, and this would require a backup updated every moment. In that case, I should also object to an hour of memory loss, due to a medication like midazolam. But I don't think that taking midazolam is tantamount to dying. Inconsistency! Either I have to agree that taking midazolam is like dying, or I have to agree that dying while leaving an old (how old?) backup behind does not matter. If I agree to the latter, then I give up worrying about the thing I don't like about dying, which is the fact that I won't be able to anticipate any future experiences. And if I give up worrying about that, then there isn't anything else that worries me about dying. So if I think that taking midazolam is no big deal (which I do), to be consistent I should also think that death is no big deal.>> It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule with comp is "don't do to the other what the other does not want you to do on him/her (except to save your soul)". But could someone makes the decision before the duplication? This is an advanced question which will make sense when we will all be virtual (with respect of the physical layer). Comp is consistent with a variety of answers. Less provocative, a similar question is: do I have the right to reconstitute an army of "Bruno" to extinguish a nuclear energy source which is on fire? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
