2009/3/7 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>:
>> I don't agree with the way you calculate utility at all. If I got $5
>> every time I pressed a button which decreased my absolute measure in
>> the multiverse a millionfold I would happily press the button all day.
> Which "I"? Aren't you concerned that you would press the button - and vanish?
No, that's the whole point. If you accept that teleportation isn't
suicide, then you should accept that culling teleportation (to use
Jack Mallah's term) isn't suicide.
There are two copies of me in perfect lockstep, A1 and A2. I'm one of
these copies and not the other (though I don't know which). Suppose
I'm A1 and I decide to teleport 100km away. That means A1 disappears
and a new copy, B, appears 100m away. I'm happy, since I feel I've
traveled 100km with little effort. If I am instead A2, I go through
exactly the same process: A2 disappears, B appears 100km away, and I'm
happy. If I'm A1 the presence or absence of A2 does not make any
difference to me, and if I'm A2 the presence or absence of A1 doesn't
make any difference to me. It doesn't make sense to say that the
presence of the other A copy will diminish my chances of ending up as
B, or diminish my quantity or quality of consciousness once I end up
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