Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/4/3 Brent Meeker <>:
>> But if you're going to derive physics from consciousness you need to
>> explain what connects across the gap - why is it still "you".  I
>> appreciate that part of the answer is memories, although Bruno seems to
>> think they are inessential.  But even if they are part of the answer
>> there still seems to me to be a problem in that almost all memories are
>> *not* in consciousness at any one time.  So must we invoke "unconscious
>> memories" (which are where?) or some other factor that provides the
>> continuity of self or do we simply assert that you are no one in
>> particular when you are not remembering anything.  My speculation is
>> that there there is subconscious "memory" on the very short term,
>> ~second, which provides continuity .  This operates even when you are
>> asleep so that there is continuity of events in you dreams.  If you
>> suffer a concussion the continuity is broken and you have gap in  memory
>> and in consciousness.  This immediate memory provides continuity between
>> times when you recall long-term memories, which are the ones Quentin is
>> concerned with.
> I have been using the term "memories" to include more than just long
> term memories. For example, I have a feeling of "being me" which
> persists from moment to moment. Even though I can't put this feeling
> into words, I would know immediately if something happens to change
> it, since then I would no longer "feel myself". While specific to each
> person, nevertheless this basal feeling would be more generic than the
> feeling + superimposed complex cognition, since the latter would have
> higher information content.
And doesn't this feeling of "being me" requires very short terms 
(~second) memory?  I've called it "immediate memory" to distinguish it 
from the short term memory which seems to be on the order of a few minutes.


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to