On 02 Apr 2009, at 13:23, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/4/2 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
>>> I would say that if you are at a fork where one version of you loses
>>> all memories and another does not, then you will find yourself going
>>> down the no memory loss path.
>> At which point? Also, why is it that we din't survive them to the
>> continuation where we don't ever mage very weird (amnesic) dreams.
>> We would not survive salvia at all.
> This sounds a bit like the argument which says that if QI is true, we
> could never fall asleep, since we don't experience unconsciousness and
> therefore we would only experience the worlds where we stay awake
For being awake you have to be conscious.
For being conscious, you don't have to be awake.
The probability that I go from state A to state B is given by the
"number" of computations going from A to B.
The problem with amnesic teleportation, that is teleportation with
partial amnesia in the reconstituted person, is that it introduce a
fuzziness on the first person uncertainty domain.
What are your prediction in the following experience, where the
protocol is told to you in advance: you are triplicated in Sidney,
Beijing and Kigali. But in Sidney you loose your long term memory: you
remember perfectly the triplication experience, your name, but nothing
of your life. In Beijing you lost your short term memory, you
remember your whole life except the last hour, and thus you forget the
triplication experience, and thus the protocol. In Kigali you keep
your whole memory. I suppose that you will never recover the memories
(this is in the protocol). How do you quantify the first person
Accepting probabilities, what would you consider as being "more
1) S = 1/3, B = 1/3 K = 1/3,
2) S = 0, B = 0, S = 1,
3) S = 0, B = 1/2, K = 1/2,
4) S = 1/2, B = 0, K = 1/2,
> That argument is invalid, unless we are falling asleep
> permanently, i.e. dying. If we fall asleep and wake up again, or
> experience amnesia and recover, then the worlds where that happens are
> *not* excluded by QI. They are simply worlds where you have a gap in
> consciousness, as valid when you are calculating subjective
> probabilities as the (in general far less common) worlds where there
> is no such gap.
I agree with you (except I am agnostic on the existence of gap of
consciousness). The problem, imo, arise with partial amnesia and
partial recovery, ... and (I think) who we are ... in the long run. Do
we need to have an ever developing brain to be (first person) immortal?
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