Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > 2009/4/22 Brent Meeker <[email protected]>: > > >> The question was whether information was enough, or whether something >> else is needed for consciousness. I think that sequence is needed, >> which we experience as the passage of time. When you speak of >> computations "going from A to B" do you suppose that this provides the >> sequence? In other words are the states of consciousness necessarily >> computed in the same order as they are experienced or is the order >> something intrinsic to the information in the states (i.e. like >> Stathis'es observer moments which can be shuffled into any order without >> changing the experience they instantiate). >> > > Say a machine is in two separate parts M1 and M2, and the information > on M1 in state A is written to a punchcard, walked over to M2, loaded, > and M2 goes into state B. Then what you are suggesting is that this > sequence could give rise to a few moments of consciousness, since A > and B are causally connected; whereas if M1 and M2 simply went into > the same respective states A and B at random, this would not give rise > to the same consciousness, since the states would not have the right > causal connection. Right? >
Maybe. But I'm questioning more than the lack of causal connection. I'm questioning the idea that a static thing like a state can be conscious. That consciousness goes through a set of states, each one being an "instant", is an inference we make in analogy with how we would write a program simulating a mind. I'm saying I suspect something essential is missing when we "digitize" it in this way. Note that this does not mean I'd say "No" to Burno's doctor - because the doctor is proposing to replace part of my brain with a mechanism that instantiates a process - not just discrete states. Brent > But then you could come up with variations on this experiment where > the transfer of information doesn't happen in as straightforward a > manner. For example, what if the operator who walks over the punchcard > gets it mixed up in a filing cabinet full of all the possible > punchcards variations, and either (a) loads one of the cards into M2 > because he gets a special vibe about it and it happens to be the right > one, or (b) loads all of the punchcards into M2 in turn so as to be > sure that the right one is among them? Would the machine be conscious > if the operator loads the right card knowingly, but not if he is just > lucky, and not if he is ignorant but systematic? If so, how could the > computation know about the psychological state of the operator? > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
