2009/4/24 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>: >> Boltzmann brains are improbable, but the example of the punchcards is >> not. The operator could have two punchcards in his pocket, have a >> conversation with someone on the way from M1 to M2 and end up >> forgetting or almost forgetting which is the right one. That is, his >> certainty of picking the right card could vary between 0.5 and 1. >> Would you say that only if his certainty is 1 would the conscious >> process be implemented, and not if it is, say, 0.9? >> >> > > I said it would be implementing *the same* consciousness if he was > following the rule. If not he might be implementing a different > consciousness by using a different rule. Of course if it were different > in only one "moment" that wouldn't really be much of a difference. I > don't think it depends on his certainty. Even more difficult we might > ask what it means for him to follow the rule - must he do it > *consciously*; in which case do we have to know whether his brain is > functioning according to the same rule? > > You're asking a lot of questions, Stathis. :-) What do you think?
I don't think the rule matters, only the result, which could consist of a series of disconnected states. The utility of a process is that it reliably brings about the relevant states; but if they arose randomly or by a different process that would be just as good. If not, then you could have an apparently functionally identical machine which has a different consciousness. One half of your brain might function by a different process that gives the same neuronal outputs, and you would have a feeling that something had radically changed, but your mouth would seemingly of its own accord continue to declare that everything is just the same. So, I agree with Kelly that the consciousness consists in the information. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
