Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > 2009/4/24 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>: > >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>> 2009/4/23 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>: >>> >>> >>>>> Say a machine is in two separate parts M1 and M2, and the information >>>>> on M1 in state A is written to a punchcard, walked over to M2, loaded, >>>>> and M2 goes into state B. Then what you are suggesting is that this >>>>> sequence could give rise to a few moments of consciousness, since A >>>>> and B are causally connected; whereas if M1 and M2 simply went into >>>>> the same respective states A and B at random, this would not give rise >>>>> to the same consciousness, since the states would not have the right >>>>> causal connection. Right? >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Maybe. But I'm questioning more than the lack of causal connection. >>>> I'm questioning the idea that a static thing like a state can be >>>> conscious. That consciousness goes through a set of states, each one >>>> being an "instant", is an inference we make in analogy with how we would >>>> write a program simulating a mind. I'm saying I suspect something >>>> essential is missing when we "digitize" it in this way. Note that this >>>> does not mean I'd say "No" to Burno's doctor - because the doctor is >>>> proposing to replace part of my brain with a mechanism that instantiates >>>> a process - not just discrete states. >>>> >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>> What is needed for the series of states to qualify as a process? >>> >> I think that the states, by themselves, cannot qualify. The has to be >> something >> else, a rule of inference, a causal connection, that joins them into a >> process. >> >> >>> I >>> assume that a causal connection between the states, as in my example >>> above, would be enough, since it is what happens in normal brains and >>> computers. >>> >> Yes, I certainly agree that it would be sufficient. But it may be more than >> is >> necessary. The idea of physical causality isn't that well defined and it >> hardly >> even shows up in fundamental physics except to mean no-action-at-a-distance. >> >> >>> But what would you say about the examples I give below, >>> where the causal connection is disrupted in various ways: is there a >>> process or is there just an unfeeling sequence of states? >>> >>> >>>>> But then you could come up with variations on this experiment where >>>>> the transfer of information doesn't happen in as straightforward a >>>>> manner. For example, what if the operator who walks over the punchcard >>>>> gets it mixed up in a filing cabinet full of all the possible >>>>> punchcards variations, and either (a) loads one of the cards into M2 >>>>> because he gets a special vibe about it and it happens to be the right >>>>> one, or (b) loads all of the punchcards into M2 in turn so as to be >>>>> sure that the right one is among them? Would the machine be conscious >>>>> if the operator loads the right card knowingly, but not if he is just >>>>> lucky, and not if he is ignorant but systematic? If so, how could the >>>>> computation know about the psychological state of the operator? >>>>> >> So you are contemplating a process that consists of a sequence of states and >> a >> rule that connects them thus constituting a process: punch cards (states) >> and a >> machine which physically implements some rule producing a new punch card >> (state) >> from a previous one. And then you ask whether it is still a process if, >> instead >> of the rule producing the next state it is produced in some other way. I'd >> say >> so long as the rule is followed (the operator loads the right card knowingly) >> it's the same process. Otherwise it is not the same process (the operator >> selects the right card by chance or by a different rule). If the process is >> a >> conscious one, is the latter still conscious? I'd say that it is. If the >> selection is by chance it's an instance of a Boltzmann brain. But I don't >> worry >> about Boltzmann brains; they're to improbable. >> > > Boltzmann brains are improbable, but the example of the punchcards is > not. The operator could have two punchcards in his pocket, have a > conversation with someone on the way from M1 to M2 and end up > forgetting or almost forgetting which is the right one. That is, his > certainty of picking the right card could vary between 0.5 and 1. > Would you say that only if his certainty is 1 would the conscious > process be implemented, and not if it is, say, 0.9? > >
I said it would be implementing *the same* consciousness if he was following the rule. If not he might be implementing a different consciousness by using a different rule. Of course if it were different in only one "moment" that wouldn't really be much of a difference. I don't think it depends on his certainty. Even more difficult we might ask what it means for him to follow the rule - must he do it *consciously*; in which case do we have to know whether his brain is functioning according to the same rule? You're asking a lot of questions, Stathis. :-) What do you think? Brent --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
