Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > 2009/4/24 Brent Meeker <[email protected]>: > > >>> Boltzmann brains are improbable, but the example of the punchcards is >>> not. The operator could have two punchcards in his pocket, have a >>> conversation with someone on the way from M1 to M2 and end up >>> forgetting or almost forgetting which is the right one. That is, his >>> certainty of picking the right card could vary between 0.5 and 1. >>> Would you say that only if his certainty is 1 would the conscious >>> process be implemented, and not if it is, say, 0.9? >>> >>> >>> >> I said it would be implementing *the same* consciousness if he was >> following the rule. If not he might be implementing a different >> consciousness by using a different rule. Of course if it were different >> in only one "moment" that wouldn't really be much of a difference. I >> don't think it depends on his certainty. Even more difficult we might >> ask what it means for him to follow the rule - must he do it >> *consciously*; in which case do we have to know whether his brain is >> functioning according to the same rule? >> >> You're asking a lot of questions, Stathis. :-) What do you think? >> > > I don't think the rule matters, only the result, which could consist > of a series of disconnected states. The utility of a process is that > it reliably brings about the relevant states; but if they arose > randomly or by a different process that would be just as good.
If two processes always produce the same sequence they are the same process in the abstract sense. > If not, > then you could have an apparently functionally identical machine which > has a different consciousness. One half of your brain might function > by a different process that gives the same neuronal outputs, and you > would have a feeling that something had radically changed, but your > mouth would seemingly of its own accord continue to declare that > everything is just the same. So, I agree with Kelly that the > consciousness consists in the information. > > But is it the information in consciousness and is it discrete? If you include the information that is in the brain, but not in consciousness, I can buy the concept of relating states by similarity of content. Or if you suppose a continuum of states that would provide a sequence. It is only when you postulate discrete states containing only the contents of instants of conscious thought, that I find difficulty. Brent Brent --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
