On 03 May 2009, at 17:09, John Mikes wrote:

> I would like to go along with Maudlin's point emphasized in Bruno's  
> text below, adding that "causal" structure is restricted to the  
> limited model of which we CAN choose likely 'causes' within our  
> perceived reality, while the unlimited possibilities include wider  
> 'intrusions' of domains 'beyond our present epistemic cognitive  
> inventory'. So the "most likely" cause - although applicable to a  
> 'physical role' (which as well is figmentous) - is limited. In  
> congruence - I think - with Bruno's words below.
> Bruno's: "...the description, although containing the genuine  
> information is just not a computation at all..." (AMEN!)
> continued, however by: "...It miss the logical relation between the  
> steps, made possible by the universal machine..."  still does not  -  
> DO -
> those 'steps' neither OPERATE the machine.
> Looks like we want to 'assume' that if there is a possibility, it is  
> also done.

Yes. It is the trade mark of all everythingers and many worlders. Be  
them quantum or arithmetical many states/worlds/histories.
relative existence = relative consistence. Actual consciousness =  
inside view of possible existence.
"Now" is as well yesterday from the point of view of yesterday than  
tomorrow from the point of view of tomorrow, if ever. The "everything"  
idea is that such an indexical approach is conceptually simpler, and  
should be favored for Occam-like related reason.
But it is neither assume in comp (my point) nor in (quantum mechanics,  
Everett-Deutsch point). Indeed any rememorable "here and now" depends  
on the statistical interference on the many many many "elsewhere". It  
is not an assumption, it is a consequence of the theory. You can  
change the theory by adding selection principles, but this is really  
cutting off everything that does not fit our wishful thinking. It is  
like when Niels Bohr says "Quantum mechanics is false in the classical  
macroscopic world, when applying QM to Niels Borh explains why Niels  
Bohr (and all of us) can experience a third person plural collapse  
despite the SWE prevent the need for it to happen "really".

> I am looking at the "physical creator" (haha)

... still looking for Aristotle initial motor (haha).

> keeping the contraption moving and us in it. Not to speak about  
> 'making it'. (Deus ex machina?)

No worry, assuming comp, it is  "Machina ex Deus".
Machines can already prove that as far as they are consistent,  
something which is not a machine, and which is not even nameable  
(arithmetical truth) transcends them (Tarski,  Askanas).

I have also discovered recently (and this has been proved by my  
student/friend "the little genius" (Eric Vandenbuscche)), that some  
false beliefs can enlarge the true provability spectrum. It is almost  
like de Bono said, according to Kim, it could be logical to be  
illogical, in some situation. But as I said to Kim, this belongs  
probably to the corona G* minus G, the space of the unspeakable.   
(Note that I fall myself in the same trap if I suggest this should be  
a reason to abandon prescriptive talk, yet, assuming comp, I can  
justify caution with such prescriptive talk, this because I talk  
explicitly on Machines and I talk on (ideally correct) Humans only  
through the comp HYPOTHESIS).

> Once all is there and moving, everything is fine.
> I salute the "...infinitely many such relations, ..." that gives me  
> the idea of a 'physical' supervenience in terms of a restrictive  
> Occam, cutting off everything that dos not fit into our goals.

Just say "No doctor". No problem. We are just studying consequences of  
an hypothesis. But I think the comp hypothesis is the less  
reductionist view possible concerning the possible first person points  
of view.  The little and simple has more degree of freedom than the  
complexe and sophisticate.
I tend to believe comp is even a vaccine against major forms of  

> "States" seem to be identified by our limited views.

Third person conceived states are indeed identify with finite  
descriptions of a (probably deep and complex) computational states  
(notion relative to the choice of a universal machine).
But then "first person states", as conceivable by first persons, are  
very complex and variable things with non trivial connectedness, and  
dependence on non nameable continuum (and thus a relative measure  

But machine can prove their own relative (to consistency, to the  
existence of a "reality") incompleteness theorem, and this introduces  
many deep nuances between all the possible variant of Theaetetus  
knowledge theories, up to the quasi Aristotelian (naturalist) theory  
of matter by Plotinus. I can't wait listening more to that humble  
universal machine ... 'course, today, it is still hard work: Gödel,  
Löb, Feferman, Smullyan, ..., but Solovay makes a progress by  
providing shortcuts: the modal systems G and G*.

> I feel that both the referred Maudlin-text and Jesse's comment are  
> on the static side, as 'descriptive', while I can presume into  
> Bruno's "relations" some sort of a functional (operative) relation  
> that would lend some dynamism (action?) into the descriptional  
> stagnancy. I still did not detect:  HOW?

Comp cannot explain HOW, for a reason similar to the fact that comp  
cannot explain where the numbers come from.

Comp can explain some things though. It explains why and how the  
numbers, relatively to each others, and through their additive and  
multiplicative relations (cf Post, Turing ... Matiyazevitch)  begin to  
believe in numbers and in dynamics, and it explains why and how the  
numbers cannot explain the numbers and the dynamics, and it explains  
how the number can explain, like your servitor tries, why the numbers  
cannot explain the numbers and the dynamics. The same for many  
transcendent notions like "truth", "consciousness", "realm", etc.

Comp gives a TOE with a gap. But it explains why there is a gap, why  
we have to be ignorant there, and why that TOE is as close as an  
explanation can possibly exist. But it shows, to simplify, that the  
physical multi-world is given by some geometry on that ignorance gap,  
making comp refutable. So, let us see...
QM confirms comp, up to now, and it is too early to conclude anything  
definitive. Eventually comp, and thus arithmetic, has to justify QM as  
QM justifies the collapse.



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