On 23 May 2009, at 18:54, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > I think it is related. I'm just trying to figure out the implications > of your theory for the problem of creating artificial, conscious > intelligences. What I gather from the above is that you think there > are > degrees of consciousness marked by the ability to prove things. Hmm ... It is more a degree of self-reflexivity, or a degree of introspective ability. RA, although universal (in the Church Turing thesis sense) is a *very* weak theorem prover. RA is quite limited in its introspection abilities. I am open to the idea that RA could be conscious, but the interview does not lead to a theory of consciousness. It is not a lobian machine like PA (= RA + induction). Lobianity begins with weaker theory than PA though, somewhere between RA and PA, and Lobianity is persistant, it concerns all sound extensions of PA, even hyperturing extension actually. Also, I don't think I have a theory. I work in a very old theory: mechanism. It is not mine, and I use it because it makes possible to use computer science to prove things. Enough things to show mechanism empirically refutable. For AUDA you need to accept the Theatetical approach to knowledge, all right. I recall that in Smullyan "Forever Undecided", which introduces to the logic of self-reference G, a nice hierarchy of reasoners is displayed up to the Lobian machine. > To > consider another view, for example, John McCarthy thinks there are > degrees of consciousness marked by having narratives created and > remembered and meta-narratives. Either of these ideas is definite > enough that they could actually be implemented (in contrast to many > philosophical ideas about consciousness). It is not bad. PA has the meta-narrative ability, and RA lacks it. You can see this in that way. > I have some reservation > about your idea because I know many people that I think are conscious > but who couldn't prove even the simplest theorem in PA. Because they lack the familiarity with the notations, or they have some math trauma, or because they are impatient or not interested. But all human beings, if you motivate them and give them time, can prove all theorems of PA, and, more importantly believe the truth of those theorems. I have to add this last close, because even RA can prove all theorems of PA, given that RA is turing universal. But RA, without becoming PA, cannot really understand the proofs, like the guy in the chinese room can talk chinese, yet cannot understand its talk. It is the place where people easily make a confusion of level similar to Searle confusion (described by Dennett and Hofstadter). I can simulate Einstein's brain, but this does not make me Einstein. On the contrary this makes possible to discuss with Einstein. It is in that sense that RA can simulate PA without becoming PA. Likewise, all theories can simulate all effective theories. PA is probably still very simple compared to any human, except highly mentally disabled person or person in comatose state of course. > Are we to > suppose they just have a qualitatively different kind of > consciousness? I don't think so, but in the entheogen forums people can discuss at infinitum if under such or such plants people experience a qualitatively different kind of consciousness. Given the hardness to just discuss on consciousness you can understand that this is a bit of a premature question. Many estimate that to be conscious is always to be conscious of some qualia. In that case I could argue that even "me today" has already a qualitatively different kind of consciousness compared with "me yesterday". Now, my opinion (which plays no role in the UDA- reasoning) is that consciousness can be qualia independent, and is something qualitatively stable, as opposed to the content of consciousness, which can vary a lot. Now, if you compare RA (non lobian) and PA (lobian), then it is far more possible that they have a different kind of consciousness, and even lives in a different kind of physics, as a consequence. RA could be closer to a "universal consciousness notion". It would mean that PA could already be under some illusions ... I don't know. Real hard questions here. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
