On 23 May 2009, at 06:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 22 May 2009, at 18:25, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> Do you believe if we create a computer in this physical
>>> universe that it could be made conscious,
>> But a computer is never conscious, nor is a brain. Only a person is
>> conscious, and a computer or a brain can only make it possible for a
>> person to be conscious relatively to another computer. So your
>> question is ambiguous.
>> It is not my brain which is conscious, it is me who is conscious.
> By "me" do you mean some computation in Platonia? I'm wondering what
> are the implications of your theory for creating "artificial"
> consciousness. Since comp starts with the assumption that replacing
> one's brain with functionally identical units (at some level of
> will make no discernable difference in your experience, it entails
> a computer that functionally replaces your brain is conscious
> of being you in fact). So if I want to build a conscious robot from
> scratch, not by copying someone's brain, what must I do?
I don't see the problem, besides the obvious and usual difficulties of
Actually if you implement a theorem prover for Peano Arithmetic (=
Robinson Arithmetic + the induction axioms) I am willing to say that
you have build a conscious entity.
It is the entity that I interview (thanks to the work of Gödel, Löb
The person related to it, which I identify with the knower (obeying to
the theaetetical logic of "provable(p) & p")
exist simultaneously in all the possible relative implementations of
it in platonia or in UD* (the universal deployment).
I mean it is the same for a copy of me, or an intelligent robot build
from scratch. Both "person" exist in an atemporal and aspatial ways in
Platonia, and will appear concrete to any entity belonging to some
computation where they can manifest themselves.
Like numbers. 17 exists in Platonia, but 17 has multiple
implementation in many computations in Platonia.
I guess I miss something because I don't see any problem here. You may
elaborate perhaps. We are in the seven step here. Are you sure you
grasp the six preceding steps?
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