I missed the meaning of *'conscious'* as applied in this discussion. *If we accept* that it means 'responding to information' ( used in the wides sense: in *responding* there is an *absorption* of the result of an observer moment and *completenig relations thereof* and te *information* as the *absorbed relations*) *then a thermostat is conscious*. Without such clarification Jason's question is elusive. (I may question the term "physical universe" as well - as the compilation of aspect-slanted figments to explain observations we made in select views by select means (cf. conventional and not-so-conventional science, numbers, Platonist filters, quantum considerations, theological views, etc.) * Then Bruno's response below refers to a *fetish* (person? what is this?) - definitely NOT a computer, but "relative to* ANOTHER(?)* computer". *The 'another' points to similarity.* It also reverberates with Jason's "*WE*(??)" (Is this 'a person', a homunculus, or what?)create a computer further *segregating* the 'fetish' Bruno refers to from 'a computer'. *I don't find it ambiguous: I find it undefined terms clashing in elusive meanings.*
Another open spot is the 'conscious robot' that would not become conscious even by copying someone's BRAIN (which is NOT conscious! - as said). We still face the "I", the "ME" *UFO* (considered as 'self'') that DOES but IS NOT. - And - is conscious. Whatever that may mean. Then comes Brent with the reasonable question. I would add: what is necessary for a 'computation in Platonia' to become a person? should it pee? I feel the term Brent asked is still a select artifact ideation, APPLICABLE (maybe) to non-computational domains to make it "a person" (whatever that may be). It is still not "I", the conscious, thinking of it. The 'conscious' ME is different from a computation with denied consciousness - as I read. Replacing the (non-conscious) brain with identical other parts does not impart the missing conscious quality - unless the replacement IS conscious, in which case it is NOT a replacement. It is a "exchange to...". - as Brent correctly points to. (Leaving open the term 'you - conscious' as a deus ex machina quale-addition for the replacement). Just looking through differently colored goggles. John Mikes On Sat, May 23, 2009 at 12:39 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]>wrote: > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 22 May 2009, at 18:25, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > ... > >> Do you believe if we create a computer in this physical > >> universe that it could be made conscious, > >> > > > > But a computer is never conscious, nor is a brain. Only a person is > > conscious, and a computer or a brain can only make it possible for a > > person to be conscious relatively to another computer. So your > > question is ambiguous. > > It is not my brain which is conscious, it is me who is conscious. > > By "me" do you mean some computation in Platonia? I'm wondering what > are the implications of your theory for creating "artificial" > consciousness. Since comp starts with the assumption that replacing > one's brain with functionally identical units (at some level of detail) > will make no discernable difference in your experience, it entails that > a computer that functionally replaces your brain is conscious (conscious > of being you in fact). So if I want to build a conscious robot from > scratch, not by copying someone's brain, what must I do? > > Brent > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
