The problem is as old as humanity, and is often answered by religion,  
which are or are not authoritative. A reformulation appears with  
Descartes, in the mechanist frame. But frankly, read the UDA, which  
can be seen as a new formulation in the frame of the digital mechanist  
hypothesis in the cognitive science.

In a nutshell, it is the problem of how a qualitative experiential  
feeling of consciousness can be associated with third personal object  
relations. How a grey brain makes us feel color, if you want. And then  
it touches question like "does consciousness have a role?", "is there  
a first person death", etc.

You can Google on it on the web, but in this list we are far in  
advance :)

Most people still believe simultaneously in MECHANISM, and WEAK  
MATERIALISM (the idea that stuffy matter exists). My point is that  
iMECHANISM and MATERIALISM (or PHYSICALISM) are epistemologically  
incompatible. Mech + Mater. leads to person eliminativism. Mech itself  
leads, by UDA, to a material appearance emerging from infinite sum of  
purely mathematical computations. UDA shows that computationalism  
leads to refutable facts, and one of my main point is that  
computationalism (or digital mechanism) is empirically testable, and  
indeed confirmed (not proved!) in his most startling features by  
quantum mechanics. Digitalism makes the mind-body problem a throughly  
scientific problem. It is the least I want to show.

Read the paper here if you want save your time:

Those results are not yet very well known. But they fit with many  
intuitions discussed in this list.


On 02 Jul 2009, at 20:02, Brian Tenneson wrote:

> I'm ignorant of what you mean by "mind body problem."  Can you  
> explain this or send me some place on the net that explains it?
> Thanks.
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I will take a further look, but I already see that the author is not
>> aware of the mind body problem. On logic he seems not too bad ... (he
>> is unaware also that very few people knows anything in model theory).
>> The way he tackles the everything question is flawed by his
>> unconscious use of the identity thesis in the "philosophy of
>> mind" (alias cognitive science).
>> Bruno
>> On 02 Jul 2009, at 11:30, ronaldheld wrote:
>>> comments?
> >

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