Brent, Another example of your somewhat non-standard "definition 2" usage:
> First of all I think epistemology precedes ontology. We first get > knowledge of some facts and then we create an ontology as part > of a theory to explain these facts. On Mon, Jul 27, 2009 at 11:56 PM, Rex Allen<rexallen...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Mon, Jul 27, 2009 at 11:40 PM, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote: >> >> I think that's a misuse of "ontology". When we discuss the atomic theory of >> matter the ontology is a set of elementary particles, including their >> couplings >> and dynamics. > > > I think most of us are using "ontology" in the sense of definition 1, > below. But you keep introducing the term in the sense of definition > 2. I'd noticed it before on David's previous "dream" thread. > > Ontology > > 1. That department of the science of metaphysics which investigates > and explains the nature and essential properties and relations of all > beings, as such, or the principles and causes of being. > > 2. A systematic arrangement of all of the important categories of > objects or concepts which exist in some field of discourse, showing > the relations between them. When complete, an ontology is a > categorization of all of the concepts in some field of knowledge, > including the objects and all of the properties, relations, and > functions needed to define the objects and specify their actions. A > simplified ontology may contain only a hierarchical classification (a > taxonomy) showing the type subsumption relations between concepts in > the field of discourse. An ontology may be visualized as an abstract > graph with nodes and labeled arcs representing the objects and > relations. Note: The concepts included in an ontology and the > hierarchical ordering will be to a certain extent arbitrary, depending > upon the purpose for which the ontology is created. This arises from > the fact that objects are of varying importance for different > purposes, and different properties of objects may be chosen as the > criteria by which objects are classified. In addition, different > degrees of aggregation of concepts may be used, and distinctions of > importance for one purpose may be of no concern for a different > purpose. > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 27, 2009 at 11:40 PM, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote: >> >> David Nyman wrote: >>> 2009/7/27 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> >>> >>>> That's a bit of a straw man you're refuting. I've never heard anyone >>>> claim that >>>> the mind is the brain. The materialist claim is that the mind is what the >>>> brain does, i.e. the mind is a process. That's implicit in COMP, the idea >>>> that >>>> functionally identical units can substituted for parts of your brain >>>> without any >>>> untoward effects. >>> >>> Yes indeed. But what do we mean by a process in materialist ontology? >>> To speak of what the brain 'does' is to refer to actual changes of >>> state of physical elements - at whatever arbitrary level you care to >>> define them - of the material object in question. So now you have two >>> options: either the 'process' is just an added-on description of these >>> material changes of state, and hence redundant or imaginary in any >>> ontological sense, or else you are implicitly claiming a second - >>> non-material - ontological status for the mind-process so invoked. As >>> I said, it would be difficult to imagine two states of being more >>> different than minds and brains (i.e. this is the classic mind-body >>> dilemma). >> >> I think that's a misuse of "ontology". When we discuss the atomic theory of >> matter the ontology is a set of elementary particles, including their >> couplings >> and dynamics. We then regard molecules and stars and planets, etc, as >> consisting of these things. It is not legitimate to object, for example, >> that >> weather is *just* an added on description or else requires an addition to the >> ontology. It's a description at a different level. Similarly, material >> changes >> in the brain may be described as mental events also. Compare a computer >> running >> some AI program. The events have a description in terms of electrons and >> gates >> and also in terms of decisions and computations. That was pretty much >> Bertrand >> Russell's theory of neutral monads - there's only one kind of thing but they >> can >> be described in mental-causal terms or material-causal terms. >> >>> >>> This is the insight in Bruno's requirement of the COMP reversal of >>> physics and mind as described in step 8 of his SANE2004 paper. It's >>> aim is to deal a knockdown blow to any facile intuition of the mind as >>> the computation (i.e. process) of a material brain, and IMO the >>> argument more than merits a direct riposte in that light. >>> Furthermore, in a platonic COMP, the question of the level of >>> substitution required to reproduce your mind is unprovable, and has to >>> be an act of faith in any 'doctor' who claims to know. >> >> The difficulty I have with COMP is in step 8, where some measure is invoked >> to >> make sense out of a computation that computes everything. What is this >> measure? >> and what does it actually predict. As I said before, an *everything* >> hypothesis is a cheap way to explain anything - unless you can explain why >> this >> rather than that. Bruno promises to be able to do that - so I'm waiting to >> see. >> >> Brent >> >> >>> >>> AFAICS, until these 'under-the-carpet' issues are squarely faced, the >>> customary waving away of the brain-mind relation as a simplistic >>> functional identity remains pure materialist prejudice, and on the >>> basis of the above, flatly erroneous. To say the least, any such >>> relation is moot, absent a radically deeper insight into the mind-body >>> problem. >>> >>> David >>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> On 26 Jul 2009, at 16:52, David Nyman wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and >>>>>> machines. Naturally I have arrogated the right to plagiarise your >>>>>> helpful comments in what follows, which is an aphoristic synthesis of >>>>>> my understanding of the main points that have emerged thus far. I >>>>>> hope this will be helpful for future discussion. >>>>>> >>>>>> THE APHORISMS >>>>>> >>>>>> We do not see the mind, we see *through* the mind. >>>>>> >>>>>> What we see through the mind - its contents - is mind-stuff: dreams. >>>>>> >>>>>> Hence dream content - i.e. whatever is capable of being present to us >>>>>> - can't be our ontology - this would be circular (the eye can't see >>>>>> itself). >>>>>> >>>>>> So the brain (i.e. what the eye can see) can't be the mind; but the >>>>>> intuition remains that mind and brain might be correlated by some >>>>>> inclusive conception that would constitute our ontology: Kant's great >>>>>> insight stands. >>>> It's more than an intuition. There's lots of evidence the mind and brain >>>> are >>>> correlated: from getting drunk, concusions, neurosurgery, mrfi,... >>>> >>>>>> It is similarly obvious that 'identity' theories and the like are >>>>>> non-sense: it would indeed be hard to think of two descriptions less >>>>>> 'identical' than brain-descriptions and mind-descriptions: hence >>>>>> again, any such identification could only be via some singular >>>>>> correlative synthesis. >>>>>> >>>>>> Hence any claim that the mind is literally identical with, or >>>>>> 'inside', the brain can be shown to be false by the simple - if messy >>>>>> - expedient of a scalpel; or else can be unmasked as implicitly >>>>>> dualistic: i.e. the claim is really that 'inside' and 'outside' are >>>>>> not merely different descriptions, but different ontologies. >>>> That's a bit of a straw man you're refuting. I've never heard anyone >>>> claim that >>>> the mind is the brain. The materialist claim is that the mind is what the >>>> brain does, i.e. the mind is a process. That's implicit in COMP, the idea >>>> that >>>> functionally identical units can substituted for parts of your brain >>>> without any >>>> untoward effects. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> >>> >>> > >>> >> >> >> >> >> > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---