Very important post, Peter. We are progressing.

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On 06 Aug 2009, at 19:09, 1Z wrote: > > > > On 31 July, 18:55, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> On 31 Jul 2009, at 18:05, 1Z wrote: >> >> >> >>> If it isn;t RITSIAR, it cannot be generating me. Mathematical >>> proofs only prove mathematical "existence", not onltolgical >>> existence. For a non-Platonist , 23 "exists" mathematically, >>> but is not RITSIAR. The same goes for the UD >> >> Is an atom RITSIAR? Is a quark RITSIAR? > > If current physics is correct. Then it is not "RITSIAR" in the sense of the discussion with David. Real in the sense that "I" am real. is ambiguous. Either the "I" refers to my first person, and then I have ontological certainty. As I said on FOR, I can conceive that I wake up and realize that quark, planet, galaxies and even my body were not real. I cannot conceive that I wake up and realize that my consciousness is not real. Ontological first person does not need an "IF this or that theory is correct". You are reifying theoretical constructions. > > >> The point is just that IF you survive "in the RITSIAR" sense, with a >> digital (even material, if you want) brain, then materiality has to >> be >> retrieved by coherence or gluing property of immaterial computation, >> or there is an error in the UD Argument. > > > It is not clear what you mean by that. If I am transferred from a > phsycial > brain into a physcial computer, physicalism is unscathed. Your > argument > against physcialism is that is unnecessary because something else > is doing the work -- My argument is not that. From what you say, I infer that you understand the seven first steps of the UD-Argument. You seem to have a problem with the 8th step, which is the step showing that no "work" is needed at all. The usual number relations do the work, and this without any need to reify them. > that I could be running on some immaterial UDA. > But you have to assume Platonism to get your UDA, so you have to > assume Platonism to refute physicalism. Without that assumption, the > rest doesn't follow.. It is step 0. Do I need platonism to believe in the existence of prime numbers? I need only the amount of arithmetical realism for saying that the (mathematical) machine x stop or doesn't stop on input y. This is enough for the computational supervenience. And physical supervenience does not work, as the step 8 of UDA shows. > > >>>>> wihout a UDA there are no generated minds, without generated minds >>>>> there is no illusory matter. >> >>>> Sure. But the UD exists, like prime number exists. >> >>> Which for a non-Platononists is not at all >>> in the relevant sense. >> >> Again, if that is true, there must be something wrong in the UD >> Argument. Which one? > > The *implict* assumption of Platonism. Step 0. It is a relief for me to see that you did look at the papers, and realise I do not postulate platonism, only realism. So now you have to attribute this assumption as an implicit assumption. I'm afraid that such an implicit assumption exists only in your imagination. You reify a physical primitive reality to instantiate consciousness, and you attribute me a reification of the numbers to get the same, but the point of step 8 is to show that such a reification, be it with matter or number, cannot work. You don't have a problem with step zero (the real one in the papers). I think that you have a problem with step 8. In step seven the UD running is still primitively material, and the step 8 shows that such an ontological materiality does not help, *cannot* help. > > >>> How can a conlusion that the material world doesn't exist >>> be neutrral about Platonism? >> >> The point is that Platonism is in the conclusion, not in the >> hypothesis. > > It has to be in the hypothesis. Otherwise you need to show > that your UDA is a phsycal entity floating in space somwhere. A physical UD does not change anything, by step 8. > > In fact, you have explictly said that the UDA has Platonic existence: > "But the UD exists, like prime number exists". I said this to explain that the existence of the UD is of the same mathematical nature as the existence of the prime number. No need to double the mathematical ontology. > > >>> If Platonism is false, >>> the mathematical world doesn';t exist either. and >>> there is nowhere for the UD to exist at all. >> >> Why do you want the UD to exist somewhere? > > Because I exist somewhere, and I can;t be generated out > of shear non-existence. You talk like if mathematical existence = non existence. I think Quentin made a similar remark. But I believe in elementary arithmetic. I can prove that prime numbers and UDs exist, and by step 8 that is enough. No need to reify such existence. And step 8 shows that this entails that reification of the physical objects is a red herring too. > > >> Does prime numbers need to >> exist somewhere to exist at all? > > I say hey don't. So you believe in the mathematical existence of prime numbers. Good. > > > You say they do.: > > "But the UD exists, like prime number exists". ... meaning that the UD, and its mathematical running, mathematically exist. UD exists in the same mathematical sense than the prime numbers, and step 8 shows this is all we can use, once we assume digital mechanism. > > >> Does the physical universe exist somewhere? > > Something does. You can't eliminate the phys. uni. AND Plato's heaven. > Then there is nothing left at all. By mathematical (arithmetical) realism, the prime numbers and the mathematical machine continue to exist. By step 8, physical supervenience is wrong, and the mathematical existence of computation forces us to restrict the supervenience thesis on those mathematical computations, which have to exist in the mathematical sense. No need to reify Plato's heaven. I don't do that, either explicitly nor implicitly (or show me where). > > >> The UDA reasoning is, in a short way: Comp -> Platonism. (In your >> sense of platonism). > > No,. its Platonism->Comp -> Platonism. No, it is Comp -> Platonism. Comp includes realism for the mathematical existence. > > >> If you believe Platonism is false, then by the UD Argument, you >> believe that comp (i.e. YD + CT) is false, or you believe that there >> is something wrong in UDA. > >> What? > > The assumption of Platonism you need to give the UD > some sort of existence. I need some sort of existence indeed. Arithmetical existence is enough by step 8. > > >> Let me ask you that question precisely. >> >> Is it a problem with the first person indeterminacy and its >> invariance >> properties? That is, is it a problem in the first sixth steps: UDA >> 1--6. >> Is it a problem with UDA-7. Where the indeterminacy domain, still >> material, is infinite? >> Is it a problem with UDA-8. Where the indeterminacy field become >> (sigma_1) arithmetical? > > I have already answered that. THere is an *implicit* assumption > of Platonism before you even get on to the rest of it. Could you show me at which step I am using that *implicit* assumption? Well, it cannot be in the seven first steps, given that we are free, there, to reify materiality and imagine the UD as a concrete material machine. So it can only be in the 8th step. But the point of step 8 consists precisely in showing that a physical or even just ontological reality is pointless. You talk like if we knew that a primitive physical ontology exists, but we don't know that, and the seven first step are neutral on that. You are the one insisting that for consciousness to exist, we need a physical ontology. But the step 8 shows that with comp such a physical ontology, or any special ontology is spurious. You make me regret to have put the step 8 at the end of UDA. Note that in all my older french version of UDA, I begin by step 8, to make clear the very essence of the mind body problem once we assume comp. Consciousness is a purely mathematical phenomenon which makes us believe in such ontology when digital mechanism forces us to admit that the simple mathematical existence is enough, and is all we can really use to attach consciousness to computations. My diagnostic: you have a problem with step 8. The problem you have with step 0 comes from the fact that you introduce an implicit assumption which is not there, or you are playing with the word by 1) reifying a non mathematical ontology for shear existence, 2) forcing me to to the same with mathematical existence. But the point is that such reification does not work (by step 8), unless you identify mathematical existence with inexistence. But then you should say "prime numbers do not exist", "UDs do not exist". You should show where in step 8 the *implicit assumption* has been used. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---