On 16 Sep, 13:49, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>
> > On 16 Sep, 13:30, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>
> > > > On 16 Sep, 12:54, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
> > > > > >> I find that I can't real say what the difference is supposed to be
> > > > > >> between numbers existing mathematically and numbers existing
> > > > > >> Platonically, other than that different labels are being used.
> > What
> > > > > >> precisely is the latter supposed to entail that the former does
> > not,
> > > > > >> and what difference is this supposed to make? Can you help,
> > Peter?
> > > > > > Existing mathematically doesn't have any ontoloigcal meaning.
> > > > > > Both formalists and Platonists can agree that 7 exists,
> > > > > > since they agree Ex:x=7 is true, but only the latter think
> > > > > > 7 has Platonic existence.
> > > > > Yes, but I still don't see what difference the word 'ontological'
> > > > > makes in this context. Surely whatever world-conjuring power numbers
> > > > > may possess can't depend on which label is attached to them?
> > > > The knowabilitry of a claim about what powers numbers
> > > > have can only depend on what labels are correctly attached.
> > > > Petrol is not flammable just becaue I attached the label
> > > > "flammable" to it. Petrol *Is* flammable, and that
> > > > makes the label-attachment correct.
> > > > > If a
> > > > > mathematical scheme fulfils a deep enough explanatory role (a moot
> > > > > point I admit) isn't that 'ontological' enough?
> > > > If you are claiming that the *existence* of numbers
> > > > would explain somehting empierica;, that is an abductive
> > > > argument for Platonism. Other than that sayign "Numbers
> > > > explain" is too vague. Numbers are often used to
> > > > explain things about other numbers. So what,
> > > > says the formalist, none of them exist and such
> > > > explanations are nothing but moves in a game.
> > > Well if it's a game how do you explain it fits observation ?
> > Much of it doesn't.
> > >How do you
> > > explain the predictability of physical theories (which are *only* numbers
> > > based) ?
> > They are a subset of maths which does fit obeserved regularities.
> > Discarded theorie are another subset of maths that doesn't.
> > The Library of Babel contains history as well as fiction. Think about
> > it.
> That wasn't what I wanted to convey... please note the "which are *only*
> numbers based".
At best that suggests that only the mathematical structures
by correct physics exist (mathematical empriicsm rather than Platonism
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