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On 18 Sep, 00:26, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote: > 2009/9/17 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>: > > > Yep, and if the conclusion is ontological, the process that reaches it > > is ontological. > > > Bruno thinks he can reach an ontological assumption starting with pure > > maths. > > But he can't. "mathematical existence" means that mathematicians take > > certain "exists" statements to be true. Whether "exists" should be > > taken > > literally in the mathematical context is an ontological question, as > > the material > > in the first posting indicates > > But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's > starting assumptions. If one starts with a theoretical commitment to > the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is > obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to this. OTOH > if one starts from the theoretical primacy of number - irrespective of > whether one labels such primacy 'arithmetical' or 'platonic' - the > opposite is the case, That is pretty much what I have been saying. But note that there is a difference between assuming something because you think it is incontrovertible (deduction) and assuming it because its consequences match observation (abduction) > and indeed Bruno argues precisely how and why, > on the basis of the MGA, one cannot take the status of matter (as > opposed to its appearances) 'literally' from the perspective of > computational theory. No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as well as CTM. > In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for > a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that > further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point > of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either > explanatory scheme. Who's been doing that? > The opinions cited in the first posting assume > the first of these theoretical commitments and hence choose to take > the primacy of matter as their inferential fons et origo. Comp takes > the opposite position. The rest is a research programme, isn't it? Yes. For my money, metaphysics is a subject-matter. It is not an epistemological modus-operandi involving declarations of irrefutable certainty. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---