On 18 Sep, 00:26, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/9/17 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
> > Yep, and if the conclusion is ontological, the process that reaches it
> > is ontological.
> > Bruno thinks he can reach an ontological assumption starting with pure
> > maths.
> > But he can't. "mathematical existence" means that mathematicians take
> > certain "exists" statements to be true. Whether "exists" should be
> > taken
> > literally in the mathematical context  is an ontological question, as
> > the material
> > in the first posting indicates
> But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's
> starting assumptions.  If one starts with a theoretical commitment to
> the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is
> obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to this.  OTOH
> if one starts from the theoretical primacy of number - irrespective of
> whether one labels such primacy 'arithmetical' or 'platonic' - the
> opposite is the case,

That is pretty much what I have been saying. But note that
there is a difference between assuming something because you
think it is incontrovertible (deduction) and assuming it because
its consequences match observation (abduction)

> and indeed Bruno argues precisely how and why,
> on the basis of the MGA, one cannot take the status of matter (as
> opposed to its appearances) 'literally' from the perspective of
> computational theory.

No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as
well as CTM.

> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
> explanatory scheme.

Who's been doing that?

>  The opinions cited in the first posting assume
> the first of these theoretical commitments and hence choose to take
> the primacy of matter as their inferential fons et origo.  Comp takes
> the opposite position.  The rest is a research programme, isn't it?

Yes. For my money, metaphysics is a  subject-matter.
It is not an epistemological modus-operandi involving declarations of
irrefutable certainty.
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