2009/9/16 Flammarion <[email protected]> > > > > On 16 Sep, 16:02, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <[email protected]> > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 16 Sep, 14:58, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <[email protected]> > > > > > > > On 16 Sep, 13:49, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <[email protected]> > > > > > > > > > On 16 Sep, 13:30, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <[email protected]> > > > > > > > > > > > On 16 Sep, 12:54, David Nyman <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <[email protected]>: > > > > > > > > > > > > >> I find that I can't real say what the difference is > > > supposed > > > > > to be > > > > > > > > > > >> between numbers existing mathematically and numbers > > > existing > > > > > > > > > > >> Platonically, other than that different labels are > being > > > used. > > > > > > > What > > > > > > > > > > >> precisely is the latter supposed to entail that the > former > > > > > does > > > > > > > not, > > > > > > > > > > >> and what difference is this supposed to make? Can you > > > help, > > > > > > > Peter? > > > > > > > > > > > > > Existing mathematically doesn't have any ontoloigcal > > > meaning. > > > > > > > > > > > Both formalists and Platonists can agree that 7 exists, > > > > > > > > > > > since they agree Ex:x=7 is true, but only the latter > think > > > > > > > > > > > 7 has Platonic existence. > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes, but I still don't see what difference the word > > > 'ontological' > > > > > > > > > > makes in this context. Surely whatever world-conjuring > power > > > > > numbers > > > > > > > > > > may possess can't depend on which label is attached to > them? > > > > > > > > > > > The knowabilitry of a claim about what powers numbers > > > > > > > > > have can only depend on what labels are correctly attached. > > > > > > > > > Petrol is not flammable just becaue I attached the label > > > > > > > > > "flammable" to it. Petrol *Is* flammable, and that > > > > > > > > > makes the label-attachment correct. > > > > > > > > > > > > If a > > > > > > > > > > mathematical scheme fulfils a deep enough explanatory > role (a > > > > > moot > > > > > > > > > > point I admit) isn't that 'ontological' enough? > > > > > > > > > > > If you are claiming that the *existence* of numbers > > > > > > > > > would explain somehting empierica;, that is an abductive > > > > > > > > > argument for Platonism. Other than that sayign "Numbers > > > > > > > > > explain" is too vague. Numbers are often used to > > > > > > > > > explain things about other numbers. So what, > > > > > > > > > says the formalist, none of them exist and such > > > > > > > > > explanations are nothing but moves in a game. > > > > > > > > > > Well if it's a game how do you explain it fits observation ? > > > > > > > > > Much of it doesn't. > > > > > > > > > >How do you > > > > > > > > explain the predictability of physical theories (which are > *only* > > > > > numbers > > > > > > > > based) ? > > > > > > > > > They are a subset of maths which does fit obeserved > regularities. > > > > > > > Discarded theorie are another subset of maths that doesn't. > > > > > > > The Library of Babel contains history as well as fiction. > Think > > > about > > > > > > > it. > > > > > > > > That wasn't what I wanted to convey... please note the "which are > > > *only* > > > > > > numbers based". > > > > > > > At best that suggests that only the mathematical structures > > > > > exemplified > > > > > by correct physics exist (mathematical empriicsm rather than > Platonism > > > > > or Formalism). > > > > > > Why "at best" ? > > > > > Because phsyics containst false theories as well as true ones. If > > > all mathematical structures existed, that would not be the case. > > > > Well unless you could observe everything and then rightfully assert that > > exist, that doesn't, you can't be sure that theories alla Tegmark are > false. > > If Tegmark is correct. there are no false physical theories. > > But you can't justify Tegmarkism by appealing to a Tegmarkian > conception of physcis -- that is circular. >
Well, likewise you can't justify PM by appealing to a PM conception of physics. > > > But anyway i do not follow your "at best"... your "at best" is whishful > > thinking. By saying it you are commiting yourself to the PM theorie... > which > > is metaphysical. > > It's no more metaphysical than Platonism or Tegmarkism. > Sure, I was only pointing that your answer commit to PM theorie and that is metaphysical (as platonism or "tegmarkism" is of course). Regards, Quentin > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
