2009/9/16 Flammarion <[email protected]> > > > > On 16 Sep, 13:49, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <[email protected]> > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 16 Sep, 13:30, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <[email protected]> > > > > > > > On 16 Sep, 12:54, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <[email protected]>: > > > > > > > > >> I find that I can't real say what the difference is supposed > to be > > > > > > >> between numbers existing mathematically and numbers existing > > > > > > >> Platonically, other than that different labels are being used. > > > What > > > > > > >> precisely is the latter supposed to entail that the former > does > > > not, > > > > > > >> and what difference is this supposed to make? Can you help, > > > Peter? > > > > > > > > > Existing mathematically doesn't have any ontoloigcal meaning. > > > > > > > Both formalists and Platonists can agree that 7 exists, > > > > > > > since they agree Ex:x=7 is true, but only the latter think > > > > > > > 7 has Platonic existence. > > > > > > > > Yes, but I still don't see what difference the word 'ontological' > > > > > > makes in this context. Surely whatever world-conjuring power > numbers > > > > > > may possess can't depend on which label is attached to them? > > > > > > > The knowabilitry of a claim about what powers numbers > > > > > have can only depend on what labels are correctly attached. > > > > > Petrol is not flammable just becaue I attached the label > > > > > "flammable" to it. Petrol *Is* flammable, and that > > > > > makes the label-attachment correct. > > > > > > > > If a > > > > > > mathematical scheme fulfils a deep enough explanatory role (a > moot > > > > > > point I admit) isn't that 'ontological' enough? > > > > > > > If you are claiming that the *existence* of numbers > > > > > would explain somehting empierica;, that is an abductive > > > > > argument for Platonism. Other than that sayign "Numbers > > > > > explain" is too vague. Numbers are often used to > > > > > explain things about other numbers. So what, > > > > > says the formalist, none of them exist and such > > > > > explanations are nothing but moves in a game. > > > > > > Well if it's a game how do you explain it fits observation ? > > > > > Much of it doesn't. > > > > > >How do you > > > > explain the predictability of physical theories (which are *only* > numbers > > > > based) ? > > > > > They are a subset of maths which does fit obeserved regularities. > > > Discarded theorie are another subset of maths that doesn't. > > > The Library of Babel contains history as well as fiction. Think about > > > it. > > > > That wasn't what I wanted to convey... please note the "which are *only* > > numbers based". > > At best that suggests that only the mathematical structures > exemplified > by correct physics exist (mathematical empriicsm rather than Platonism > or Formalism). >
Why "at best" ? > > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
