Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> The theory
>>>>> explains what exists, and how the rest emerges from it.
>>>> But then doesn't the "rest" exist, too? I just see a problem with
>>>> claiming
>>>> to explain what exists, when it is really not clear what existance
>>>> could
>>>> mean apart from the relatively meaningful, but vague, every day use.
>>>
>>> In that context existence is the same as in the expression "it exists
>>> a number having this or that property". Among the property there will
>>> be property like "relatively to that number this number observe this
>>> phenomenon". the rest belongs to the dream of numbers, and they do
>>> those dream because they describe computations. We assume  
>>> mechanism, I
>>> recall.
>> Okay, though I still think it's advisable to not use simply  
>> "existence" as a
>> word a here, because it sounds too exclusive. "What exists" sounds  
>> like
>> "Everything that exists".
>> And I find "dreams of numbers" sounds as if the dreams where less
>> fundamental than the numbers.
> 
> They are. Numbers are primitive. The variable x and y represents  
> excusively those numbers. Finite pieces of computation are speical  
> numbers, like prime numbers. To be a (finite piece of a) computation  
> is a property of number, a relation which has to be defined in term of  
> addition and multiplication of numbers. To be a computation are  
> emergent property (emerging from addition and multiplication).
Sorry, I just don't get it. Your theory necessarily presumes dreams before
numbers, because for you numbers appear just in your dreams. Additionally,
the notion of numbers relies on the notion of truth, which is a notion that
fundamentally can't be defined, only known. Without *experiencing* truth
there is no sense to numbers. So there are numbers without there being
"dreaming"/experiencing first.

It seems to me that you call that "primitive", which relies already on the
truths ("there are dreams/experiences") of which it gives emergence to. Do
you see my problem with that? 



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> But since you don't only assume mechanism, but
>> also conciousness (like all theories)
> 
> Digitam mechanism (comp) assumes consciousness explicitly (cf the  
> sense of the "yes doctor"). Most theories does not assume  
> "consciousness". The word does not appear in the description of the  
> theories.
I don't think it's necessary to write that you assume conciousness. All
theories assume truth and still no one makes this implicit. Because it is
obivous; you simply can't deny there is truth or that you're concious. Well,
actually you can deny it, but then it is clear for me that your use of the
words "conciousness" or "truth" doesn't point to what I mean.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> and consensual reality (the dreams in
>> which the representations of numbers appear), I don't see how it  
>> makes sense
>> to put numbers "before" conciousness and (perceived) reality.
> 
> Well, it is a bit like "addition" comes before "being prime". You need  
> addition in Robinson arithmetic to define what a prime number is. Then  
> you need addition, and prime, before defining when a number represent  
> a finite piece of computation. And you need that to eventually attach  
> consciousness to computations. The "before" is logical, not temporal.
I need someone making sense of "addition in Robinson arithmetic" before I
(logically) can refer to addition in Robinson arithmetic (or if you want it
this way "I need the sense itself in 'addition in Robinson arithmetic'
before I can refer to addition in Robinson arithmetic"). 
It makes sense for me to say that we need numbers in order to link
conciousness to numbers, but that is already obvious. But you need
conciousness (the mysterious "senser" or "sensing") in order to make sense
of anything, including numbers.
Numbers just come before any *notion* of conciousness that is reflected in
the numbers, but they can't come before conciousness itself. Or at least I
don't get what this could mean.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>> But this is just insulting the machines, and nothing else.
>> My point is not to insult machines. A machine is identified by what  
>> it does,
>> because feelings can not be uniquely linked with a machine.
> 
> Why? We can, for all practical purpose, attach a mind to a machine.  
> What we cannot do is to attach a machine to a mind, but "only" an  
> infinity of machine to a mind.
How can we attach a mind to a machine? If you have the description of a
machine, you know what it feels? You are a machine lover indeed ;).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Conciousness is already attached to an
>> infinity of machines and from our perspective we are at least  
>> conciousness;
>> that which is always sure here and now. So every observer, just by  
>> virtue of
>> observing *anything*, already feels the truth about an infinity of  
>> machines.
>> But *are* we machines then? If we always are or "could be"  
>> infinitely many
>> machines, if we always feel some truth about *every machine*, it is  
>> not a
>> bit of an understatement to say we are a machine or even machines?
> 
> You are right, and that is why sometimes I sum up the reversal by  
> saying that
> 3-we being a 3-machine entails that the 1-we are not machine.
> There is a sense to say that first person, from the first person view,  
> are not machine. This is already true for the third (and seventh and  
> eigth) hypostases. the machine already tell us that they are not  
> machine, from their point of view. But G*, the "theologian of the  
> machine" knows that 1-we = 3-we. The machine cannot know that.
This is not clear for me. "3-we being a 3-machine entails that the 1-we are
not machine.", but "1-we = 3-we"...? How could this possibly be? It seems to
be possible only if it is wrong that 3-we is a machine, but assuming it
leads to the right conclusion it is not a machine. But this would mean COMP
is self-refuting.

-- 
View this message in context: 
http://old.nabble.com/Why-I-am-I--tp26616194p26969001.html
Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com.

--

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.


Reply via email to