Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Honestly I think you are a bit dishonest to yourself here, since you
>> already
>> presume the appearance of matter,
>
> I assume nowhere primitive matter. I do assume "consensual reality".
> If not, I would not post message on a list.
Well, that was my point. So indeed numbers don't make sense independent of
that, because
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> unless you can make theories about numbers
>> without perceiving anything, which I doubt.
>
> Humans cannot do that, but this is independent which are simùpler
> concept. All scientists agrees on numbers, and to day we can explain
> in a precise sense why numbers is the least we have to assume.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> When you do abstract math you
>> nevertheless work with matter, that is, word written on paper or on a
>> computer screen. So either you can indeed make sense of a circular
>> theory
>
> Indeed. That is the case. Circularity is fundamental. I will soon
> explain this through the second recursion theorem of Kleene. The whole
> AUDA things is based almost exclusively based on that handling of
> circularity, which makes the self-reference possible, for machine, and
> relatively to universal machine(s).
So we seem to agree actually.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Of course, the human conception of the numbers depends on the human
>>> conception of his neighborhood and life, but when searching a TOE we
>>> have to agree on the simplest objects (ontology) from which we derive
>>> the others (phenomenology).
>> For me this is not meaningful. What kind of phenomology could be
>> derived
>> from the "fundamental" numbers?
>
> You may read Plotinus, for having an informal idea. The
> phenomenologies corresponds to the hypostases, + intelligible and
> sensible matter.
> from the numbers (+ comp) we can explain the non communicability of
> consciousness, its local undoubtability, how "primitive matter"
> emerges and leads to first plural quantum-like indeterminacies, etc.
What I find difficult to grasp: If conciousness is non communicable how
could we explai
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Basically just that they need to be
>> phenomena and that they are not expressible in terms of something
>> else. But
>> this for me has little to do with what the phenomena *are*.
>
> I don't understand this.
Well every strictly formal theory will just explain you phenomena formally.
But since phenomena are something that trascends formalities, they fail to
explain that which is fundamental to phenomena.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> It's like a
>> theory saying: "There is something, but don't aks me what it is."
>
> You should study the theory, and makes specific remark.
That would lead nowhere, since I don't have anything specific against the
theory. It's just that I think claiming it to explain something fundamental
is missleading; it makes one search fundamental truth where there is none.
Because what is fundamental to everyone is his own experience.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> The theory
> explains what exists, and how the rest emerges from it.
But then doesn't the "rest" exist, too? I just see a problem with claiming
to explain what exists, when it is really not clear what existance could
mean apart from the relatively meaningful, but vague, every day use.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Searching it for me feels like searching something that is not there
>> (it
>> feels *bad*).
>
> You are right, in the sense that we already know there is no complete
> theory of what universal machines, or numbers, can do and not do.
> But that is the reason to become aware that about numbers and machine,
> we know nothing, and the hypothesis that we are machine, makes physics
> a concrete sum on all computations and this has observable consequences.
>
> We are just trying to understand what happens. don't confuse the
> search of a theory of everything, with any normative or authoritative
> theology.
>
> If you don't search for a theory of everything, you will adopt the
> current one. A brain is already a (failed) attempt toward a theory of
> everything. Searching *that* is what universal machines do. There is
> no problem with admitting that the word "everything" can have an
> evolving meaning in most terrestrial or effective context.
I see where you coming from, but in effect a "theory of everything" is
really just a theory of "something" then. The word "everything" itself has
sort of a absolute connotation, because it doesn't say everything of *WHAT*?
Relativizing it makes clear that the word "everything" is meaningless
without context, though than it is just confusing to still use the word
without context .
Really we only discuss semantics here... I just find "theory of everything"
sounds authorative, because it seems to claim there is nothing else to
explain. Basically that is my only problem with a "theory of everything" -
it is either a confusing name or disingenious,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> But
>>> elementary arithmetics does explain both consciousness, including its
>>> non definability
>> That's funny, because this is little more than empty words for me.
>
> Read the papers. Or ask questions.
I don't what conciousness really is. So in order to to explain it to me, you
would have to define it... But wait, you just said elementary arithmetics
explains it can't defined... What can't be defined? I don't even know what
exactly your referring to!
You seem to assume I already have a clear view of what conciousness is, so
you don't need to define it in order to be meaningful. Indeed you don't have
to, because I very roughly know what conciousness could refer too. But then
your theory is very vague, because the object it seeks to explain is very
vague. Or the theory is clear, but is says: "This theory does not explain
what is vague in this theory." But then you can't claim to have a theory of
fundamental existance or reality or everything.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> , and matter, including both its computational and non
>>> computational aspects.
>> For me matter is explained by the fact that it is touchable,
>> seeable, and so
>> forth. Elementary arithmetics cannot do that. So no, it doesn't
>> explain
>> matter for me.
>
> Hmm... Not yet read UDA I see.
I did read UDA.It explains why we can't both postulate we are machines and
that physics is independent of us (and thus independent of arithmetics), so
materialism (there exists matter and nothing else) is shown to be
meaningless (if we accept COMP).
But I can't touch anything in it, because it is just a text. This already
proves to me it doesn't explain what matter really is to me.
Probably I do not fully agree with axiom number 3, because it claims numbers
to be independent of me and you, while I don't even understand what me
really is and what the difference between me and you is - and whether it is
an absolute or relative difference. How could I then postulate numbers are
independent of something so vague (yet obviously important)? After all, some
kind of "me" seems to exists everywhere numbers are understood, so it seems
to be unreasonable to postulate their independent existance.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> If you have a better explanation, I can listen, but why not study the
>>> existing explanation?
>> My "explanation" is that every explanation in words is suboptimal/
>> incomplete
>> and you need to trascend words in order to get a better explanation.
>
> But this is a "theorem" in "my theory/conjecture/hypothesis" (that we
> are machine).
But then "your" theory is not a TOE at all, because it itself admits it
doesn't explain everything. :wistle:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Another try: The only ultimate explanation for everything is that
>> everything
>> is the ultimate explanation. Or that there is no divorce between
>> explanation
>> for reality/everything and reality itself - they are the same! After
>> all,
>> *what could* explain everything, except itself :D? It's
>> acknowledging that
>> circularity is valid, though not useful in all expressions and
>> contexts.
>
>
> That's cute, but we are trying to do a bit of science here. And I
> don't like your religion which seems to imply our quest is vain, right
> at the start; which is ridiculous compared to what we a have already
> discovered.
>
> You are a bit dogmatic. Humans cannot fly, so all attempts to do so is
> necessarily ridiculous.
I'm indeed dogmatic on some things. I can't help myself. I *just know*
theories don't explain everything since everytime I try to grasp a theory
the truth "theories explain not everything since the experience you have
right know explains something a theory can't explain" gets transmitted,
too. Althoug sometimes it is so vague, that I don't really remember that
this makes it futile to want a theory to explain everything (I just get a
bad feeling then).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> So why aks a question that can't be answered with words at all?
>>>
>>> It is up to you to show the question cannot answered at all, and for
>>> this you need a theory.
>> No I don't. You already see in front of you that the answer to any
>> ultimate
>> question (ultimate *for you*) is not to be found in words (since
>> words only
>> appear *in* your experience, which I take as meaning that experience
>> is more
>> ultimate than words) so any theory is superfluous in that matter.
>
> I have no clue what you are saying, and what you mean by explaining
> through words. The nice point with the computational hypothesis is
> that itv explains exactly that, why, if we are machine, we are
> confronted to the non expressible, the non provable, the non
> computable, necessarily. I explain why universal machine get both
> mystical and rational at the same time.
But then you admit arithmetics can not be a theory of everything at all...
Every explanation of everything, necessarily must transcend all theories.
You say I need a theory to show you that some questions cannot be adequately
answered with words and than you say that your theory says we don't need a
theory to know that some questions cannot be adequately answered with words
(because with every sensation, for example the sensation of getting an
answer to a question, we get confronted to the "non communicable", that is,
that which transcends words). A little akward I think.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Personally I think research always starts in experience and words
>> are for
>> conveying some part of what you experienced to someone else.
>
> Sure. The theory I study, and the methodology I am using, is based on
> some acknowledgment on that fact.
>
> Do you think it is possible that we are machine, (that we can survive
> with an artificial brain)
Well, I don't think the question whether we survive something in an absolute
way is pretty meaningless. If I absolutely don't survive something, than
there is no one there to survive or not survive. So as long as I am there, I
will survive *anything*.
So yes, we can survive with an artificial brain and we can survive with no
brain at all, because the question "who has a brain?" is a relative question
already.
So does this mean we are machines? Well, I think we are and we are not... It
depends on what you mean with "are" and "we". Ultimately, though, I prefer
to say we are not machines, because all descriptions fail to describe what
we *really* are. Beauty and freedom cannot be directly described, but only
felt.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> and if so, have you understand that it
> entails a reversal between physics and number theory (or combinator, C+
> +; whatever).
I think I understood your reasoning. I think it's obvious that in so far as
we are machines, the shapes of what we perceive can only be explained by our
inner functioning ("machine psychology"?).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> But since we
>> don't know what our words exactly mean to someone else we better
>> don't take
>> them too serious.
>
> In science we have to take our ideas (words) seriously, and make them
> the most precise as possible. Only then are we able to discover the
> inconsistency of our ideas, and progress.
I agree. But only if you don't take this seriousness to serious. "Serious"
has a connotation of rigidness. But true science is of course not rigid. If
you try to make science completly rigid (axiomitize everything) it simply
becomes inconsistent (it shakes of all rigidness if you want;-)).
Science needs flexibility and playfulness. I just said "too serious", not
"not serious at all". I'm afraid you took me to serious:-D.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> I think your way of thinking (in this paragraph, not neccesarily in
>> general
>> ;-)) is somewhat dangerous, because it leads to pseuodo-precision and
>> pseudo-control.
>
> I would have prefered: partial precision and partial control. "Pseudo"
> seems only insulting.
You're right, I sounds indeed insulting. I didn't want to sound that way. I
don't think you wanted to be authorative, it's just that I think it sounds
authorative to act like a theory is vague or clear independent of your own
perception of it.
I think clear / vague are relative notions. For someone who doesn't
understand a theory it's extremely vague, for someone who does it may be
very clear. Someone may dismiss a work of art as almost meaningless / having
a vague massage, while someone else will find the message it wants to convey
more clear than all "scientific theories" could be.
Honestly I think we even can't seperate science and art totally. Both really
come down to taste, even though science relies more on measurements than on
intuition (though still it is dependent on intuition) and art has (mostly)
no intention being formally rigid.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> From wanting to be clearer than you can (or others can
>> understand), dangerous things like authorative religion and states
>> (in the
>> form of various repressive systems / ...cracys like democracy) emerge.
>
> Well democracy, imo, is the less repressive systems, although
> obviously democracies are not immune against many form of "humans
> taste of authoritative argument weakness" in many democratic sub-
> institution (Democracies can be rotten, like the human body can have
> tumors).
I too think democracy is the least repressive system we have. But I believe
wanting to resolve important and complex matters like healthcare or security
in a rigid system is bound to fail.
Democracy itself is already authorative, because it claims authorative force
to be legitimate as long as it is suppported by the majority (at least in
theory, practically often even this isn't the case). I prefer a society
where force (or the threat thereof),- IMO one of the most destructive form
of authority - is generally seen as not legitimate, unless in situations of
self-defence. This is incompatible with a state, and thus with democracy as
commonly understood.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> I think you have not read well my posts or papers, because I show that
> computationalism prevents the authoritative argument everywhere in
> science, and this including theology (and that is new, since at least
> 1500 years).
I already got that. Nevertheless sometimes you seem to use authorative
language. Actually I think everybody does. I just wanted to point it out.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I am *not* against making clear theories. I'm against acting like
>> having a
>> clear theory, when actually the theory makes nothing clear for most
>> people.
>
> What is unclear? Don't confuse the reasoning, which is long and rather
> very new for some Aristotelian, and the theory, which is the clearest
> of all theories (and actually believed by most rationalist,
> unfortunately in company of a less clearer theory (materialism).
>
> But if you really think that comp is unclear, just ask precision. It
> is the usual manner to proceed.
I think comp is unclear in that it postulates "we" are machines, even though
we do not understand what "we" are. How could we say X is a machine, while X
is totally mysterious to us?
Of course every theory concerning "us" has this problem. This is exactly why
I think every theory concerning us is necessarily vague.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> And all theories regarding fundamental things make very little
>> clear, which
>> shows itself in the theory making no realistically testable
>> predictions and
>> in having no practical application (like string theory).
>
> Comp, including the Theaetetus's definition, makes utterly clear
> experimental predictions.
For example?
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