I willl not reply to all parts of your post in detail, because I think we
mainly discuss semantics on some specific issues. I feel we agree on most
things either way, it seems pointless to get 

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> It's like a
>>> theory saying: "There is something, but don't aks me what it is."
>> You should study the theory, and makes specific remark.
> That would lead nowhere, since I don't have anything specific  
> against the
> theory. It's just that I think claiming it to explain something  
> fundamental
> is missleading; it makes one search fundamental truth where there is  
> none.
> Because what is fundamental to everyone is his own experience.

I agree. But then study the theory which explains why machine can  
already understand this, but that we have to explain physics from the  
number if we want to take the theory seriously.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I have never claim it explains something fundamental, it explains a  
> "new" problem, the problem of justifying how machine dreams "glue"  
> enough to stabilize first person plural sharable observation.
"The theory   
explains what exists, and how the rest emerges from it."... Sounds pretty
fundamental to me ;). I think your wording was just a bit absolute for me
here, maybe you should be more careful there, maybe I just took you too
serious. After all you're talking in the context of a theory, so I should
take "The theory   
explains what exists, and how the rest emerges from it." as ""The theory   
explains what exists as formalizable in the theory, and explains from it how
there must be more than this, which trascends the formalities of this

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> The theory
>>> explains what exists, and how the rest emerges from it.
>> But then doesn't the "rest" exist, too? I just see a problem with  
>> claiming
>> to explain what exists, when it is really not clear what existance  
>> could
>> mean apart from the relatively meaningful, but vague, every day use.
> In that context existence is the same as in the expression "it exists  
> a number having this or that property". Among the property there will  
> be property like "relatively to that number this number observe this  
> phenomenon". the rest belongs to the dream of numbers, and they do  
> those dream because they describe computations. We assume mechanism, I  
> recall.
Okay, though I still think it's advisable to not use simply "existence" as a
word a here, because it sounds too exclusive. "What exists" sounds like
"Everything that exists". 
And I find "dreams of numbers" sounds as if the dreams where less
fundamental than the numbers. But since you don't only assume mechanism, but
also conciousness (like all theories) and consensual reality (the dreams in
which the representations of numbers appear), I don't see how it makes sense
to put numbers "before" conciousness and (perceived) reality.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Really we only discuss semantics here... I just find "theory of  
>> everything"
>> sounds authorative, because it seems to claim there is nothing else to
>> explain. Basically that is my only problem with a "theory of  
>> everything" -
>> it is either a confusing name or disingenious,
> And what do you think about "theology". The idea is to unify knowledge  
> in a coherent realm, which does not eliminate the person nor the  
> appearances, but help to figure them out.
Not so good. Theology sounds too big. After all, there is no science or any
other practice that does not study spirituality or god in some sense. By
calling it theology it sounds like "your" theory is especially close to
grasping god. But I don't think it's any good to ever invoke closeness to
god in any theory.
I would like "theory of relationship of numbers and that which trascends
them" or something more precise and modest, without using "everything" or
some appeal to god.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> But
>>>>> elementary arithmetics does explain both consciousness, including  
>>>>> its
>>>>> non definability
>>>> That's funny, because this is little more than empty words for me.
>>> Read the papers. Or ask questions.
>> I don't what conciousness really is.
> I am sure you know very well what it is. Think of what is common in  
> all subjective experiences.
What is common in all subjective experience...? I don't really know.
Something is, that is for sure, but I don't know what!

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> So in order to to explain it to me, you
>> would have to define it...
> Not at all. To make theories we need only to share some statements  
> about something. We never define really the object of our thought and  
> theories.
> I cannot define two you what is a line, bit we may agree that two  
> points determines a unique line, for example. And reason from that.
> I cannot define to you consciousness, but we may agree on some  
> statement on it, like conscious people cannot doubt "here and now"  
> that they are conscious, for example.
Okay, but then you don't explain what conciousness is, but rather *that* it
is. But this really exlains nothing, because I knew it already ;). So I
don't get where the explanation is. Maybe you explain that elementary
arithmetics is compatible with conciousness, but this is far from explaining
conciousness itself, I am afraid.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> so
>> you don't need to define it in order to be meaningful. Indeed you  
>> don't have
>> to, because I very roughly know what conciousness could refer too.  
>> But then
>> your theory is very vague, because the object it seeks to explain is  
>> very
>> vague.
> I don't think it vague at all. As I said on the FOR list, it is the  
> difference between faking to be tortured and being tortured. If you  
> undersatnd that diffrence, we mau-y already agree on many things about  
> consciousness.
The difference between faking to be tortured and being tortured is not being
concious, in my opinion. Somone faking something is necessarily concious,

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Then, comp is the hypothesis that my relative consciousness will  
> remains unchanged for some substitution of my parts (betting on some  
> level). From this you can already get startling counter-intuitive  
> result, notably that physicalism doesn't work.
"my relative consciousness" is so vague for me. In order to make sense of
this I would need to understand more about conciousness than it being here
and now and undoubtable (otherwise I cannot relate it to anything else in an
intellectual way).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Or the theory is clear, but is says: "This theory does not explain
>> what is vague in this theory." But then you can't claim to have a  
>> theory of
>> fundamental existance or reality or everything.
> All what I claim is that IF e are machine, then, in soccer language:  
> And I don't pretend it is the last match.
> I am a logician. I am interested in the relations between (human, and  
> then machine/numbers) beliefs. All what I say is that those who  
> believe in primitive matter/physicalism, have to abandon mechanism (or  
> rationalism). Or, equivalently, that those who believe in mechanism,  
> have to abandon materialism (and indeed have to explain physics from  
> the numbers: a new problem if you want).
OK, I like this. ;)

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> If you have a better explanation, I can listen, but why not study  
>>>>> the
>>>>> existing explanation?
>>>> My "explanation" is that every explanation in words is suboptimal/
>>>> incomplete
>>>> and you need to trascend words in order to get a better explanation.
>>> But this is a "theorem" in "my theory/conjecture/hypothesis" (that we
>>> are machine).
>> But then "your" theory is not a TOE at all, because it itself admits  
>> it
>> doesn't explain everything. :wistle:
> yes, if you understand the theory, you will understand that we are  
> infinitely more ignorant. You may intuit that science has not yet  
> begin (or perhaps it has begun in -500, and stopped in +500).
> And yes, a part of that ignorance is intrinsical and fundamental. It  
> is was makes truth an "eternal attractors". The theory is indeed a  
> negative theology in the sense of the neoplatonist.
OK, so we finally agree that there is nothing even close to a theory of
everything... ;)

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Another try: The only ultimate explanation for everything is that
>>>> everything
>>>> is the ultimate explanation. Or that there is no divorce between
>>>> explanation
>>>> for reality/everything and reality itself - they are the same! After
>>>> all,
>>>> *what could* explain everything, except itself :D? It's
>>>> acknowledging that
>>>> circularity is valid, though not useful in all expressions and
>>>> contexts.
>>> That's cute, but we are trying to do a bit of science here. And I
>>> don't like your religion which seems to imply our quest is vain,  
>>> right
>>> at the start; which is ridiculous compared to what we a have already
>>> discovered.
>>> You are a bit dogmatic. Humans cannot fly, so all attempts to do so  
>>> is
>>> necessarily ridiculous.
>> I'm indeed dogmatic on some things. I can't help myself. I *just know*
>> theories don't explain everything since everytime I try to grasp a  
>> theory
>> the truth "theories explain not everything since the experience you  
>> have
>> right know explains something a theory can't explain"  gets  
>> transmitted,
>> too. Althoug sometimes it is so vague, that I don't really remember  
>> that
>> this makes it futile to want a theory to explain everything (I just  
>> get a
>> bad feeling then).
> You take the expression "theory of everything" too much seriously.  
This was obviously my problem. Maybe I should adhere more to what I write

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> If you have already an answer, you may or not try to communicate it to  
> some others. But you cannot use that fact to discourage another to try  
> to communicate his idea.
This was not my intention. Sorry if I seemed discouraging.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> So does this mean we are machines? Well, I think we are and we are  
>> not... It
>> depends on what you mean with "are" and "we". Ultimately, though, I  
>> prefer
>> to say we are not machines, because all descriptions fail to  
>> describe what
>> we *really* are. Beauty and freedom cannot be directly described,  
>> but only
>> felt.
> The point is that the consciousness of any machine is already not  
> described by, nor describable by the machine. So this cannot be an  
> argument, just a statement that *you* feel superior to *any* machine  
> in the art of feeling beauty and freedom.
> But this is just insulting the machines, and nothing else.
My point is not to insult machines. A machine is identified by what it does,
because feelings can not be uniquely linked with a machine. So it makes more
sense for me to say that we are or have a perspective(s) on (the relations
of) infinitely many machines. Conciousness is already attached to an
infinity of machines and from our perspective we are at least conciousness;
that which is always sure here and now. So every observer, just by virtue of
observing *anything*, already feels the truth about an infinity of machines.
But *are* we machines then? If we always are or "could be" infinitely many
machines, if we always feel some truth about *every machine*, it is not a
bit of an understatement to say we are a machine or even machines?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> and if so, have you understand that it
>>> entails a reversal between physics and number theory (or  
>>> combinator, C+
>>> +; whatever).
>> I think I understood your reasoning. I think it's obvious that in so  
>> far as
>> we are machines, the shapes of what we perceive can only be  
>> explained by our
>> inner functioning ("machine psychology"?).
> OK. But it is not obvious for every one. Nothing is. 
I agree, I don't claim it is obvious. Really, it only became obvious to me
after reading your proof. I just meant "very clear".

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> I think you have not read well my posts or papers, because I show  
>>> that
>>> computationalism prevents the authoritative argument everywhere in
>>> science, and this including theology (and that is new, since at least
>>> 1500 years).
>> I already got that. Nevertheless sometimes you seem to use authorative
>> language. Actually I think everybody does. I just wanted to point it  
>> out.
> Don't hesitate to tell me where. If I did, it has to be a typo error!
I referred to the use of words like "everything", "existence", _theo_logy
with reference to a theory that claims to explain something...

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