On 06 Jan 2010, at 03:34, Brent Meeker wrote:

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Nick Prince wrote:Hi Brent Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this: "So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner experience only to the type of computation involved. The reason is that only those types are univocally related to all their possible counterfactuals. This entails that, from a first person point of view, not onlythe physical cannot be distinguished from the virtual, but thevirtualcan no more be distinguished from the arithmetical. Now DU is emulated platonistically by the verifiable propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the form ‘‘it exists n such thatP(n)’’ with P(n) decidable. Their truth entails their provability,andthey are known under the name of Sigma1 sentence. If comp is correct, the appearance of physics must be recovered from some point of views emerging from those propositions.Why only the atomic sentences? Why not all true sentences? How is"appearance" recovered?

`The atomic propositions p, q, r of the modal logic (G) are interpreted`

`by the Sigma_1 sentences of Arithmetic (with shape ExP(x), P`

`decidable). Dovetailing on their (infinitely many) proofs can be shown`

`equivalent with a universal dovetailing (and thus truly universal with`

`Church thesis). Limiting the arithmetical interpretation on that tiny`

`Sigma_1 complete part is the way to interview the *computationalist"`

`machine.`

`The formula "p -> Bp" characterizes such Sigma_1 arithmetical formula,`

`provably so, by the Löbian machine.`

So G + p -> Bp is used in the final.

Indeed, taking into account the seven steps once more, we arrive at the conclusion that the physical atomic (in the Boolean logician sense) invariant proposition must be given by a probability measure on those propositions.But what gives the probability measure? Is it just the relativefrequency of occurrence of the atomic sentences in the UD output upto a given step?

`The 'measure one' will have a logic related to the logic of Bp & Dt`

`(and variants). The measure itself may follow, or not.`

`Incompleteness; being self-discoverable, provides a geometry on the`

`common ignorance of all universal machines, from which the 'physical`

`laws" should emerge.`

`Hmm... I guess you miss something in the MGA, or with computational`

`supervenience. Computational supervenience is really "step 7", but in`

`front of arithmetical realism, which contains UD* in some way.`

Not easy stuff ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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