On 06 Jan 2010, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order
than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even
what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state
It seems strange that we start with the hypothesis that
consciousness is a kind of computation - a sequential processing
of information - and then arrive at picture in which there is no
processing and sequence is just inferred. On the one hand
consciousness is a process, on the other hand it is static state.
I suspect there is something wrong with the slicing of the stream
of consciousness into zero-duration, non-overlapping states.
But that problem occurs also with physics, as illustrated by the
debate on "time" and "block universe". Also, we have to be careful:
no where it has been said that consciousness is a kind of
It's been said on this list several times (at least by me :-) ).
I would not brag on this. Physicalist does such identification mistake
(mind = brain, for example).
Consciousness is a first person apprehension of itself, a belief/
kowledge in a reality, etc. It may associate (with some probability)
to a particular computation, but it is better not to identify them.
It is subtle. A lot of identification will be true (= provable by G*),
yet, not provable by the machine (not provable by G).
Those identification are "religious" (belongs to G* minus G). They are
true but not provable, and this plays some key role for the
understanding of what happens.
It's not obvious to me. If the doctor says to me, "This artificial-
hypothalmus I'm going to substitute for yours, does exactly the same
input-output computations that your original does.", then I'll be
much more inclined to say "yes" than if he says it doesn't do any
Obviously "consciousness" is not a kind of computation.
This shows only that some computation can bear consciousness, not that
consciousness is equal to a computation.
Being a first person notion, it is better (still slighty false) to
attach consciousness to all "similar" computation in the UD.
Then the relative proportion of relative measure will distinguish
between the probable experiences and the rare (white rabbit) one.
It is a property of (first) person, which, assuming mechanism, is
invariant for a set of functional substitution.
What is invariant under the functional substitution if not the
OK. And with comp, if the functional substitutions are done at the
right level, consciousness will be preserved too, but this does not
mean that the consciousness is the computation.
A functional substitution can preserve the fact that you are winning a
chess game, but the state of "winning a chess game" is not a
computation per se, it is something else, which can be locally attach
to some computation, but no more.
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