Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order S1/S2/S3 than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even understand what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state order. QuentinIt seems strange that we start with the hypothesis that consciousnessis a kind of computation - a sequential processing of information -and then arrive at picture in which there is no processing andsequence is just inferred. On the one hand consciousness is aprocess, on the other hand it is static state. I suspect there issomething wrong with the slicing of the stream of consciousness intozero-duration, non-overlapping states.But that problem occurs also with physics, as illustrated by thedebate on "time" and "block universe".Also, we have to be careful: no where it has been said thatconsciousness is a kind of computation.

It's been said on this list several times (at least by me :-) ).

Obviously "consciousness" is not a kind of computation.

`It's not obvious to me. If the doctor says to me, "This`

`artificial-hypothalmus I'm going to substitute for yours, does exactly`

`the same input-output computations that your original does.", then I'll`

`be much more inclined to say "yes" than if he says it doesn't do any`

`computation.`

It is a property of (first) person, which, assuming mechanism, isinvariant for a set of functional substitution.

What is invariant under the functional substitution if not the computations? Brent

Then a reasoning shows that we cannot distinguish a "physicalcomputation" from a mathematical one, and that we have to take thisinto account for justifying the (conscious) appearance of the physicallaws.Slicing the stream of consciousness, or just the stream of time likethe physicists do a lot, into zero-length interval is a critics of theuse of real number, and somehow comp escapes it, given that realnumbers does not (necessarily) exists at the ontological level. Theyexist necessarily at the epistemological level though.I can see that states can encode information that, when coarsegrained, define a sequence of increasing entropy, but is itlegitimate to identify having the information "in memory" with"remembering"?In my opinion, time is far less problematical in comp than in physics,given that we assume a form of primitive time, first by the numberorder, then by the length of computations or of proofs.Arithmletic and provability logic are so "antisymmetrical" that I wasafraid the comp physics would contradict the very symmetry of nature(laws of physics are reversible, most computations are not).But the "intelligible and sensible" comp "matter" (the probability onedefined by Bp & Dt (& p), luckily enough seems able to restaure thesymmetry, or at least some symmetry. Enough? Open problem.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email toeverything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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