Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order S1/S2/S3
than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even understand
what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state order.
Quentin
It seems strange that we start with the hypothesis that consciousness
is a kind of computation - a sequential processing of information -
and then arrive at picture in which there is no processing and
sequence is just inferred. On the one hand consciousness is a
process, on the other hand it is static state. I suspect there is
something wrong with the slicing of the stream of consciousness into
zero-duration, non-overlapping states.
But that problem occurs also with physics, as illustrated by the
debate on "time" and "block universe".
Also, we have to be careful: no where it has been said that
consciousness is a kind of computation.
It's been said on this list several times (at least by me :-) ).
Obviously "consciousness" is not a kind of computation.
It's not obvious to me. If the doctor says to me, "This
artificial-hypothalmus I'm going to substitute for yours, does exactly
the same input-output computations that your original does.", then I'll
be much more inclined to say "yes" than if he says it doesn't do any
computation.
It is a property of (first) person, which, assuming mechanism, is
invariant for a set of functional substitution.
What is invariant under the functional substitution if not the computations?
Brent
Then a reasoning shows that we cannot distinguish a "physical
computation" from a mathematical one, and that we have to take this
into account for justifying the (conscious) appearance of the physical
laws.
Slicing the stream of consciousness, or just the stream of time like
the physicists do a lot, into zero-length interval is a critics of the
use of real number, and somehow comp escapes it, given that real
numbers does not (necessarily) exists at the ontological level. They
exist necessarily at the epistemological level though.
I can see that states can encode information that, when coarse
grained, define a sequence of increasing entropy, but is it
legitimate to identify having the information "in memory" with
"remembering"?
In my opinion, time is far less problematical in comp than in physics,
given that we assume a form of primitive time, first by the number
order, then by the length of computations or of proofs.
Arithmletic and provability logic are so "antisymmetrical" that I was
afraid the comp physics would contradict the very symmetry of nature
(laws of physics are reversible, most computations are not).
But the "intelligible and sensible" comp "matter" (the probability one
defined by Bp & Dt (& p), luckily enough seems able to restaure the
symmetry, or at least some symmetry. Enough? Open problem.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
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