2010/1/11 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>:

> But aren't you assuming that consciousness is produced by the abstract
> Platonic computation - rather than by the actual physical process (which is
> not the same) - in other words assuming the thing being argued?

No, I'm at this point assuming only that consciousness is produced by
the physical process. We can assume for simplicity that the two
machines M1 and M2 have similar architecture and similar operating
systems. Once the program is loaded into M2 from the disc, S2 proceeds
exactly the same as it would have had the computation been allowed to
continue running on M1. Therefore, at least after the first few
milliseconds, the subjective content of S2 must be the same as it
would have been on the one machine. Could the subjective content be
different at the transition between S1 and S2 if the computation is
split up? If there is a subjective difference it won't be something
the subject can notice because, later in the course of S2, he can have
no memory of it. It also can't be a difference that would disrupt the
completion of a task or thought that requires continuity of
consciousness spanning S1-S2, since again the subject cannot have any
evidence that such a disruption occurred.

Stathis Papaioannou
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