Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>:
I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed
about the
computation being "the same". Is it the same Platonic
algorithm? Is it
one that has the same steps as described in FORTRAN, but
not those in LISP?
Is it just one that has the same input-output? I think
these are questions
that have been bypassed in the "yes doctor" scenario.
Saying "yes" to the
doctor seems unproblematic when you think of replacing a
few neurons with
artificial ones - all you care about is the input-output.
But then when you
jump to replacing a whole brain maybe you care about the
FORTRAN/LISP
differences. Yet on this list there seems to be an
assumption that you can
just jump to the Platonic algorithm or even a Platonic
computation that's
independent of the algorithm. Bruno pushes all this
aside by referring to
"at the appropriate level" and by doing all possible
algorithms. But I'm
more interested in the question of what would I have to do
to make a
conscious AI. Also, it is the assumption of a Platonic
computation that
allows one to slice it discretely into OMs.
Start by replacing neurons with artificial neurons which are
driven by
a computer program and whose defining characteristic is that
they copy
the I/O behaviour of biological neurons. The program has to
model the
internal workings of a neuron down to a certain level. It may
be that
the position and configuration of every molecule needs to be
modelled,
or it may be that shortcuts such as a single parameter for the
permeability of ion channels in the cell membrane make no
difference
to the final result. In any case, there are many possible programs
even if the same physical model of a neuron is used, and the same
basic program can be written in any language and implemented
on any
computer: all that matters is that the artificial neuron works
properly. (As an aside, we don't need to worry about whether these
artificial neurons are zombies, since that would lead to absurd
conclusions about the nature of consciousness.) From the
single neuron
we can progress to replacing the whole brain, the end result
being a
computer program interacting with the outside world through
sensors
and effectors. The program can be implemented in any way - any
language, any hardware - and the consciousness of the subject will
remain the same as long as the brain behaviour remains the same.
You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is the "appropriate
level" to make "brain behavior" the same; and I tend to agree that
would be sufficient (though perhaps not necessary). But that's
preserving a particular algorithm; one more specific than the
Platonic computation of its equivalence class. I suppose a Turing
machine could perform the same computation, but it would perform
it very differently. And I wonder how the Turing machine would
manage perception. The organs of perception would have their
responses digitized into bit strings and these would be written to
the TM on different tapes? I think this illustrates my point
that, while preservation of consciousness under the digital neuron
substitution seems plausible, there is still another leap in
substituting an abstract computation for the digital neurons.
Also, such an AI brain would not permit slicing the computations
into arbitrarily short time periods because there is communication
time involved and neurons run asynchronously.
Yes you can, freeze the computation, dump memory... then load memory
back, and defreeze. If the time inside the computation is an internal
feature (a counter inside the program), the AI associated to the
computation cannot notice anything if on the other hand the time
inside of the computation is an input parameter from some external
then it can notice... but I always can englobe the whole thing and
feed that external time from another program or whatever.
That assumes that the AI brain is running synchronously, i.e. at a clock
rate small compared to c/R where R is the radius of the brain. But I
think the real brain runs asynchronously, so if the AI brain must do the
simulation at a lower level to take account of transmission times, etc.
and run at a much higher clock rate than do neurons. But is it then
still "the same" computation?
The fact that you can disrupt a computation and restart it with some
different parameters doesn't mean you can't restart it with *exactly*
the same parameters as when you froze it.
That's arbitrarily excluding the physical steps in "freezing" and
"starting" a computation, as though you can pick out the "real"
computation as separate from the physical processes. Which is the same
as assuming that consciousness attaches to the Platonic "real"
computation and those extra physical steps somehow don't count as
"computations".
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
