2010/1/12 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> >> >> 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com <mailto: >> meeke...@dslextreme.com>> >> >> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com >> <mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com> >> <mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com >> >> <mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>> >> >> >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com >> <mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com> >> <mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com >> >> <mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>>: >> >> >> I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is >> being >> assumed >> about the >> computation being "the same". Is it the same Platonic >> algorithm? Is it >> one that has the same steps as described in >> FORTRAN, but >> not those in LISP? >> Is it just one that has the same input-output? I >> think >> these are questions >> that have been bypassed in the "yes doctor" scenario. >> Saying "yes" to the >> doctor seems unproblematic when you think of >> replacing a >> few neurons with >> artificial ones - all you care about is the >> input-output. >> But then when you >> jump to replacing a whole brain maybe you care >> about the >> FORTRAN/LISP >> differences. Yet on this list there seems to be an >> assumption that you can >> just jump to the Platonic algorithm or even a Platonic >> computation that's >> independent of the algorithm. Bruno pushes all this >> aside by referring to >> "at the appropriate level" and by doing all possible >> algorithms. But I'm >> more interested in the question of what would I >> have to do >> to make a >> conscious AI. Also, it is the assumption of a Platonic >> computation that >> allows one to slice it discretely into OMs. >> >> Start by replacing neurons with artificial neurons >> which are >> driven by >> a computer program and whose defining characteristic is >> that >> they copy >> the I/O behaviour of biological neurons. The program has to >> model the >> internal workings of a neuron down to a certain level. >> It may >> be that >> the position and configuration of every molecule needs >> to be >> modelled, >> or it may be that shortcuts such as a single parameter >> for the >> permeability of ion channels in the cell membrane make no >> difference >> to the final result. In any case, there are many >> possible programs >> even if the same physical model of a neuron is used, >> and the same >> basic program can be written in any language and >> implemented >> on any >> computer: all that matters is that the artificial >> neuron works >> properly. (As an aside, we don't need to worry about >> whether these >> artificial neurons are zombies, since that would lead >> to absurd >> conclusions about the nature of consciousness.) From the >> single neuron >> we can progress to replacing the whole brain, the end >> result >> being a >> computer program interacting with the outside world through >> sensors >> and effectors. The program can be implemented in any >> way - any >> language, any hardware - and the consciousness of the >> subject will >> remain the same as long as the brain behaviour remains >> the same. >> >> >> You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is >> the >> "appropriate >> level" to make "brain behavior" the same; and I tend to >> agree that >> would be sufficient (though perhaps not necessary). But that's >> preserving a particular algorithm; one more specific than the >> Platonic computation of its equivalence class. I suppose a >> Turing >> machine could perform the same computation, but it would >> perform >> it very differently. And I wonder how the Turing machine would >> manage perception. The organs of perception would have their >> responses digitized into bit strings and these would be >> written to >> the TM on different tapes? I think this illustrates my point >> that, while preservation of consciousness under the digital >> neuron >> substitution seems plausible, there is still another leap in >> substituting an abstract computation for the digital neurons. >> >> Also, such an AI brain would not permit slicing the >> computations >> into arbitrarily short time periods because there is >> communication >> time involved and neurons run asynchronously. >> >> >> Yes you can, freeze the computation, dump memory... then load >> memory back, and defreeze. If the time inside the computation >> is an internal feature (a counter inside the program), the AI >> associated to the computation cannot notice anything if on the >> other hand the time inside of the computation is an input >> parameter from some external then it can notice... but I >> always can englobe the whole thing and feed that external time >> from another program or whatever. >> >> That assumes that the AI brain is running synchronously, i.e. at a >> clock rate small compared to c/R where R is the radius of the >> brain. But I think the real brain runs asynchronously, so if the >> AI brain must do the simulation at a lower level to take account >> of transmission times, etc. and run at a much higher clock rate >> than do neurons. But is it then still "the same" computation? >> >> >> >> The fact that you can disrupt a computation and restart it >> with some different parameters doesn't mean you can't restart >> it with *exactly* the same parameters as when you froze it. >> >> >> That's arbitrarily excluding the physical steps in "freezing" and >> "starting" a computation, as though you can pick out the "real" >> computation as separate from the physical processes. Which is the >> same as assuming that consciousness attaches to the Platonic >> "real" computation and those extra physical steps somehow don't >> count as "computations". >> >> >> But it is the same... When I write a program in say java... that's not my >> "program" that is run on the machine, it is a translation in the target >> machine language. Yet it is the same, that's what we use UTM for. >> >> Also the restarted computation has no knowledge at all of having been >> freezed and restarted in the first place. >> > > Well maybe I'm confused about this, but you're talking about a program that > has the same input/output and therefore all the processes after the input > and before the program halts are irrelevant. You're saying it's "the same" > if the same inputs halt with the same outputs - which is the abstract Turing > machine or Platonic meaning of "the computation". I don't see that as being > the same as attaching consciousness to brain processes which don't halt? > How are you mapping the Turing computation to the brain process? If you > replace each neuron with a Turing machine that reproduces the same > input/output, I can understand the mapping. But then you reproduce that > collection of interacting Turing machines with a single, super-Turing > machine which includes some simulation of the local environment too. > Because the neuron level Turing machines ran asynchronously, the > super-Turing machine has to include a lot of additional computation to keep > track of the signal passing. Yet we are to bet that it instantiates the > same stream of consciousness because - exactly why?...because it will halt > on the same outputs for the same inputs? > > Because it is isomorphic to the "platonic" computation. If it was not the case... I don't see how I could write a program in any language in the first place, if a compilator couldn't make an equivalent program for the target machine.
Also what you're saying is that somehow the machine which executes it adds something to the computation... that somehow super AI could know (without having necessary "sensor" for) information outside the computation. That it could sense that it is run on super Quantum Computer 360 and not on the super x86_2048 or on a virtual machine running on ... ? Quentin > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.--
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