My apologies. I forgot that Lawrence National Laboratories no longer
hosted the physics archive. I should have cited:
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604079
The Free Will Theorem
Authors: John Conway
<http://arxiv.org/find/quant-ph/1/au:+Conway_J/0/1/0/all/0/1>, Simon
Kochen <http://arxiv.org/find/quant-ph/1/au:+Kochen_S/0/1/0/all/0/1>
(Submitted on 11 Apr 2006)
Abstract: On the basis of three physical axioms, we prove that if
the choice of a particular type of spin 1 experiment is not a
function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then
its outcome is equally not a function of the information accessible
to the particles. We show that this result is robust, and deduce
that neither hidden variable theories nor mechanisms of the GRW type
for wave function collapse can be made relativistic. We also
establish the consistency of our axioms and discuss the
philosophical implications.
And here's a later, stronger version that uses some weaker premises.
http://arxiv.org/abs/0807.3286
Brent
On 3/11/2010 2:16 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Brent, nice statement:
* "But it's certainly not a deterministic universe" *
**
I have to take your word, because the reference you gave said: * "NOT
FOUND"*
So what kind of a 'universe' is it? bootstrap, self reflecting
autodidacta? Creator-made?
John M
**
**
On 3/11/10, *Brent Meeker* <meeke...@dslextreme.com
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>> wrote:
On 3/11/2010 1:26 PM, m.a. wrote:
*Bruno and John,*
* The confusion is my fault. I copied
the URL from a Kurzweil page heading when I should have gone to
the article itself, so the wrong feature appeared. This is the
one I requested comments about:*
*http://www.physorg.com/news186830615.html*
(Excerpts)
*PhysOrg.com) -- When biologist Anthony Cashmore claims that the
concept of free will is an illusion, he's not breaking any new
ground. At least as far back as the ancient Greeks, people have
wondered how humans seem to have the ability to make their own
personal decisions in a manner lacking any causal component other
than their desire to "will" something. But Cashmore, Professor of
Biology at the University of Pennsylvania, says that many
biologists today still cling to the idea of free will, and reject
the idea that we are simply conscious machines, completely
controlled by a combination of our chemistry and external
environmental forces.*
**
*To put it simply, free will just doesn’t fit with how the
physical world works. Cashmore compares a belief in free will to
an earlier belief in vitalism - the belief that there are forces
governing the biological world that are distinct from those
governing the physical world. Vitalism was discarded more than
100 years ago, being replaced with evidence that biological
systems obey the laws of chemistry and physics, not special
biological laws for living things.“I would like to convince
biologists that a belief in free will is nothing other than a
continuing belief in vitalism (or, as I say, a belief in magic),”
Cashmore told /PhysOrg.com/. *
**
*There seems to be an evolutionary rightness and inevitability to
the idea that free will is taking its place as just another
illusion like vitalism, religion, aether, absolute time and
space, geocentric universe, single-galaxy universe and so on. But
I think people will have an even tougher time dealing with the
implications of strict determinism. It's an idea that could tear
through the entire fabric of society even though acceptance
needn't change one's behavior in the slightest respect. marty a.*
But it's certainly not a deterministic universe.
_http://xxx.lanl.gov/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0604/0604079.pdf_
Brent
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