On 3/13/2010 9:17 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Mar 2010, at 23:15, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 3/13/2010 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi William,

OK I found it on the net:

http://www.socialbehavior.uzh.ch/teaching/semsocialneurosciencespring09/Haynes_NatNeurosci_2008_ext.pdf

But my comment will consist in repeating what I am always saying about free will or free decision.

The existence of free acts has nothing to do with the fact that such acts are determined, in advance or not.
The article, relatively to what I try to convey preaches the chore.

Given that free will is a high level self-referential ability, it would be astonishing that the brain has not a lot of work to do, and this including the transformation of the will into act.

Given that mechanism is my working hypothesis, the will cannot, in no direct ways, influence any of my parts, say, at my substitution level. "I" am emerging from billions of amoebas (neuronal cells) which got the cables (axon), and without using drugs, I cannot interfere deliberately on this or that specific neurons.

Also, I don't know if you have read my papers, but I do not attach consciousness to a working brain, only to an abstract person, which lives really in Platonia, and uses "only" its local brain to manifest itself relatively to me with some high probability. But the consciousness itself is attached to infinities of computations (existing through elementary arithmetic, or combinators, etc.).

Could you explain that last. What does "attached to" mean? And is the infinity related to quantum infinities, e.g. the infinite number of paths in a Feynman path integral computation? or is it just the potential aleph0 infinity of successive possible classical states?


I could have said "associated" or "attributed" instead of "attached". To say that a brain is conscious is a category error. My brain is not conscious (no more than a rock). The person who has that brain can be said to be conscious.

So how does a person "have" a brain?  Why does a computation need one?

The same consciousness will be associated to that person in all computational histories going through the relevant brain's computational state.

Obviously you are supposing that the brain's computational state does not entirely determine the its future states, e.g. different computations (in fact infinitely many) "go thru" the same state. But is this because of quantum indeterminancy or because of different external interactions (e.g. perceptions) or both.

Now the relative measure is put on the histories (not the finite number of states), which makes a continuum of histories 2^aleph_0 in the limit space of histories. We have to take that limit space, because the first person is unaware of the delays in the UD-time-step.

So we're taking the limit over computations, not over perceived time?

Brent

The border of the Mandelbrot set is a good illustration of what such a limit space, when made compact, can look like.
I may say more on this in my reply to Marty.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>



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