I am a compatibilist. Free will necessitates determinism. It makes people choosing to do what their want, notably when choosing between alternatives. But they cannot choose what they want. This depends on many factors.

Free will is a high level phenomenon. Adding indeterminacy is irrelevant, concerning free-will. Adding indeterminacy in a choice can only lessen the freeness of the will.


Cashmore demolishes a naive notion of free-will which makes no sense at the start. We can do freely actions, even when our friends who know us can predict the action. Free will is the ability to choose, among alternatives, in gneral with incomplete information, the actions which maximize some self-satisfiability constraints. It is self-determination.

Bruno


On 11 Mar 2010, at 22:26, m.a. wrote:

Bruno and John,
The confusion is my fault. I copied the URL from a Kurzweil page heading when I should have gone to the article itself, so the wrong feature appeared. This is the one I requested comments about:


http://www.physorg.com/news186830615.html

(Excerpts)
PhysOrg.com) -- When biologist Anthony Cashmore claims that the concept of free will is an illusion, he's not breaking any new ground. At least as far back as the ancient Greeks, people have wondered how humans seem to have the ability to make their own personal decisions in a manner lacking any causal component other than their desire to "will" something. But Cashmore, Professor of Biology at the University of Pennsylvania, says that many biologists today still cling to the idea of free will, and reject the idea that we are simply conscious machines, completely controlled by a combination of our chemistry and external environmental forces.

To put it simply, free will just doesn’t fit with how the physical world works. Cashmore compares a belief in free will to an earlier belief in vitalism - the belief that there are forces governing the biological world that are distinct from those governing the physical world. Vitalism was discarded more than 100 years ago, being replaced with evidence that biological systems obey the laws of chemistry and physics, not special biological laws for living things.“I would like to convince biologists that a belief in free will is nothing other than a continuing belief in vitalism (or, as I say, a belief in magic),” Cashmore told PhysOrg.com.

There seems to be an evolutionary rightness and inevitability to the idea that free will is taking its place as just another illusion like vitalism, religion, aether, absolute time and space, geocentric universe, single-galaxy universe and so on. But I think people will have an even tougher time dealing with the implications of strict determinism. It's an idea that could tear through the entire fabric of society even though acceptance needn't change one's behavior in the slightest respect. marty a.






----- Original Message -----
From: m.a.
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2010 3:42 PM
Subject: Re: Free will

Bruno,

ummm...I don't follow this answer. Does your reply affirm free will, deny it or take some other tact? m.a.


----- Original Message -----
From: Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2010 12:01 PM
Subject: Re: Free will

Marty,

With the MWI, superluminal computers are particular case of quantum computer, as far as I guess correctly on what they are talking about. There is no transmission of information at speed higher than light speed, but in a single universe view, quantum weirdness exploitation (like quantum teleportation) may make it appears to be so. Looks a bit like Marketing. If someone know better. (here I assume QM, not comp, although comp should imply QM).

Bruno



On 11 Mar 2010, at 15:03, m.a. wrote:


Bruno,
In the light of the article presented below, I'm trying to remember whether you have committed yourself on this issue one way or another. marty a.


http://www.kurzweilai.net/news/frame.html?main=/news/ news_single.html?id%3D11909--
















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