On 24 Sep, 04:26, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 23, 2010 at 12:12 PM, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > On 22 Sep, 17:20, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> I guess I'd have to hear your definition of "property" to make any
> >> sense of that.  In what sense is it like the properties of charge,
> >> mass, spin, or color?
> > it's a distinguishing characteristic
> > that is detectable
> So your position is that there is an algorithm that would correctly
> detect all instances of intelligence with no false positives?

no. that isn't possible for physical properties either, and in any
case has nothing to do
with determinism

> If you possessed this algorithm, I could present you with a large cube
> of metal, silicon, and flashing lights, you could apply your algorithm
> to determine for certain whether any form of artificial intelligence
> was instantiated by the cube?
> No matter how obfuscated, encrypted, or abstract the representation
> used to instantiate the AI?
> This would be in contradiction to Hilary Putnam's work:
> "Putnam's proposal, and its historical importance, was analyzed in
> detail in Piccinini forthcoming b.  According to Putnam (1960, 1967,
> 1988), a system is a computing mechanism if and only if there is a
> mapping between a computational description and a physical description
> of the system.  By computational description, Putnam means a formal
> description of the kind used in computability theory, such as a Turing
> Machine or a finite state automaton.  Putnam puts no constraints on
> how to find the mapping between the computational and the physical
> description, allowing any computationally identified state to map onto
> any physically identified state.  It is well known that Putnam's
> account entails that most physical systems implement most
> computations.  This consequence of Putnam's proposal has been
> explicitly derived by Putnam (1988, pp. 95-96, 121-125) and Searle
> (1992, chap. 9)."
> Or, as Hans Moravec puts it:
> "What does it mean for a process to implement, or encode, a
> simulation? Something is palpably an encoding if there is a way of
> decoding or translating it into a recognizable form. Programs that
> produce pictures of evolving cloud cover from weather simulations, or
> cockpit views from flight simulations, are examples of such decodings.
> As the relationship between the elements inside the simulator and the
> external representation becomes more complicated, the decoding process
> may become impractically expensive. Yet there is no obvious cutoff
> point. A translation that is impractical today may be possible
> tomorrow given more powerful computers, some yet undiscovered
> mathematical approach, or perhaps an alien translator. Like people who
> dismiss speech and signs in unfamiliar foreign languages as
> meaningless gibberish, we are likely to be rudely surprised if we
> dismiss possible interpretations simply because we can't achieve them
> at the moment. Why not accept all mathematically possible decodings,
> regardless of present or future practicality? This seems a safe,
> open-minded approach, but it leads into strange territory."
> Where do you think that Putnam and Moravec went wrong?
> >> And in what sense is it different?
> > it's not physically basic
> Then what is it?  In what sense does it exist, if not physically?

I assume your list of mass, charge, etc, were intended to be.

Again, this has nothing to do with determinism

> >> >> Solving a problem correctly is no more impressive or significant than
> >> >> rain falling "correctly".  You answer the question in the only way the
> >> >> deterministic laws allow.  The rain falls in the only way that the
> >> >> deterministic laws allow.
> >> > so your actual conclusion is not that intelligence isn't
> >> > intelligence, but that intelligence isn't an achivement
> >> No, my actual conclusion is the part where I conclude:
> >> "The word 'intelligence' doesn't refer to anything except the
> >> experiential requirements that the universe places on you as a
> >> consequence of its causal structure."
> > I have no idea what that means
> Okay, so here's a definition of intelligence from the Merriam-Webster
> dictionary:
> "the ability to apply knowledge to manipulate one's environment or to
> think abstractly as measured by objective criteria (as tests)"
> But what is an ability in a deterministic universe?

It's something you can have, but not choose to have.
It is not, in other words an achievement; one wuuld be no more
responsible for ones
rationality or intelligence than eye-colour

> For any given input, a deterministic system can only react in one way.
> If you expose a deterministic system to a set of inputs that represent
> a particular environment, the system will react in the one and only
> way it can to that set of inputs.
> Knowledge is just the internal state of the deterministic system.
> This is true of a human.  This is true of a bacterium.  This is true
> of a Roomba vacuum cleaner.  This is true of a hurricane.  This is
> true of a rock.

ie they are all equally deterministic. You
haven't shown they are equally (un)intelligent.

the behaviour of a dropped rock and a dropped
feather may be equally indeterministic, but it is not the

> And, as I pointed out in the original post, probabilistic systems are no 
> better.

better at what? the only thing determinism is incompatible with is
free choice.

in order to argue that determinism is incompatible with intelligence,
you have to take intelligence to mean something like freely chosen

> Intelligence is an arbitrary criterion based only on how things "seem"
> to you, and which has no other basis in how things are.

not established. That something has a relatively  wide and complex
repertoire of
responses to stimuli is an objective fact. (That it has "memory", or
the ability to modify its responses according to its whole history and
not just
the present stimulus is as well)

> So, that is what I mean by:
> "The word 'intelligence' doesn't refer to anything except the
> experiential requirements that the universe places on you as a
> consequence of its causal structure."

nothing above explains the "experiential requirements" clause

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