Hi Stephen,
The discussion has evolved enough now from my original topic as
to require that I restate my thesis and add some new ideas in a new
post with a new subject line, given some new understanding of your
ideas. I greatly appreciate your patience and comments as I have
learned a great deal from it. I believe that we agree on sufficient
points to move forward so that I will leave you comments below stand
as a reference for the future. Right now I have one question: Are
you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's idea of game semantics for Logic
in which (crudely put) on thinks of a proof is related to the
existence of a winning strategy in a 2-person game.
What is your opinion of such, if any?
For examples please see:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-games/
http://www.csc.villanova.edu/~japaridz/CL/gsoll.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_semantics
That is very interesting, but with respect to the question I am
interested in, this is a question of implementation. The point of
mechanism is that the internal views does not depend on the choice of
the initial system.
I ask this because it seems that one of the key points of
divergence in our discussion is related to my use of ideas that are
implicit in game semantic based logics.
All digital parallelism can be emulated by digital sequences. In the
mind-body problem parallelism is a red herring, because IF it plays
some role for the measure problem, THEN it will be justified by the
extraction of space and time. Of course in concrete 3D-time
applications, parallelism is without doubt of upmost importance.
Additionally there is resent work that seems to strongly support my
crazy idea of how we might solve the measurement problem in QM
(which is my main motivation).
So you do assume QM, even QM + collapse apparently. I don't assume
anything in physics, given that the results is that physics is
derivable from arithmetic, and *has to be derived* from arithmetic if
we want obtain the qualia, and not just the quanta.
Please see: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~abranden/icig-05-27-08.pdf
This is very much related to the work of Jean-Yves Girard in his
"Geometry of Interaction".
? (The relation is either trivial, or is not obvious for me. Very
technical paper(s). You should stick a bit more on the idea(s) instead
of mentioning so much papers which seems to me both a bit 1004-like
with respect to the topic).
By the way, almost all of Girard's papers are inaccessible to me as
I am not in a university. I know of his work from my study of
Pratt's papers.
Take a look here:
http://iml.univ-mrs.fr/~girard/Articles.html
from Girard's web page:
http://iml.univ-mrs.fr/~girard/
Best,
Bruno
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 2010 1:10 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: A paper for your Comments
Hi Stephen,
My thinking here depends on the idea that within a single
simulation it is possible to have what we could take as multiple
entities in some 1st person notion of a simultaneous order. This is
where we first see a need to explain "space".
I don't understand "multiple entities in some 1st person notion of
simultaneous order". You mean a set of people seen by some one,
perhaps in a video game shared by different individuals? In that
case, assume the DM hypothesis, we need a good crunching number
machine, or even only the good relation between some numbers.
OK. Right now, as you read this email, is there a large
number of other objects around you other than your computer monitor,
such as a desk, walls of the room, a chair, etc.? My point is that a
simulation, such as the one that our brain generates, that is the
content of our 1st person experience (!),
is given as a whole but the objects in it can be taken as separate
from each other. We could take it for granted that this content
*is* the 3rd person describable bodies, but I submit that this
strictly true because we have the reality of illusions and
hallucinations. We have to have a way to filter for this.
I am not sure this makes sense with the DM theory (assumption,
conjecture, hypothesis). We have to take into account the infinity
of brains (relatively defined in arithmetic). Typically a brain or a
machine does not generate or create an experience or a
consciousness. It helps only to localize it in some probable
computational histories (always an infinities). This might be even
more subtle than that, and that is why I use the self-reference
theory + the definition of knowledge by Theaetetus to tackle that
problem mathematically. Also, the notion of physical object remains
to be defined (with mechanism).
Keep in mind that my contribution in the field is rather negative:
it shows that the mind-body problem is two times more difficult than
the materialist believe. Mechanism makes it mandatory to reduce
physics to "pure number theory". My work is a modest argument
showing the necessity, when we assume mechanism, of a reduction of a
problem (the mind-body problem) to the problem of reducing a field
(physics) to another field (number theory/computer science). Then a
second part makes the argument more constructive by using self-
reference theory + Theaetus's definition of knowledge.
It is because illusions and hallucinations exist that I am
skeptical that the notion of 3rd person describable is somehow
something that is independent of some notion of observation,
Science discourse have to assume some sharable 3d person notions to
start with. With mechanism we assume arithmetic, computable
functions, etc. This is supposed to be independent of us (realism).
But then physical objects have to be (re)defined in term of first
person plural notions. Here Everett QM gives an hint that such a
bizarre idea does make sense. First person plural concerns
multiplied populations (instead of multiplied individuals). This is
what the linearity of QM entails, and that is why I am open to
logical approach to "interaction" in term of linear logical system.
Do you know the work by Jean-Yves Girard "Geometry of Interaction".
This might interest you a lot. But, with the goal of solving the
mind body problem from mechanism, even a logical work like the one
by Girard is a bit of a treachery, and indeed, all those kind of
physicalist or physicalistically based approach to physics are bound
to confuse the qualia and the quanta. Yet Girard selected his theory
by appeal to incompleteness: what I show mandatory. What I say is
that should be done explicitly. Then the difference between the self-
reference logics G and G* extends to the difference between
intelligible and sensible, quanta and qualia, sharable and
unsharable, etc.
I cannot use Girard, nor Abramski, but such works can be seen as
pavage making easier the mind/matter bridge construction.
but up till now all attempts to consider this have assumed that
the "empty" places between objects was a primitive.
I have not yet any object, nor places. Just an abstract theory of
observable, without time, space nor hamiltonian, but with notion of
person, consciousness, first and first person plural, etc. Time
(duration) and space (localization) have to be derived from the
measure, itself derivable from the Z1* and X1* logics (and perhaps
S4Grz1 too)
This kind of thinking goes all the way back to Democritus.
People have focused on the idea of "atoms" and only lately with the
issue of "dark energy" has the emptiness been a subject of
conversations. Let me touch back on this later…
DM has not yet a notion of energy. But the little "fundamental
equation of physics" (p -> BDp) gives some shadow of possible
conservation of energy and repeatability of measurements. But the
point is not to give the solution of the problem of which physics we
will find; my point is only that: IF we are machine, then physics
has to be find in the self-referential way.
And this is coherent with the Platonism of Plato, or the
neoplatonism of Plotinus: physical reality is the border of
something else.
Provocatively sometimes I say that the physical universe is just a
distraction from the fundamental inquiry. Better to use it with
moderation.
snip
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