Hi Stephen,

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The discussion has evolved enough now from my original topic asto require that I restate my thesis and add some new ideas in a newpost with a new subject line, given some new understanding of yourideas. I greatly appreciate your patience and comments as I havelearned a great deal from it. I believe that we agree on sufficientpoints to move forward so that I will leave you comments below standas a reference for the future. Right now I have one question: Areyou familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's idea of game semantics for Logicin which (crudely put) on thinks of a proof is related to theexistence of a winning strategy in a 2-person game.What is your opinion of such, if any? For examples please see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-games/ http://www.csc.villanova.edu/~japaridz/CL/gsoll.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_semantics

`That is very interesting, but with respect to the question I am`

`interested in, this is a question of implementation. The point of`

`mechanism is that the internal views does not depend on the choice of`

`the initial system.`

I ask this because it seems that one of the key points ofdivergence in our discussion is related to my use of ideas that areimplicit in game semantic based logics.

`All digital parallelism can be emulated by digital sequences. In the`

`mind-body problem parallelism is a red herring, because IF it plays`

`some role for the measure problem, THEN it will be justified by the`

`extraction of space and time. Of course in concrete 3D-time`

`applications, parallelism is without doubt of upmost importance.`

Additionally there is resent work that seems to strongly support mycrazy idea of how we might solve the measurement problem in QM(which is my main motivation).

`So you do assume QM, even QM + collapse apparently. I don't assume`

`anything in physics, given that the results is that physics is`

`derivable from arithmetic, and *has to be derived* from arithmetic if`

`we want obtain the qualia, and not just the quanta.`

Please see: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~abranden/icig-05-27-08.pdfThis is very much related to the work of Jean-Yves Girard in his"Geometry of Interaction".

`? (The relation is either trivial, or is not obvious for me. Very`

`technical paper(s). You should stick a bit more on the idea(s) instead`

`of mentioning so much papers which seems to me both a bit 1004-like`

`with respect to the topic).`

By the way, almost all of Girard's papers are inaccessible to me asI am not in a university. I know of his work from my study ofPratt's papers.

Take a look here: http://iml.univ-mrs.fr/~girard/Articles.html from Girard's web page: http://iml.univ-mrs.fr/~girard/ Best, Bruno

From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 2010 1:10 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: A paper for your Comments Hi Stephen,My thinking here depends on the idea that within a singlesimulation it is possible to have what we could take as multipleentities in some 1st person notion of a simultaneous order. This iswhere we first see a need to explain "space".I don't understand "multiple entities in some 1st person notion ofsimultaneous order". You mean a set of people seen by some one,perhaps in a video game shared by different individuals? In thatcase, assume the DM hypothesis, we need a good crunching numbermachine, or even only the good relation between some numbers.OK. Right now, as you read this email, is there a largenumber of other objects around you other than your computer monitor,such as a desk, walls of the room, a chair, etc.? My point is that asimulation, such as the one that our brain generates, that is thecontent of our 1st person experience (!),is given as a whole but the objects in it can be taken as separatefrom each other. We could take it for granted that this content*is* the 3rd person describable bodies, but I submit that thisstrictly true because we have the reality of illusions andhallucinations. We have to have a way to filter for this.I am not sure this makes sense with the DM theory (assumption,conjecture, hypothesis). We have to take into account the infinityof brains (relatively defined in arithmetic). Typically a brain or amachine does not generate or create an experience or aconsciousness. It helps only to localize it in some probablecomputational histories (always an infinities). This might be evenmore subtle than that, and that is why I use the self-referencetheory + the definition of knowledge by Theaetetus to tackle thatproblem mathematically. Also, the notion of physical object remainsto be defined (with mechanism).Keep in mind that my contribution in the field is rather negative:it shows that the mind-body problem is two times more difficult thanthe materialist believe. Mechanism makes it mandatory to reducephysics to "pure number theory". My work is a modest argumentshowing the necessity, when we assume mechanism, of a reduction of aproblem (the mind-body problem) to the problem of reducing a field(physics) to another field (number theory/computer science). Then asecond part makes the argument more constructive by using self-reference theory + Theaetus's definition of knowledge.It is because illusions and hallucinations exist that I amskeptical that the notion of 3rd person describable is somehowsomething that is independent of some notion of observation,Science discourse have to assume some sharable 3d person notions tostart with. With mechanism we assume arithmetic, computablefunctions, etc. This is supposed to be independent of us (realism).But then physical objects have to be (re)defined in term of firstperson plural notions. Here Everett QM gives an hint that such abizarre idea does make sense. First person plural concernsmultiplied populations (instead of multiplied individuals). This iswhat the linearity of QM entails, and that is why I am open tological approach to "interaction" in term of linear logical system.Do you know the work by Jean-Yves Girard "Geometry of Interaction".This might interest you a lot. But, with the goal of solving themind body problem from mechanism, even a logical work like the oneby Girard is a bit of a treachery, and indeed, all those kind ofphysicalist or physicalistically based approach to physics are boundto confuse the qualia and the quanta. Yet Girard selected his theoryby appeal to incompleteness: what I show mandatory. What I say isthat should be done explicitly. Then the difference between the self-reference logics G and G* extends to the difference betweenintelligible and sensible, quanta and qualia, sharable andunsharable, etc.I cannot use Girard, nor Abramski, but such works can be seen aspavage making easier the mind/matter bridge construction.but up till now all attempts to consider this have assumed thatthe "empty" places between objects was a primitive.I have not yet any object, nor places. Just an abstract theory ofobservable, without time, space nor hamiltonian, but with notion ofperson, consciousness, first and first person plural, etc. Time(duration) and space (localization) have to be derived from themeasure, itself derivable from the Z1* and X1* logics (and perhapsS4Grz1 too)This kind of thinking goes all the way back to Democritus.People have focused on the idea of "atoms" and only lately with theissue of "dark energy" has the emptiness been a subject ofconversations. Let me touch back on this laterâ€¦DM has not yet a notion of energy. But the little "fundamentalequation of physics" (p -> BDp) gives some shadow of possibleconservation of energy and repeatability of measurements. But thepoint is not to give the solution of the problem of which physics wewill find; my point is only that: IF we are machine, then physicshas to be find in the self-referential way.And this is coherent with the Platonism of Plato, or theneoplatonism of Plotinus: physical reality is the border ofsomething else.Provocatively sometimes I say that the physical universe is just adistraction from the fundamental inquiry. Better to use it withmoderation.snip--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.