Hi Stephen,


The discussion has evolved enough now from my original topic as to require that I restate my thesis and add some new ideas in a new post with a new subject line, given some new understanding of your ideas. I greatly appreciate your patience and comments as I have learned a great deal from it. I believe that we agree on sufficient points to move forward so that I will leave you comments below stand as a reference for the future. Right now I have one question: Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's idea of game semantics for Logic in which (crudely put) on thinks of a proof is related to the existence of a winning strategy in a 2-person game.
    What is your opinion of such, if any?

    For examples please see:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-games/
http://www.csc.villanova.edu/~japaridz/CL/gsoll.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_semantics

That is very interesting, but with respect to the question I am interested in, this is a question of implementation. The point of mechanism is that the internal views does not depend on the choice of the initial system.




I ask this because it seems that one of the key points of divergence in our discussion is related to my use of ideas that are implicit in game semantic based logics.

All digital parallelism can be emulated by digital sequences. In the mind-body problem parallelism is a red herring, because IF it plays some role for the measure problem, THEN it will be justified by the extraction of space and time. Of course in concrete 3D-time applications, parallelism is without doubt of upmost importance.




Additionally there is resent work that seems to strongly support my crazy idea of how we might solve the measurement problem in QM (which is my main motivation).

So you do assume QM, even QM + collapse apparently. I don't assume anything in physics, given that the results is that physics is derivable from arithmetic, and *has to be derived* from arithmetic if we want obtain the qualia, and not just the quanta.



Please see: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~abranden/icig-05-27-08.pdf This is very much related to the work of Jean-Yves Girard in his "Geometry of Interaction".

? (The relation is either trivial, or is not obvious for me. Very technical paper(s). You should stick a bit more on the idea(s) instead of mentioning so much papers which seems to me both a bit 1004-like with respect to the topic).




By the way, almost all of Girard's papers are inaccessible to me as I am not in a university. I know of his work from my study of Pratt's papers.


Take a look here:

http://iml.univ-mrs.fr/~girard/Articles.html

from Girard's web page:

http://iml.univ-mrs.fr/~girard/

Best,

Bruno

From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 2010 1:10 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A paper for your Comments


Hi Stephen,
My thinking here depends on the idea that within a single simulation it is possible to have what we could take as multiple entities in some 1st person notion of a simultaneous order. This is where we first see a need to explain "space".

I don't understand "multiple entities in some 1st person notion of simultaneous order". You mean a set of people seen by some one, perhaps in a video game shared by different individuals? In that case, assume the DM hypothesis, we need a good crunching number machine, or even only the good relation between some numbers.

OK. Right now, as you read this email, is there a large number of other objects around you other than your computer monitor, such as a desk, walls of the room, a chair, etc.? My point is that a simulation, such as the one that our brain generates, that is the content of our 1st person experience (!),
is given as a whole but the objects in it can be taken as separate from each other. We could take it for granted that this content *is* the 3rd person describable bodies, but I submit that this strictly true because we have the reality of illusions and hallucinations. We have to have a way to filter for this.

I am not sure this makes sense with the DM theory (assumption, conjecture, hypothesis). We have to take into account the infinity of brains (relatively defined in arithmetic). Typically a brain or a machine does not generate or create an experience or a consciousness. It helps only to localize it in some probable computational histories (always an infinities). This might be even more subtle than that, and that is why I use the self-reference theory + the definition of knowledge by Theaetetus to tackle that problem mathematically. Also, the notion of physical object remains to be defined (with mechanism).

Keep in mind that my contribution in the field is rather negative: it shows that the mind-body problem is two times more difficult than the materialist believe. Mechanism makes it mandatory to reduce physics to "pure number theory". My work is a modest argument showing the necessity, when we assume mechanism, of a reduction of a problem (the mind-body problem) to the problem of reducing a field (physics) to another field (number theory/computer science). Then a second part makes the argument more constructive by using self- reference theory + Theaetus's definition of knowledge.

It is because illusions and hallucinations exist that I am skeptical that the notion of 3rd person describable is somehow something that is independent of some notion of observation,

Science discourse have to assume some sharable 3d person notions to start with. With mechanism we assume arithmetic, computable functions, etc. This is supposed to be independent of us (realism). But then physical objects have to be (re)defined in term of first person plural notions. Here Everett QM gives an hint that such a bizarre idea does make sense. First person plural concerns multiplied populations (instead of multiplied individuals). This is what the linearity of QM entails, and that is why I am open to logical approach to "interaction" in term of linear logical system. Do you know the work by Jean-Yves Girard "Geometry of Interaction". This might interest you a lot. But, with the goal of solving the mind body problem from mechanism, even a logical work like the one by Girard is a bit of a treachery, and indeed, all those kind of physicalist or physicalistically based approach to physics are bound to confuse the qualia and the quanta. Yet Girard selected his theory by appeal to incompleteness: what I show mandatory. What I say is that should be done explicitly. Then the difference between the self- reference logics G and G* extends to the difference between intelligible and sensible, quanta and qualia, sharable and unsharable, etc. I cannot use Girard, nor Abramski, but such works can be seen as pavage making easier the mind/matter bridge construction.

but up till now all attempts to consider this have assumed that the "empty" places between objects was a primitive.

I have not yet any object, nor places. Just an abstract theory of observable, without time, space nor hamiltonian, but with notion of person, consciousness, first and first person plural, etc. Time (duration) and space (localization) have to be derived from the measure, itself derivable from the Z1* and X1* logics (and perhaps S4Grz1 too)

This kind of thinking goes all the way back to Democritus. People have focused on the idea of "atoms" and only lately with the issue of "dark energy" has the emptiness been a subject of conversations. Let me touch back on this later…

DM has not yet a notion of energy. But the little "fundamental equation of physics" (p -> BDp) gives some shadow of possible conservation of energy and repeatability of measurements. But the point is not to give the solution of the problem of which physics we will find; my point is only that: IF we are machine, then physics has to be find in the self-referential way. And this is coherent with the Platonism of Plato, or the neoplatonism of Plotinus: physical reality is the border of something else. Provocatively sometimes I say that the physical universe is just a distraction from the fundamental inquiry. Better to use it with moderation.

snip


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