Hi Bruno,
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  Sent: Friday, October 15, 2010 1:27 PM
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Subject: Re: A paper for your Comments

  On 11 Oct 2010, at 00:54, Stephen Paul King wrote:

    Fixing a missing part of my post
      From: Stephen Paul King 
      Sent: Sunday, October 10, 2010 2:46 PM
      To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
      Subject: Re: A paper for your Comments

      Hi Bruno,

        From: Bruno Marchal 
        Sent: Sunday, October 10, 2010 11:16 AM
        To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
        Subject: Re: A paper for your Comments

        Hi Stephen,


        [BM] All digital parallelism can be emulated by digital sequences. In 
the mind-body problem parallelism is a red herring, because IF it plays some 
role for the measure problem, THEN it will be justified by the extraction of 
space and time.  Of course in concrete 3D-time applications, parallelism is 
without doubt of upmost importance. 

                I agree and this goes straight to the root of the idea that I 
am exploring. This is why I am looking at the duality between Boolean algebras 
(and their generalizations) and disconnected/scattered spaces that we see in 
the Stone Representation theorem. Minds would be instances of the former and 
Bodies would be instances of the latter. The trick is to see how the evolution 
of these works; this is what Pratt has figured out (in basic terms). 
<Emoticon1.gif>  Additionally, your repeated notion that if "any empirical 
difference between this arithmetical physics and the empirical physics, would 
refute, not Plotinus, but the present arithmetical interpretation" requires a 
means to connect or analytically continue into physical theory; "concrete 
3D-time applications" are instances of the latter. By the way, the passages 
that I quoted previously from Stephen Wolfram where relating to that physical 
side and speak to limits on the content of individual Mechanisms; those are 
what I am considering in the bisimulation model of interactions.
            I am not advocating physicalism except as one side of a duality. 

  [BM] You mean "matter". By definition physicalism excludes that the other 
part as a fundamental ontology. In a sense numbers don't exist for a 
physicalist. Only a dulaist can believe in number and primitive fundamental 
  Your quote too much in different fields to grasp what you are trying to say.

      Yes, bodies are included in matter, that should be obvious... Have you 
read the Pratt paper, Rational Mechanics and Natural Mathematics all the way 
through? He explains the idea well... I change only one thing and that has to 
do with what you are thinking is a contradiction. I'll explain below.

        I am against the idea that the physical (or the logical) is "all that 

  [BM] Make clear what are your assumption. What exist for you at the base 

      Is "base level" the most primitive level? Only existence itself exists at 
my base level, this level is more primitive than the hypostases of Plotinus or 
Plato's Ideas. One has to have some kind of primitive ground or else we can use 
the anti-foundation axiom idea (which I prefer) but you seem to resist all 
attempts that I have make to understand it. I can explain the idea either way. 
My statement here is directly against material monism or some form there of. 
Physicalism seems to be a weak form of material monism.

        and the proof of sorts that I point to is the epiphenomena problem that 
both physical monism and mental/ideal monism have. 

  [BM] It is not symmetrical. If you believe in "only mind", you don't need to 
make matter an epiphenomena given that uou have only "phenomena". You could say 
"epi-ontologena", except that with "mind only" (and mechanism) we don't need 
any ontology for matter, by definition.

      Good grief Bruno! Have you read of the debate between Berkeley and Dr. 
Johnson? Why are you making this so difficult? Additionally, you have not yet 
explained how idealism ("only in the mind") explains for the plurality of 
minds. This is why I keep bringing up the question of solipsism. This is 
related to the epiphenomena problem of idealism because it offers no reason, 
other than some ad hoc postulation, that there is matter. Sure, we can take the 
hand waving stuff that Plotinus wrote, but is that really sufficient an 
argument for you? You demand far more from me! 
      Moving on to the rest of your statement here. I am trying to argue for a 
form of dualism. Is this not yet clear? Descartes' failed attempt at dualism 
does not taint all forms of dualism, for his form depended on the notion of 
substance and had no means to account for change, time and transitivity, a 
failure that very often gets overlooked.

        Of course we need a neutral common ground to absorb both into but that 
is taken into account in terms of "in the limit of where all differences 

  [BM] This is a nice poetical description of inconsistency, the limit where 1 
- 0 = 0.

      Sure, it is inconsistent as we are looking at it and that is the point 
that I am trying to drive. Think of this: At the most primitive level of your 
ontology, is there something that is supervening such that the notion of 
differences obtains for that primitive? This goes directly to the problem of 
measures and mereology that you seem to mention in passing but never seem to 
speak directly about. How does the notion of differences even obtain if there 
is nothing to compare to at all? This is not complicated! 
      Take your "only mind" ideas. Imagine your self in a completely empty 
universe. How would you know what you are? You have no body. You would have no 
notion of change for there is nothing to gauge any change against. What would 
serve to gauge our thoughts? 

        Forgive me here as I am sacrificing clarity for brevity.

          Additionally there is resent work that seems to strongly support my 
crazy idea of how we might solve the measurement problem in QM (which is my 
main motivation). 

        [BM] So you do assume QM, even QM + collapse apparently. I don't assume 
anything in physics, given that the results is that physics is derivable from 
arithmetic, and *has to be derived* from arithmetic if we want obtain the 
qualia, and not just the quanta.

                Yes, because I am coming from the opposite direction from you! 
I assume QM 

  [BM] That's way too much for me. Although I believe QM is true, I estimate we 
have to derive it from arithmetic. And that is the conclusion of the UDA 
argument. Third person classical mechanism entails first person plural quantum 

      We have yet to see that entailment. You need to overcome the large body 
of research showing that classical logics are insufficient to embed quantum 
logics. This is the result of Svozil and others that I pointed you to.

        but not "collapse" per say as the metaphysical assumptions in 
"collapse" go against the Perfect Cosmological Principle. We see this in the 
preferred reference frame that any objective collapse model generates. What we 
need, I believe, is a model where we obtain what appears as a Collapse from a 
1st person P.o.V. but is more like the Everett-Dewitt idea from the outside 3rd 
person view all the while understanding that there is no special "observer" 
that could perceive the latter except as an abstract notion. 

          Please see: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~abranden/icig-05-27-08.pdf 
This is very much related to the work of Jean-Yves Girard in his "Geometry of 

        [BM] ? (The relation is either trivial, or is not obvious for me. Very 
technical paper(s). You should stick a bit more on the idea(s) instead of 
mentioning so much papers which seems to me both a bit 1004-like with respect 
to the topic). 

            That paper discusses the notion of correlations in games which is 
another way of looking at bisimulations between Mechanisms. From the abstract: 

        "Correlations arise naturally in non-cooperative games, e.g., in the 
equivalence between undominated
        and optimal strategies in games with more than two players. But the 
non-cooperative assumption
        is that players do not coordinate their strategy choices, so where do 
these correlations come from?
        The epistemic view of games gives an answer. Under this view, the 
players’ hierarchies of beliefs
        (beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, . . . ) about the strategies played in 
the game are part of the description
        of a game. This gives a source of correlation: A player believes other 
players’ strategy choices are
        correlated, because he believes their hierarchies of beliefs are 
correlated. We refer to this kind of
        correlation as “intrinsic,” since it comes from variables—viz., the 
hierarchies of beliefs—that are part
        of the game. We compare the intrinsic route with the “extrinsic” route 
taken by Aumann [2, 1974],
        which adds signals to the original game."

            I hoped that you might get an intuition of what I am trying to work 
out by reading this paper... It seems to me that the notion of Belief that 
Brandenburger et al are using would be related to your B as in Bp&p. In my idea 
this manifests as simulations of simulations, etc. 

  [BM] If you find a precise relation, then submit it. Well, you can think 
aloud for some time, but don't expect too much understanding.

      I can be hopefull. 


          By the way, almost all of Girard's papers are inaccessible to me as I 
am not in a university. I know of his work from my study of Pratt's papers.

        Take a look here:


        from Girard's web page:





            Thanks for pointing me to that, now I have 2X reasons to learn to 
read French. :P I am still thinking on how to write up the interaction idea. It 
takes me time to translate pictures in my head to words on the screen. 

  Try to write a paper, and make it readable by some experts in the field you 
cross. Or for a wider audience, on a less ambitious version. 
  Mechanism is compatible with matter and dualism, if it is taken in some 
phenomenological view.
  You can assume QM, but my point is only that we can't do that, if we assume 
M. (mechanism). QM has to be justified in M through machine's self-reference 
intensional nuances.



         I try hard to only assume those ideas that have empirical evidence 
for. I will continue to work on a paper. Thank you for your comments so far.



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