On 11 Oct 2010, at 00:54, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Fixing a missing part of my post From: Stephen Paul King Sent: Sunday, October 10, 2010 2:46 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: A paper for your Comments Hi Bruno, Interleaving... From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Sunday, October 10, 2010 11:16 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: A paper for your Comments Hi Stephen,The discussion has evolved enough now from my original topic asto require that I restate my thesis and add some new ideas in a newpost with a new subject line, given some new understanding of yourideas. I greatly appreciate your patience and comments as I havelearned a great deal from it. I believe that we agree on sufficientpoints to move forward so that I will leave you comments belowstand as a reference for the future. Right now I have one question:Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's idea of game semantics forLogic in which (crudely put) on thinks of a proof is related to theexistence of a winning strategy in a 2-person game.What is your opinion of such, if any? For examples please see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-games/ http://www.csc.villanova.edu/~japaridz/CL/gsoll.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_semantics[BM] That is very interesting, but with respect to the question I aminterested in, this is a question of implementation. The point ofmechanism is that the internal views does not depend on the choiceof the initial system.[SPK]My idea is that the "top-down" instantiation of proofs fromArithmetic Realism's P.o.V. is reflected in a "bottom-up" way by aninfinite number of interactions *between many agents, thus therelevance of the notion of proofs from semantic games andcorrelations therein*. This sets up a natural symmetry of sortsbetween the ONE and the MANY, where the "internal views" are withinthe MANY *as 1st person PoV*.There would be no unique "initial system" in the objective sensefor the same reason that there can be no first implementation in theobjective 3rd person sense. This has the implication for physicalsystems that there is no origin for time and space in an objectivesense. The Perfect Cosmological Principle that the Universe ishomogenous and isotropic in space and time would obtain for anaverage "observer"; thus a finite space and duration of the worldwould obtain for any instance. This would solve the initialconditions problem in physics.**I ask this because it seems that one of the key points ofdivergence in our discussion is related to my use of ideas that areimplicit in game semantic based logics.[BM] All digital parallelism can be emulated by digital sequences.In the mind-body problem parallelism is a red herring, because IF itplays some role for the measure problem, THEN it will be justifiedby the extraction of space and time. Of course in concrete 3D-timeapplications, parallelism is without doubt of upmost importance.[SPK]I agree and this goes straight to the root of the idea thatI am exploring. This is why I am looking at the duality betweenBoolean algebras (and their generalizations) and disconnected/scattered spaces that we see in the Stone Representation theorem.Minds would be instances of the former and Bodies would be instancesof the latter. The trick is to see how the evolution of these works;this is what Pratt has figured out (in basic terms).<Emoticon1.gif> Additionally, your repeated notion that if "anyempirical difference between this arithmetical physics and theempirical physics, would refute, not Plotinus, but the presentarithmetical interpretation" requires a means to connect oranalytically continue into physical theory; "concrete 3D-timeapplications" are instances of the latter. By the way, the passagesthat I quoted previously from Stephen Wolfram where relating to thatphysical side and speak to limits on the content of individualMechanisms; those are what I am considering in the bisimulationmodel of interactions.I am not advocating physicalism except as one side of a duality.

`You mean "matter". By definition physicalism excludes that the other`

`part as a fundamental ontology. In a sense numbers don't exist for a`

`physicalist. Only a dulaist can believe in number and primitive`

`fundamental particle.`

`Your quote too much in different fields to grasp what you are trying`

`to say.`

I am against the idea that the physical (or the logical) is "allthat exists"

`Make clear what are your assumption. What exist for you at the base`

`level.`

and the proof of sorts that I point to is the epiphenomena problemthat both physical monism and mental/ideal monism have.

`It is not symmetrical. If you believe in "only mind", you don't need`

`to make matter an epiphenomena given that uou have only "phenomena".`

`You could say "epi-ontologena", except that with "mind only" (and`

`mechanism) we don't need any ontology for matter, by definition.`

Of course we need a neutral common ground to absorb both into butthat is taken into account in terms of "in the limit of where alldifferences vanish".

`This is a nice poetical description of inconsistency, the limit where`

`1 - 0 = 0.`

Forgive me here as I am sacrificing clarity for brevity. **Additionally there is resent work that seems to strongly support mycrazy idea of how we might solve the measurement problem in QM(which is my main motivation).[BM] So you do assume QM, even QM + collapse apparently. I don'tassume anything in physics, given that the results is that physicsis derivable from arithmetic, and *has to be derived* fromarithmetic if we want obtain the qualia, and not just the quanta.[SPK]Yes, because I am coming from the opposite direction fromyou! I assume QM

`That's way too much for me. Although I believe QM is true, I estimate`

`we have to derive it from arithmetic. And that is the conclusion of`

`the UDA argument. Third person classical mechanism entails first`

`person plural quantum mechanism.`

but not "collapse" per say as the metaphysical assumptions in"collapse" go against the Perfect Cosmological Principle. We seethis in the preferred reference frame that any objective collapsemodel generates. What we need, I believe, is a model where we obtainwhat appears as a Collapse from a 1st person P.o.V. but is more likethe Everett-Dewitt idea from the outside 3rd person view all thewhile understanding that there is no special "observer" that couldperceive the latter except as an abstract notion.**Please see: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~abranden/icig-05-27-08.pdfThis is very much related to the work of Jean-Yves Girard in his"Geometry of Interaction".[BM] ? (The relation is either trivial, or is not obvious for me.Very technical paper(s). You should stick a bit more on the idea(s)instead of mentioning so much papers which seems to me both a bit1004-like with respect to the topic).[SPK]That paper discusses the notion of correlations in games whichis another way of looking at bisimulations between Mechanisms. Fromthe abstract:"Correlations arise naturally in non-cooperative games, e.g., in theequivalence between undominatedand optimal strategies in games with more than two players. But thenon-cooperative assumptionis that players do not coordinate their strategy choices, so wheredo these correlations come from?The epistemic view of games gives an answer. Under this view, theplayers’ hierarchies of beliefs(beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, . . . ) about the strategies playedin the game are part of the descriptionof a game. This gives a source of correlation: A player believesother players’ strategy choices arecorrelated, because he believes their hierarchies of beliefs arecorrelated. We refer to this kind ofcorrelation as “intrinsic,” since it comes from variables—viz., thehierarchies of beliefs—that are partof the game. We compare the intrinsic route with the “extrinsic”route taken by Aumann [2, 1974],which adds signals to the original game."I hoped that you might get an intuition of what I am trying towork out by reading this paper... It seems to me that the notion ofBelief that Brandenburger et al are using would be related to your Bas in Bp&p. In my idea this manifests as simulations of simulations,etc.

`If you find a precise relation, then submit it. Well, you can think`

`aloud for some time, but don't expect too much understanding.`

**By the way, almost all of Girard's papers are inaccessible to me asI am not in a university. I know of his work from my study ofPratt's papers.Take a look here: http://iml.univ-mrs.fr/~girard/Articles.html from Girard's web page: http://iml.univ-mrs.fr/~girard/ Best, Bruno [SPK]Thanks for pointing me to that, now I have 2X reasons to learnto read French. :P I am still thinking on how to write up theinteraction idea. It takes me time to translate pictures in my headto words on the screen. <Emoticon10.gif>

`Try to write a paper, and make it readable by some experts in the`

`field you cross. Or for a wider audience, on a less ambitious version.`

`Mechanism is compatible with matter and dualism, if it is taken in`

`some phenomenological view.`

`You can assume QM, but my point is only that we can't do that, if we`

`assume M. (mechanism). QM has to be justified in M through machine's`

`self-reference intensional nuances.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.