On 14 Jan 2011, at 06:55, Colin Hales wrote:

Hi David,

I think feisty/curmudgeon is more apt than fierce... but yeah ... :-)

RE: "In other words, what is the relation, in your theory,
between the first-person and specific third-person phenomena?"

Right to it eh? Call the two perspective 1-P and 3P

OK. First, there may be a bit of a misdirection in the words "first- person and specific third-person phenomena?". Phenomena are 100% encountered by a scientist's 1-P experience. It's 100% of our access to anything. It's 'scientific observation'. There's no such thing as "3rd person phenomena". 3rd person is a description of the 'contents of consciousness as scientific observation'...These descriptions have no more reality than that of an abstract set of rules prescribing/proscribing regularity between agreed 1st-person percepts. Their predictive success entails no claim to any capture of ontology or necessity for causal relations.

The 1-P/3-P divide is, in my system, a duality of equivalent descriptions pivoting on mutual consistency in the production of an observer that acquires the 'what it is like, 1-P experience' as a result of the fundamental properties of being within the system thus described. This is not a duality of substance. It is a duality of knowledge resulting from being in and made of a system's componentry and describing it from within.

That's all you have to do.

The usual mistake that's made at this point is to fail to discriminate between the 'why/how' of 1-P and the 'what'. It's extemely easy to isolate the 'what': ELECTROMAGNETISM (EM). This is the beautiful 3-P description of a brain. The list of possible 'what' is delivering 1-P is of length 1. 'Being' electromagnetism results in 1-P.

The real WHY/HOW is in asking 'why is it that EM delivers it?'

Well there you go. You know that the description yuo have of EM and the description that says WHY EM does 1-P (when configured like a brain) are not the same descriptions. In other words you have to start describing the universe in a manner prior to the observer.

How do you empirically justify this new set of descriptions?

Whatever this new descriptive realm is, it should predict an observer that sees the world as we do AND that appears to be a brain when you look at it 3-P.

Neither description set need be unique.

I hope that's enough!


Not sure. I think David alluded to the 1-3 distinction introduced so that people can understand that mechanism leads to 1-indeterminacy, 1- non-locality, even 1-non-clonability, which are steps to understand that the physical reality emerges in a 1-plural way (assuming I can survive with a digital (generalized) brain. The "1" and "3" are just the difference between inside a teleportation box, or outside. It is a simple transparent 3-definition of a notion of 1-view. It makes also the "3"-view a sort of relative notion, given that you can duplicate population of machines practicing internal teleportation and self- multiplication.

But I do agree with your duality view. In the arithmetical translation you get it by the difference, for the machine, between Bp and Bp & p. G* proves them equivalent, but G does not, and machines "lived" them as different. The machine is modest: she does not always believe that Bp -> p, but she always believe that (Bp & p) -> p, of course. But this duality is a part of an octality (the eight hypostases).

I am never sure what you mean by "world", nor what is your ontology, and you don't seem aware, or convinced perhaps, that the physical realities does exist as shared dream by universal machines, assuming we are *no more* than universal (Löbian) machine (it is easy to show that we are all *at least* such machine).

May be the question is: how do you relate your approach with UDA (and perhaps AUDA, but that is more technically involved). I took time to explain this in this list. You might relate to older posts if you have already said something on this which I don't remember. I do remember the feisty/curmudgeon style though :)

Regards,

Bruno







cheers
colin


David Nyman wrote:

Gawd, I've missed you Colin, you fierce old thing!  Is it wet where
you are or is the inundation confined to poor old Brisbane?

I suppose you know that Bruno and you agree (at least in my estimation
of your lines of argument) that observation is the key phenomenon to
be explained at the outset, instead - as you rightly say - of just
being taken for granted.  If this cardinal error is committed at the
starting gate, the rest of the argument inevitably runs in a circle.
Of course you and Bruno start from different premisses vis-a-vis the
primitives, but on the positive side either theory is (I presume) open
to empirical falsification.

One thing I haven't been able to fathom so far about your own ideas is
where you stand on what Bruno calls first-person indeterminacy, which
has come up again in a recent thread.  You know, the transporter
thought experiment, or just the question in general of why I find
myself to be in this particular observer position (as raised in the
target paper).  In other words, what is the relation, in your theory,
between the first-person and specific third-person phenomena?  In
Bruno's computational approach, the relation seems to emerge via a
kind of filtering process or sieve of consciousness considered as a
whole through the infinity of possible computations.  In this way the
computational "everything" is conceived as converging on consistent
first-person narratives as a consequence of various kinds of "measure" - a very rough analogy would be the emergence of all possible books in
Borges' "Library of Babel".   What would be the analogous ideas in
your own approach?

David

On 12 January 2011 22:50, Colin Hales <c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au> wrote:

I confess to the usual level of exasperation. Yet again the great culturally
maintained mental block subverts real progress. And, yet again, the
participant doesn;t even know they are doing it.  Garrett says ....

"The key is that observers are just a particular type of information, as is everything else. That is, we assume that the Physical Church Turing Thesis
(PCTT) ..blah blah blah...."

WRONG WRONG WRONG.

The author has somehow remained completely uninformed by the real message in
the consciousness material cited in the article.

Observers are NOT just a particular type of information!!!!

The word information _was defined by an observer_, a human, USING
observation. Like every other word it's just a metaphoric description of as thing, with meaning to a human. No matter what logical steps one proceeds to enact from this juncture, you are not describing anything that can be used to build or explain an observer. You are merely describing what an
observer will see.

What does it take to get something so simple across to physics?

I'll have yet another go at it.

Consider a SET_X =  {BALL1, BALL2, BALL3, BALL4}
This is a traditional 3-rd person (3P) view of the set created by a
scientific act of OBSERVATION of the set of balls.
BALL SET SCIENCE then proceeds to construct very clever mathematical
descriptions of set member behaviour.

BUT

If you are the observer = BALL1, INSIDE SET X, the very act of observation results from the 1ST PERSON (1-P) relationship between [you, observer = BALL 1 ] and [the rest of the set, from within SET_X]. This description is not the same as the above description of SET_X!!!! Can't anyone see that ?? The ability to observe anything arises from that circumstance, not from the
3P-circumstance constructed by having observed.

Science has not even begun to characterise SET_X   in the 1P way.
=================

Every single attempt so far in science has the following generic form.....

I am human scientist FRED. How we humans do observation is a real mystery. I like mysteries. And I am really good at maths. I will do the very clever maths of observation. Now where do I begin.......ASSUMING OBSERVATION
....... blah blah blah.....

Then off we go into the weeds, YET AGAIN.

FRED just doesn't get the difference between 1-P and 3-P. It's a systemic
blindness.

I'll just crawl off and fume for a while. I'll be OK soon enough! :-)

Colin Hales
<if you can't formulaically predict/build an observer with what you
produced, you haven't explained observation and you don't really understand
it>


ronaldheld wrote:

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1101/1101.2198v1.pdf
   Any comments?
                                 Ronald



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