On Jan 14, 5:55 am, Colin Hales <c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au> wrote:
> Hi David,
> I think feisty/curmudgeon is more apt than fierce... but yeah ... :-)
> RE: "In other words, what is the relation, in your theory,
> between the first-person and specific third-person phenomena?"
> Right to it eh? Call the two perspective 1-P and 3P
> OK. First, there may be a bit of a misdirection in the words
> "first-person and specific third-person phenomena?". Phenomena are 100%
> encountered by a scientist's 1-P experience. It's 100% of our access to
> anything. It's 'scientific observation'. There's no such thing as "3rd
> person phenomena". 3rd person is a description of the 'contents of
> consciousness as scientific observation'...These descriptions have no
> more reality than that of an abstract set of rules
> prescribing/proscribing regularity between agreed 1st-person percepts.

The descriptions has  not reality itself, or what is described has no

> Their predictive success entails no claim to any capture of ontology or
> necessity for causal relations.

Why not? Those seem loke good reasons to many.

> The 1-P/3-P divide is, in my system, a duality of equivalent
> descriptions pivoting on mutual consistency in the production of an
> observer that acquires the 'what it is like, 1-P experience' as a result
> of the fundamental properties of being within the system thus described.
> This is not a duality of substance. It is a duality of knowledge
> resulting from being in and made of a system's componentry and
> describing it from within.
> That's all you have to do.
> The usual mistake that's made at this point is to fail to discriminate
> between the 'why/how' of 1-P and the 'what'. It's extemely easy to
> isolate the 'what': ELECTROMAGNETISM (EM). This is the beautiful 3-P
> description of a brain. The list of possible 'what' is delivering 1-P is
> of length 1. 'Being' electromagnetism results in 1-P.
> The real WHY/HOW is in asking 'why is it that EM delivers it?'
> Well there you go. You know that the description yuo have of EM and the
> description that says WHY EM does 1-P (when configured like a brain) are
> not the same descriptions. In other words you have to start describing
> the universe in a manner prior to the observer.
> How do you empirically justify this new set of descriptions?


> Whatever this new descriptive realm is, it should predict an observer
> that sees the world as we do AND that appears to be a brain when you
> look at it 3-P.
> Neither description set need be unique.
> I hope that's enough!
> cheers
> colin

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to