On Jan 14, 5:55 am, Colin Hales <c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au> wrote: > Hi David, > > I think feisty/curmudgeon is more apt than fierce... but yeah ... :-) > > RE: "In other words, what is the relation, in your theory, > between the first-person and specific third-person phenomena?" > > Right to it eh? Call the two perspective 1-P and 3P > > OK. First, there may be a bit of a misdirection in the words > "first-person and specific third-person phenomena?". Phenomena are 100% > encountered by a scientist's 1-P experience. It's 100% of our access to > anything. It's 'scientific observation'. There's no such thing as "3rd > person phenomena". 3rd person is a description of the 'contents of > consciousness as scientific observation'...These descriptions have no > more reality than that of an abstract set of rules > prescribing/proscribing regularity between agreed 1st-person percepts.
The descriptions has not reality itself, or what is described has no reality. > Their predictive success entails no claim to any capture of ontology or > necessity for causal relations. Why not? Those seem loke good reasons to many. > The 1-P/3-P divide is, in my system, a duality of equivalent > descriptions pivoting on mutual consistency in the production of an > observer that acquires the 'what it is like, 1-P experience' as a result > of the fundamental properties of being within the system thus described. > This is not a duality of substance. It is a duality of knowledge > resulting from being in and made of a system's componentry and > describing it from within. > > That's all you have to do. > > The usual mistake that's made at this point is to fail to discriminate > between the 'why/how' of 1-P and the 'what'. It's extemely easy to > isolate the 'what': ELECTROMAGNETISM (EM). This is the beautiful 3-P > description of a brain. The list of possible 'what' is delivering 1-P is > of length 1. 'Being' electromagnetism results in 1-P. > > The real WHY/HOW is in asking 'why is it that EM delivers it?' > > Well there you go. You know that the description yuo have of EM and the > description that says WHY EM does 1-P (when configured like a brain) are > not the same descriptions. In other words you have to start describing > the universe in a manner prior to the observer. > > How do you empirically justify this new set of descriptions? Abduction? > Whatever this new descriptive realm is, it should predict an observer > that sees the world as we do AND that appears to be a brain when you > look at it 3-P. > > Neither description set need be unique. > > I hope that's enough! > > cheers > colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.