On Feb 2, 10:35 pm, Colin Hales <c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au> wrote: > Hi all, > This is a response to all the vigor my comp/COMP decision has caused. > First: Go Evgenii! That weirdest of weird substances, money, nothing > more than a calibrated belief system in humans, gets us all in the end! > You may be the only person in this list hooked into reality. :-) > ==== back to issues. > We've all been through the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment. The recent > questions raised in the discussion suggest to me that it may not be > apparent to all that this experiment has actually been done. It's you. > Me. Everyone. Already. > > Our brains are suspended in a bath of cerebral spinal fluid. One of the > layers between the brain meninges. If you mentally expanded then to > vat-sizes and took the outer layers off...you have a brain in a vat. > > We _are_ brains in a vat. > The pertinent sense of BiV is that sensory inputs are falsified
> This means we are hooked into the external world in ways that are not > present in the peripheral nerves. Looking at the (nerves pulses) > signals, it is impossible to tell if they are vision, smell, touch or > anything else. But looking at the nerves themselves, it is possible because they are hooked up in certain ways. It's like an analog telphone exchange: *this* line comes from Mr Smith's house, *that* line goes to Mrs Brown's house > Those that think that a computer can add this extra bit > of connectivity to the external world, It's not missing >believe in comp/COMP. When you > replace the brain with a model of a brain using a computer, that "extra" > bit, the connection with the outside world we get from our qualia,...the > qualia created by the brain matter itself, is replaced by the qualia you > get by 'being' the computer. > > If you believe comp/COMP, then you believe that the computer's model -or > - the computer hardware itself - somehow replaces the function of the > qualia, by analysing the sensory signalling, which is fundamentally > degenerately related to the external world. Only a human with qualia > can, from sensory signals, provide any sort of model for our > 'computer-in-a-vat' that might stand-in for an external world. Having > done that, the world being explored by our computer-in-a-vat is the > world of the human model generated from the sensory signals, not the > world itself. When an encounter with the unknown happens, then the > unknown will be chacterized by a human model's response to the unknown, > not the (unknown) actual world. The extent to which these things are > different is the key. > > Neuroscience is beginning to progress from NCC (Neural correlates of > consciousness) to EMCC (electromagnetic correlates of consciousness). > Researchers are slowly discovering that certain aspects of cognition and > behaviour correlate better with the LFP (local field > potential/extracellular field) than mere action potentials. > > If the EM fields are the difference, then in replacing the fields of the > brain with the fields of the computer running a model...and your > qualia/cognition go with it. > > So when you think of the 'input/output' relations for a computer, the > sensory signalling is only part of it. There is another complete set of > 'input' relations, qualia, that together with the sensory signals, form > our real connection to the outside world. So the old black-box > replacement idea is right - but only if the black box has a whole other > set of 'input' signals, from the qualia. The only way you can > computationally replace these signals is to already know everything > about the external world already. Your alternative? Keep the qualia in > your 'black box'. To me that means generating the fields as well. > > Don't get me wrong. Lots of really nifty AI can result from the > 'computer-in-a-vat'. However, that's not what I am aiming at. I want > AGI. G for General. > > I am an engineer. Well not quite. I think I am some kind of > neuroscientist now. Just handing my PhD in...I will build an AGI based > on choices. My research suggests that replacing the fields, emulating > the brain, is the way to go. That's why my PhD is all about how neurons > originate the endogenous field system measured by scalp EEG/MEG. Having > nutted it out, time to make hardware to do it. > > Gotta go. > > Colin Hales > > Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > > on 02.02.2011 11:00 Stathis Papaioannou said the following: > >> On Wed, Feb 2, 2011 at 6:45 PM, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com> > >> wrote: > > >>> I think it very likely that the brain can be so modeled. But the > >>> meaning that simulated brain, as expressed in it's output decisions > >>> relative to inputs is dependent on the rest of the world, or at > >>> least of it with which the brain will interact - including the past > >>> evoutionary history which led up to the brain. Its computations > >>> have no canonical interpretation in themselves. > > >> You can connect the simulated brain to transducers which convert > >> environmental inputs into electrical signals. But then, what would > >> happen if the same electrical signals were input from data on disk > >> rather than the environment? Would the brain's experience be > >> different? If so, how would it know where the data was coming from? > > > I believe that at this point the Chalmers' paper > > > David Chalmers, The Matrix as Metaphysics > >http://consc.net/papers/matrix.pdf > > > could be useful. We can assume MAT or we can assume MEC, but this > > brings no changes in my personal life. I have to do the same things, > > for example I have to earn money to be able further to try to > > understand what comp is. If money are over than I am in trouble, > > either I am in the Matrix or not. > > > Evgenii > > >http://blog.rudnyi.ru -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
