On Feb 1, 10:53 pm, Colin Hales <[email protected]> wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 01 Feb 2011, at 07:51, Colin Hales wrote: > > >> Hi Bruno, > > >> I have been pondering this issue a bit and I am intrigued about how > >> you regard the problem space we inhabit. When you say things like ... > > >> "Are you aware that If comp is true, that is if I am a machine ..." > > >> I cannot fathom how you ever get to this point. > > > By looking at amoeabs, then reading book on molecular genetics, > > smelling Turing universality, then by reading G�del's proof and the > > discovery of how to handle self-duplication and self-reference in > > representational machine, ... > > > I did not take this too much seriously until my understanding of > > Church thesis deepens. The closure of computerland for diagonalization > > makes universal machine extremely universal, if I can say. > > >> This is a presupposition that arises somehow in the lexicon you have > >> established within your overall framework of thinking. > > > It has lead me to some interest with that hypothesis. > > >> Let me have a stab at how my view and yours correlate. > > >> In my view > >> ======================================================== > >> A) There is a natural world. > >> We, Turing machines dogs, computers are all being 'computed' by it. > >> This is a set of unknown naturally occurring symbols > >> The natural 'symbols' interact naturally. > >> This is 'natural computation'. NOT like desktop computing. > >> Universe U ensues. > >> Scientist S is being computed within U > >> Scientist S can observe U from within. > >> U makes use of fundamental properties of the symbols to enable > >> .... observation, from within. Call this principle P-O > > > If by natural world you mean the world of the natural numbers with > > addition and multiplication, I am OK. I can picture your "A)". > > No. Here's where we part company. This presupposition about the relation > between the abstractions for quantity we call numbers, and the natural > world is one I do not make. All you can logically claim is that it is > made of a large set of 'something', these 'somethings' interact > simultaneously, on mass. The 'numbers' do not relate to each other like > natural numbers, but they do relate in a way that can be MODELLED using > natural numbers. > > > If by natural world you mean the physical worlds as seen by 'numbers', > > what you say might be locally correct, but that remains to be proved > > (assuming comp). > > No. You have it all backwards. You can assume _nothing_ about the > natural world and abstract number systems. > > > > >> B) This is a symbolic description of U created by S from within U > >> S can concoct a description of the natural symbols in (A) > >> It need not be unique, many (B) correspond to one (A) > >> S can never know if it's completely done. > >> S can never know the real nature of the sybols in (A) > >> Descriptions (B), with P-O, explains observation and the observer S > > >> C) There is a _second_ description > >> It is also concocted by S > >> These are the normal empirical laws we all know so well > > > ? > > >> It describes how the U appears to S from inside > >> It need not be unique, many (C) correspond to one (A) > >> No (C) ever explains observation. > > >> In this framework > >> (i) a computer running description/rules (B) is not the natural world. > > > OK. With the two sense of natural world I accept above. > > >> (ii) a computer running description/rules (C) is not the natural world. > > > OK. > > >> (iii) a computer running descriptions (B) or (C) is 'artificially > >> computing' > > > Yes. it is an isolated malin g�nie. > > >> (iv) (C) is physics that present day scientists construct > > > I don't get "C". > > So you don't understand what basic empirical scientists do. Boy have I > failed to connect or what! > > >> (v) (B) is physics of a natural world prior to an observer. > > > This exist for L�bian machine (although they can find it "looking > > inward"). > Who's 'they'? > > >> (vi) (A) is 'NATURALLY computing' in the sense that it is literally > >> 'computing' scientist S. > >> ===================================================== > >> OK. > >> These options are the logically justifiable position we can take when > >> we are, as we are, inside U trying to work U out from within, using > >> an observation faculty provided by U as part of (A). Empirical > >> evidence justifying (C) is normal overvation (contents of one or more > >> observer-agreed conscious experisnces). Empirical evidence justifying > >> (B) is implicit in the existence of an observer concocting a set (C). > >> You can't be confused about an bservation unless there is an observer > >> to be confused. > >> ===================================================== > >> All that said.....now .... > > >> You mention "digital physics". You say "Are you aware that If COMP is > >> true, that is if I am a machine ..." > > >> In terms of my framework....you are speaking of ...what? > > > I postulate, eventually, only natural numbers and addition and > > multiplication. Then from this (it is not obvious but standard in good > > logic textbook) you can show that the arithmetical relation (defined > > with "+" and "*", and classical logic) emulate all computations. > > Physics or the natural world is never emulated (but often simulated by > > malin g�nie program). Physics is what appear from inside taking the > > first person indeterminacy inyto account. A priori the natural world > > is not a computational object. > > "Physics is what appear from inside taking the first person > indeterminacy inyto account. " > > This is (C). Standard empirical physics. > > "A priori the natural world is not a computational object" > > This is (A). the universe U is not a computational object. Not computed. > > OK. Clarity of a sort. Where does (B) fit in? I think you assume it as a > com,puter program on a magical non-existent computer running something. > I hold that descriptions (B) are accessible. I also hold that these > descriptions are not the same as the (C) descriptions. Both constructed > by the same observer/scientist. > > No I think maybe you merge (A) and (B) and then replace them both with > your lower-case comp machine. OK. > > > > >> (1) A 'Turing machine (digital computer)' inside U running (B) > >> descriptions? > >> (2) The natural computation itself, of kind (A)? > > >> I suspect > > >> (3) Some kind of magical 'computer' in idea-space computing us as (A)? > >> i.e. A 'virtual machine' that 'acts as if' it generates an arbitrary > >> number of different U? > > >> The COMP I talk about having refuted is in (i) or (ii) above. > >> I suspect this is not the COMP you are speaking of... > > > The comp I talk about is the assumption that my (generailzed) brain > > can be emulated by a digital computer. The rest should follow. > > The 'comp' you talk about is actually an abstract machine in a > non-existent abstract space that manipulates abstractions. It's got > nothing to do with the COMP I talk about, which is a computer, made of > the real world (not integers), in the real natural world, running a > description (made by humans) of the natural world. This applies to > 'quasi-digital' (desktop style), analogue and quantum computers. > > You have a deep seated conviction that this abstract computer that 'is' > a reality and a real computer that runs descriptions of a reality are > indistinguishable. This is unjustifiable. The simpler, parsimonious > solution is to assume that is not the case, and work out what options > exist for a describer and the possible relations between a describer and > the described. > > The reason your propositions have trouble getting accepted is because > they make this step into a faith-based presupposition that is > indistinguishable from a statement like "the natural world is erected in > real time by the little purple regularity fairies". It has exactly the > same level of faith and assumption. So the comp you speak of, I > conclude, at last, is not the COMP I refute, nor is it the one of the > many other refutations. Which is kind of good from your perspective. > From my perspective it means I have to battle no more with your comp. > > In relation to Stathis' request: > > If you model a natural environment presenting some problem to a human > within that environment, the simulated human will arrive at the same > solution as the real human would have. If intelligence is > problem-solving behaviour, there is therefore no difference between > the natural world and the model provided that the model is in fact a > good one. Your claim that computers cannot replicate human > intelligence is thus equivalent to a claim that there is some process > in the human brain which is not Turing emulable. What process do you > > No. This is just plain wrong. You cannot model an observation of something > that you have no idea of the evidence of .i.e. You cannot model the unknown.
But you can build an abstract, functional model of what you observe. An abstract model only has to relate inputs (as seen by you) to outputs (as seen by you). What they really are doesn't matter to an abstract model..that's why it's abstract. That is clearly enough to deal with logic, maths, games, etc because they are all abstract themselves---there is no meaningful difference between emulating chess and "really" playing it. Whether all of intelligence can be modelled that way is the question. Flight simultors don't fly: abstract modelling does not capture reality in that case. It is not that we know it can't, it is that we don't know one way or the other. > The non-Turing emulable part of the natural world is the relationship between > every little bit X and every other bit of it that is NOT directly related to > X. Why? That seems a non sequitur. > A product of massive parallelism created by a massive collection of the > entities of which we are actually made, which is best assumed not to be > abstract numbers if you want to understand it. This is something we inherit > by 'being' in the world. Something that cannot be simulated. Something that a > Turing Machine (computer), totally different to us physically, does not get > in its program. > > By way of example, I have attached a video of a simulated neuron firing. It's > from a paper I have in review at the moment. The video depicts the currents > originating the biologically realistic EM fields around a neuron due to the > ion channels involed in an action potential. It was produce by the package > NEURON. In it you will see a pair of red/blue interfaces travelling away from > the soma. These interfaces are virtual evanescent current-dipoles. They are > mathematically describable, but form no part of the mathematical description > that generated them. THAT is what is missing. These are the virtual > relationships not accessed by the mathematics of a Turing machine. No matter > what is going on in a Turing machine, NONE of this kind of phenomenon are > accessed by it. > > The question is 'what is it like to BE those fields'. It cannot be claimed to > be like the mathematical description that represents them, nor can it be > claimed to be 'like' being the computer running the simulation. The traditional argument from qualia. > A final demo that tells you what can't be emulated...using, yes, actual > natural numbers. > Here's a 1. > Here another 1. > If I 'be' the first 1, you 'be' the second 1. what 'law' captures the > relationship between the two instances of 1? That 'law' is not any law that > you and I concoct sitting up here, staring down at them like a god. No amount > of abstraction of 'one-ness' capture that relationship. > Says who? There's no argument there, unless you are going back to qualia again . You can't assume things have an irreducible individual perspective just because they are distinct. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
