On Feb 4, 1:05 am, Colin Hales <c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au> wrote: > Stathis (....Down below...) > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On Thu, Feb 3, 2011 at 9:35 AM, Colin Hales > > <c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au> wrote: > > >> This means we are hooked into the external world in ways that are not > >> present in the peripheral nerves. Looking at the (nerves pulses) signals, > >> it > >> is impossible to tell if they are vision, smell, touch or anything else. > >> Those that think that a computer can add this extra bit of connectivity to > >> the external world, believe in comp/COMP. When you replace the brain with a > >> model of a brain using a computer, that "extra" bit, the connection with > >> the > >> outside world we get from our qualia,...the qualia created by the brain > >> matter itself, is replaced by the qualia you get by 'being' the computer. > > >> If you believe comp/COMP, then you believe that the computer's model -or - > >> the computer hardware itself - somehow replaces the function of the > >> qualia, > >> by analysing the sensory signalling, which is fundamentally degenerately > >> related to the external world. Only a human with qualia can, from sensory > >> signals, provide any sort of model for our 'computer-in-a-vat' that might > >> stand-in for an external world. Having done that, the world being explored > >> by our computer-in-a-vat is the world of the human model generated from the > >> sensory signals, not the world itself. When an encounter with the unknown > >> happens, then the unknown will be chacterized by a human model's response > >> to > >> the unknown, not the (unknown) actual world. The extent to which these > >> things are different is the key. > > >> Neuroscience is beginning to progress from NCC (Neural correlates of > >> consciousness) to EMCC (electromagnetic correlates of consciousness). > >> Researchers are slowly discovering that certain aspects of cognition and > >> behaviour correlate better with the LFP (local field > >> potential/extracellular > >> field) than mere action potentials. > > >> If the EM fields are the difference, then in replacing the fields of the > >> brain with the fields of the computer running a model...and your > >> qualia/cognition go with it. > > >> So when you think of the 'input/output' relations for a computer, the > >> sensory signalling is only part of it. There is another complete set of > >> 'input' relations, qualia, that together with the sensory signals, form our > >> real connection to the outside world. So the old black-box replacement idea > >> is right - but only if the black box has a whole other set of 'input' > >> signals, from the qualia. The only way you can computationally replace > >> these > >> signals is to already know everything about the external world already. > >> Your > >> alternative? Keep the qualia in your 'black box'. To me that means > >> generating the fields as well. > > >> Don't get me wrong. Lots of really nifty AI can result from the > >> 'computer-in-a-vat'. However, that's not what I am aiming at. I want AGI. G > >> for General. > > > Can the behaviour of the neurons including the electric fields be > > simulated? For example, is it possible to model what will happen in > > the brain (and what output will ultimately go to the muscles via > > peripheral nerves) if a particular sequence of photons hits the > > retina? If that is a theoretical impossibility then where exactly is > > the non-computable physics, and what evidence do you have that it is > > non-computable? > > Lots of aspects to your questions.... and I'll try and answer Bruno at > the same time. > > 1) I am in the process of upgrading neural modelling to include the > fields in the traditional sense of simulation of the fields. The way to > think of it is that the little capacitor in the Hodgkin-Huxley > equilvalent circuit is about to get a whole new role. > > 2) Having done that, one can do simulations of single unit, multiple > unit, populations etc etc...You may be able to extract something > verifiable in the wet-lab. > > 3) However, I would hold that no matter how comprehensive the models, no > matter how many neurons ... even the whole brain and the peripheral > nerves...they will NOT behave like the real thing in the sense that such > a brain model cannot ever 'be' a mind. The reason is that we 'BE' the > fields. We do not 'BE' a description of the fields. The information > delivered by 'BE'ing the field acts in addition to that described by the > 3rd-person-validated system of classical partial differential equations > that are Maxwell's equations. > > 4) A given set of photons, can result from an infinity of different > configurations of the distal world. A single red photon can come across > the room from your xmas decorations or across the galaxy from a > supernova. It is a fundamentally degenerate relationship. Yet the brain > inherits enough information to converge on a visual scene that captures > the difference. HOW?
a) It guesses. It isn;t always right. b) the eyes receive millions of photons. It doesn;t build a scene from them individually, it comes up with a hypothesis that explains them jointly, a gestalt. That greatly constrains the problem space (although not always uniquely, as the Necker cube shows). > I think I know, but that explanation is too long > and doesn't matter. The fact is that the EM fields deliver _extra_ > information inherited from their relationship with space itself. It has > to. There's no place else or it to come from! That is, again, a magical solution to a non existent problem. > 5) Regardless of my wacky ideas about space, I'd like to reinforce the > implications of the particular case of the scientist, who is trying to > find out about the distal natural world from position of fundamental > ignorance. If you claim that we have enough information to overcome the > degeneracy, then you already have what the scientist wants...knowledge > of the unknown external distal world....so you are not actually doing > science. You already know. You are conflating the idea that we have enough information to get started with the idea that we know everything >This is the killer logical position. If you > say a computer can do it, you are saying, in effect, that science does > nothing/already knows everything. > ============ > > In the end, then, I am not saying that there is something uncomputable > in the sense that it is impossible to 'simulate' it. You can simulate > anything! What I am saying is that if you could _you wouldn't bother_ > because you'd already know everything. To accurately simulate a > scientist you have to simulate (a) the scientist and (b) the entire > environment of the scientist, when the scientist is trying to uncover > the unknown and you can't simulate it because you don;t know it. I use > the scientist as a model for the generally intelligent behaviour. And that conflates not being able to simulate intelligence with not being able to simulate an environment -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.