On 05 Feb 2011, at 01:47, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 2/4/2011 7:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 Feb 2011, at 01:59, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 2/3/2011 5:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 03 Feb 2011, at 01:18, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 2/2/2011 2:00 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Feb 2, 2011 at 6:45 PM, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com > wrote:


I think it very likely that the brain can be so modeled. But the meaning that simulated brain, as expressed in it's output decisions relative to inputs is dependent on the rest of the world, or at least of it with which the brain will interact - including the past evoutionary history which led up to the brain. Its computations have no canonical interpretation in
themselves.

You can connect the simulated brain to transducers which convert
environmental inputs into electrical signals. But then, what would happen if the same electrical signals were input from data on disk
rather than the environment? Would the brain's experience be
different? If so, how would it know where the data was coming from?


It wouldn't know; and it's responses would have no meaning except to someone who did know. Context is essential. Otherwise you get the rock that calculates everything.


If the context is needed and is not Turing emulable, then comp is just false. If it is Turing emulable then the reasoning go through, unless you have an objection, and it would be nice you try to say where.

Bruno

My reservation is that the context will be Turing emulable, but it will have to be so large as to constitute a whole world. That this is what is required that be self-interpreting.


But that is not an objection at all. It is just an affirmation that our comp substitution level is so low that the doctor has to emulate the entire physical universe to get an artificial brain.

No, the doctor doesn't have to do that because he's only substituting for a little part of it and allowing it to interact with the rest that is already existing.

That is a nice move to keep the doctor's job in case the Subst. level is very low. But this is not an objection: it just appears that your generalized brain is the universe (this leads to personal identity problem, but that's another topic). If the generalized brain is Turing emulable, then, even if it is as big as the physical observable universe, the reasoning goes through.



But the reasoning still go through, and the laws of physics have still to be retrieved from computer science, and so we keep the qualia/quanta distinction, which is fine.

The only thing which *is* ruled out by having such a low substitution level is the idea of buying *in practice* an artificial brain. But this practice idea is not used in the reasoning. I

I think it rules out the movie graph kind of brain as being conscious of this world.

But this is already in comp. The movie graph contains a description of a computation, but does not compute at all. If you build the movie graph of the entire universe (like you have to do for the MGA reasoning with your very low level) it will also not do any computation, yet it will have the same physical activity as the entire universe, and you will have to abandon the physical supervenience thesis. Again, this show that the argument makes physics emerging on the laws of computer science or numbers. As I just said, this shows that by making the level sufficiently low, the number's phenomenology extend to a form of internal physicalism. Now, I think few mechanist would accept that their consciousness depends on far away events in the universe, but who knows? This points on things that we can never be sure if we assume comp, and the computationalist of tomorrow will dispute ever the reasonable and the "real" level of substitution. It is a weakness of comp, that by being so much not reductionist, and mute on the level, it leaves us with still a large spectrum of possibility between near Aristotelian and ultrapythagorean conception of reality. But in all case physics emerges from addition and multiplication.

Bruno




Brent

t is used in step 1-6 for making things easier, but is eliminated by the step seven. If the entire physical universe is Turing emulable, the UD will emulate it infinitely often, and the measure problem remains (a nice problem given that its current solution already explain many things, which are not explained, or are explained away, by physicalism).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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