From: Jason Resch 
Sent: Monday, February 14, 2011 1:13 AM
Subject: Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its 

On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker <> wrote:

  On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:

    On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meeker<>  wrote:


            What do you think the chances are that any random object in
            Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support 
intelligent life?
            1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?


    Does that allow us to argue:

    1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
    possibilities has measure
    2) Our universe exists so it has measure>0
    3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
    4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
    infinite possibilities (since all
    of maths includes the real line, etc)
    5) MUH is false.

  Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing machines 
are not the right kind of things to support life.

>I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand by 
>answering the following questions:

>Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing machine?
>How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven distinguish 
>it from a universe that does not?


    Don’t we need to be able to define exactly what Life is first, in order to 
know whether or not it is Turing Emulable? AFAIK there is no agreed upon 
definition of life and the folks that believe that Life is Turing emulable seem 
to do so as a act of faith, given that there is no evidence at all that such is 
possible or impossible. Additionally, the existence of the Platonic realm 
cannot be established by empirical means nor logical necessity even if some 
famous people wrote papers about it, its existence is mere conjecture. Thus it 
too is believed as an act of faith. There has not be a resolution to the debate 
between nominalism and universals that I know of, so the jury is still out on 
even the objective existence of numbers. 
    I grew up among people with faith like that, except they believed in a God 
that would condemn mankind to an existence in a lake of fire for not accepting 
blah blah ... until I realized that it was all a power game to control my mind. 
Thus am very leery of beliefs that cannot be justified by either empirical 
evidence or logical necessity or some combination of the two.
    One can tentatively accept the existence of some entity for the sake of an 
argument and see what the implications are, but to base one’s ontology on such 
without very careful deliberation is to engage in the same kind of 
irrationality that we disdain religions fanatics for. I have been holding back 
on expressing this thought here, but seriously, we need to step back and 
reconsider what we are taking for granted in our “reasonings”. 
    I must admit this because I have been advocating for a form of dualism that 
would claim that numbers and even information has an objective existence of 
sorts but this dualism is not so bold as the dualism that is inherent in the 
belief in Platonia. The Platonic realm is obviously not a physical place and 
thus has to be considered as separate from our world of experience. Roger 
Penrose seems to be the only person to be up front about this aspect of 
Platonism and he got his books panned for his honest attempt to defend his 



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